Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCV00079, Date: 2023-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV00079    Hearing Date: February 27, 2023    Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 2-27-23

Case #22CHCV00079

Trial Date: 5-15-23

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Erica Barba

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Neftali Martinez

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On February 1, 2022, plaintiff Neftali Martinez filed a complaint for quiet title, constructive trust, and resulting trust against defendant Erica Barba. Defendant answered and filed a cross-complaint for quiet title, and declaratory relief on March 25, 2022. The dispute involves title to 11208 Tamarack Ave., Pacoima.

RULING: Granted.

Evidentiary Objections: Sustained.

The declaration of Neftali Martinez indicates execution of the declaration outside the state of California, without reference to compliance with California law. The declaration is therefore in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5, and cannot be presented as evidence in support of the opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 618.) Affidavits and declarations submitted in connection with summary judgment motions must set forth admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) 

Given the lack of a valid declaration, the exhibits attached lack foundation, and are therefore not admissible as well. All objections are therefore sustained.

Defendant Erica Barba moves for summary judgment on the entire complaint on grounds that Plaintiff Neftali Martinez lacks any claim to title on the property and therefore cannot state any claim within the operative complaint. Plaintiff in opposition contends triable issues of material fact exist on the basis of a single declaration from Plaintiff denying ever authorizing Plaintiff’s wife, Maria Martinez, to transfer title to the property even though a power of attorney was admittedly executed. Defendant in reply contends the opposition relies on irrelevant arguments, and unsupported, inadmissible evidence. Defendant reiterates the transfer of the property. Defendant also raises new arguments regarding the parol evidence rule and statute of frauds.

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)”  (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD., v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) Plaintiff Neftali Martinez filed a complaint for quiet title, constructive trust, and resulting trust against defendant Erica Barba.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Ibid.) 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.”  (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).) 

The motion itself depends on both a 2014 deed conveying a 50% interest in the property by Maria Martinez, spouse of plaintiff Martinez, and a 2017 executed and recorded grant deed transferring full title executed by plaintiff Martinez.

It is undisputed that title to the property transferred to Neftali Martinez, a Married Man, as his sole and separate property, in 2005. [Declaration of William Carlsen, Compendium of Exhibits, Ex. 4.] On March 7, 2013, Plaintiff executed a power of attorney in favor or Maria Martinez, whereby Maria was authorized “to make any financial decision necessary to salvage our home. [Plaintiff] granted complete permission and consent to [Maria] to handle any financial affair in my absence until the completion of the pending refinancing loan.” [Id., Ex. 7.] Although the declaration of Martinez is inadmissible, the court notes that the power of attorney is undisputed by Plaintiff. [Declaration of Neftali Martinez, ¶ 3, Ex. 2.]

According to Barba, the Martinez home fell into default, which led to a short sale listing. The lender agreed to a loan workout and removal from the short sale listing, if Barba was added to the title. This lead to Maria transferring a 50% interest in the property to her daughter, Barba. [Declaration of Erica Barba, ¶¶ 12-13; Compendium of Exhibits, Ex. 8.] Plaintiff disputes the authority of Maria to transfer title, but presents no legally supported argument for the ability to retrospectively determine the propriety of the transfer at the time, given the undisputed power of attorney. [See Declaration of Neftali Martinez.] Again, the court in no way relies on the declaration of Martinez, and cites to it for purposes of addressing the legal merits of the argument even if Martinez submitted an admissible declaration. The court otherwise finds the unchallenged declaration of Barba establishes that the transfer was in fact completed for purposes of financial “salvage” of the home.

Regardless of the 50% transfer, Barba also presents evidence of a full grant deed of the property executed by Plaintiff with a notarized seal in El Salvador from the Vice Counsel of the United States. [Declaration of Erica Barba, ¶ 15; Compendium of Exhibits, Ex. 1.] The grant deed is dated October 31, 2017. Barba subsequently signed and recorded the grant deed on April 25, 2022. [Declaration of Erica Barba, ¶ 16; Compendium of Exhibits, Ex. 2.] Plaintiff maintains that the recording of the grant deed constituted an improper act in that Plaintiff previously revoked any and all authority of Barba to transfer title. [Martinez Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. 7.] Again, nothing in the declaration or opposition legally supports any argument as to how the alleged revocation of powers to manage a portion of the property supersedes an undisputed, and unchallenged executed and notarized grant deed. (Severn v. Ruhde (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 704, 708.) In other words, the transfer was an act beyond the power of attorney, in that Plaintiff directly executed the grant deed, and no power of attorney was required to sign and record the grant deed.

The court therefore considers the 2017 executed and 2022 recorded grant deed valid and enforceable. “A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property, unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended.” (Civ. Code, § 1105.) “Every grant of an estate in real property is conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or incumbrancer who in good faith and for a valuable consideration acquires a title or lien by an instrument that is first duly recorded.” (Civ. Code, § 1107.) “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” (Evid. Code, § 662.) “A seal is presumed to be genuine and its use authorized if it purports to be the seal of: (a) The United States or a department, agency, or public employee of the United States.

(b) A public entity in the United States or a department, agency, or public employee of such public entity. … (d) A public entity in a nation recognized by the executive power of the United States or a department, agency, or officer of such public entity. …” (Evid. Code, § 1452.) “A signature is presumed to be genuine and authorized if it purports to be the signature, affixed in his official capacity, of: (a) A public employee of the United States. (b) A public employee of any public entity in the United States. …” (Evid. Code, § 1453.) “(a) The record of an instrument or other document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property is prima facie evidence of the existence and content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed if: (1) The record is in fact a record of an office of a public entity; and (2) A statute authorized such a document to be recorded in that office. (b) The presumption established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.” (Evid. Code, § 1600.)

The court finds Plaintiff lacks a valid claim to title following the execution of the grant deed. Without a valid claim to title, all causes of action fail. (Code Civ. Proc., 872.210; Wagner v. Worrell (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 172, 180; Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980, 990; Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 834, 847.) The court finds no triable issues of material fact, and therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Barba on the complaint of Martinez.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Trial date currently remains set for May 15, 2023 as to the remaining cross-complaint.