Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCV00278, Date: 2022-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV00278    Hearing Date: August 10, 2022    Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 8-10-22

Case #22CHCV00278

Trial Date: Not Set

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Javier Rodriguez dba Grumpy’s Automotive

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Roy Halpern

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurrer to the Complaint

·         1^st Cause of Action: Breach of Written Contract

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Roy Halpern alleges Defendant Javier Rodriguez dba Grumpy’s Automotive failed to pay rent due on December 1, 2021, and refused to give up possession of the premises. The property is located at 9933 Glade Ave., Chatsworth.

On April 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Breach of Written Contract.

RULING

Demurrer: Overruled.

Defendant Andrew Alex brings a demurrer to the complaint for breach of contract on grounds that “Grumpy’s Automotive” is not a named party within the lease agreement, and the contract attached to the complaint is not signed. Defendant also contends the action belongs in limited jurisdiction court and/or the parties should go to mediation. Plaintiff in opposition contends the contract attached to the complaint is both initialed by Defendant Rodriguez, which constitutes a signature, and the complaint sufficiently articulates the terms of the agreement. The court electronic filing system shows no reply at the time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

“To state a cause of action for breach of contract, [a plaintiff] must plead the contract, his performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, [defendant’s] breach and the resulting damage. (Citation.) Further, the complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. (Citation.)” (Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458–59.) In examining a breach of contract claim, the court is required to examine the terms, or at least the legal effect of the contract. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318 [“we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context”]; Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 459 [“If the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference”]; Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198–199 [“In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language”].)

The complaint contains a copy of a written lease for residential property. The terms are fully articulated and the agreement is therefore properly presented. As for “Grumpy’s Automotive,” nothing in the demurrer establishes that Grumpy’s Automotive is an actual separate party to the contract. Thus, the court finds Javier Rodriguez is the proper party to the action regardless of the existence of any dba identification.

Rodriguez is the identified guarantor on the lease, and Plaintiff represents that the initials agreeing to the lease terms are from Rodriguez. “As in all cases where the intent is the test, there can be no hard and fast legal rule as to form. … Signature by initials has been held to be sufficient under the statute of frauds … An instrument is deemed signed although the signature is typed, lithographed, rubber-stamped or printed. The foregoing methods of signature have been sustained in many cases.” (Weiner v. Mullaney (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 620, 634.) The court finds the initials valid for purposes of ruling on the demurrer and otherwise decline to consider any extrinsic factual argument.

The property is located within the City of Los Angeles. Neither party addresses the moratorium on the collection of rent under Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.3.

During the Local Emergency Period and for three months thereafter, no Owner shall endeavor to evict or evict a tenant of Commercial Real Property for non-payment of rent during the Local Emergency Period if the tenant is unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic. These circumstances include loss of business income due to a COVID-19 related workplace closure, child care expenditures due to school closures, health care expenses related to being ill with COVID-19 or caring for a member of the tenant’s household or family who is ill with COVID-19, or reasonable expenditures that stem from government-ordered emergency measures. Tenants shall have up to three months following the expiration of the Local Emergency Period to repay any rent deferred during the Local Emergency Period. Nothing in this article eliminates any obligation to pay lawfully charged rent. No Owner shall charge interest or a late fee on rent not paid under the provisions of this article.

“Tenants may use the protections afforded in this article as an affirmative defense in an unlawful detainer action.” (Los Angeles Muni. Code, § 44.99.6.)

The demurrer is overruled. Defendant to answer within 10 days. Defendant may bring a separate motion for reclassification, and/or seek mediation. The court declines to consider any such requests in the instant motion.

Defendant to give notice.