Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCV00748, Date: 2023-03-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CHCV00748 Hearing Date: March 27, 2023 Dept: F49
Dept.
F-49
Date:
3-27-23
Case
#22CHCV00748
Trial Date: Not Set
DEMURRER
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Afshin Azizisefat, et
al.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Varuzh Azaryan
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Demurrer
to the Complaint
·
1st
Cause of Action: Fraud and Intentional Deceit
·
2nd
Cause of Action: Conspiracy to Defraud
·
3rd
Cause of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
·
4th
Cause of Action: Constructive Fraud
·
5th
Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
·
6th
Cause of Action: Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Motion
to Strike
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Varuzh Azaryan alleges the formation of an agreement with defendant Afshin
Azizisefat, whereby the parties would jointly acquire and remodel 12509 Pinney
St., Pacoima with all proceeds split equally. Plaintiff alleges Afshin agreed
to contribute a down payment and take title to the property, with Plaintiff
undertaking remodeling operations.
It’s
not clear whether the parties intended to resell or rent the premises.
Plaintiff alleges a written agreement “itemizing their partnership and
Plaintiff’s ownership interest” on May 7, 2022. On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff
alleges Afshin Azizisefat (Afshin) listed the premises for sale without the
agreement of Plaintiff, and denied the existence of any partnership agreement
or equity interest in the property. Afshin identified defendant Neda Azizisefat
(Neda) as the business partner and joint equity holder. Afshin also provided a “fraudulent
and backdated” promissory note dated March 2022 as evidence of Defendants’
ownership interest.
On
September 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Fraud and Intentional
Deceit, Conspiracy to Defraud, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Constructive Fraud,
Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Quiet
Title, and Conversion. Neda is only named in the conspiracy cause of action;
Afshin is named in all causes of action.
RULING
Demurrer: Overruled.
Defendants
Afshin Azizisefat and Neda Azizisefat submit a demurrer to the first through
sixth causes of action to the complaint on grounds of insufficient facts and
failure to state a claim. Plaintiff in opposition maintains all causes of
action are well pled. Defendants in reply reiterate the arguments in the
demurrer.
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for
which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which
the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see
also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a
pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v.
Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the
court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action
has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
726, 733.)
“A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules,
where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently
apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for
uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
1st
Cause of Action: Fraud and Intentional Deceit
Afshin
challenges the subject cause of action on grounds that the complaint lacks an
alleged knowing false statement and basis of reasonable reliance. Plaintiff in
opposition maintains the cause of action is properly pled.
“‘The elements of fraud, which
give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or
“scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable
reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” (Lazar
v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) “‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something
necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made
without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may
be actionable fraud.” (Ibid.) “‘Active concealment or suppression of facts by a nonfiduciary
“is the equivalent of a false representation, i.e., actual fraud.” [Citation.] (Citation).)’ A fraud claim based upon the suppression or concealment
of a material fact must involve a defendant who had a legal duty to disclose
the fact. (Civ.Code, § 1710, subd. (3) [a deceit includes “[t]he suppression of
a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other
facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact”];
Citation.)” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1186.)
Plaintiff
apparently seeks to allege fraud based on Afshin falsely presenting an interest
and intent to form a real estate investment partnership, when in fact Afshin
intended to “steal the proceeds” of Plaintiff’s acumen and work on the project.
[Comp., ¶¶ 12-14, 22, 26-27.] The court finds the allegations sufficient for
purposes of withstanding the demurrer. The intent comes across in the context
of the transaction, and the reliance is demonstrated in the conduct of
Plaintiff acting upon the belief and assumption regarding the furtherance of
the purported partnership agreement.
2nd
Cause of Action: Conspiracy to Defraud
Defendants
rely on the argued deficiencies in the first cause of action as a lack of
foundation for the conspiracy claim. Plaintiff counters that the complaint both
alleges fraud and conspiracy.
“Conspiracy is not a cause
of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although
not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors
a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510–511.) The conspiracy “must be activated by the commission of an
actual tort.” (Id. at 511.)
“A party seeking to establish a civil conspiracy ‘must show that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual
understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that one or more of
them committed an overt act to further it. [Citation.] It is not enough that
the [conspirators] knew of an intended wrongful act, they must agree—expressly
or tacitly—to achieve it.’ (Citation omitted.) It must be recognized,
however, that because of the very nature of a conspiracy,
‘its existence must often be inferentially and circumstantially derived from
the character of the acts done, the relations of the parties and other facts
and circumstances suggestive of concerted action.’ (Citation omitted.) While a complaint must contain more than a bare
allegation the defendants conspired, a complaint is sufficient if it apprises
the defendant of the ‘character and type of facts and circumstances upon which
she was relying to establish the conspiracy.’ (Citations omitted.)” (Arei II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
1004, 1022.)
A conspiracy claim requires
three elements: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of
the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from
the wrongful conduct.” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581.) The operative complaint provides reference to the
elements of a conspiracy. [Comp., ¶¶ 33-38.]
While the action
of Neda lacks specifics, the previously found sufficient fraud claim combined
with the conspiracy allegations renders the cause of action satisfactory for
purposes of the demurrer.
3rd
Cause of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Afshin
challenges the subject cause of action on grounds of the lack of a validly pled
fiduciary duty, due to an insufficiently pled partnership agreement foundation.
Plaintiff cites to the complaint in support of the existence of the partnership
agreement and therefore a fiduciary duty.
A fiduciary duty is founded upon a special relationship
imposed by law or under circumstances in which “confidence is reposed by
persons in the integrity of others” who voluntarily accept the confidence. (Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf,
Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1139, 1150.) “A
fiduciary or confidential relationship can arise when confidence is reposed by
persons in the integrity of others, and if the latter voluntarily accepts or
assumes to accept the confidence, he or she may not act so as to take advantage
of the other's interest without that person's knowledge or consent.” (Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th
1093, 1101–02.) “The elements of a
cause of action for breach of a duty of loyalty, by analogy to a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, are as follows: (1) the existence of a relationship giving rise to
a duty of loyalty; (2) one or more
breaches of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by that breach. (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 400, 410.)
The operative complaint alleges the existence of the
parties’ partnership agreement. [Comp., ¶¶ 19-20, 41.] The court finds no dispute over the imposition of a
fiduciary duty between partners, and therefore finds the allegations otherwise adequate.
4th
Cause of Action: Constructive Fraud
Afshin
refers back to the first and third causes of action in support of the lack of a
constructive fraud cause of action. Plaintiff maintains constructive fraud is
properly pled.
The elements of constructive fraud are: “(1) a fiduciary
relationship; (2) nondisclosure (breach of fiduciary duty); (3) intent to
deceive; and (4) reliance and resulting injury (causation).” (Stokes v. Henson (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d
187, 197.) The complaint alleges a fiduciary relationship and fraud. [Comp., ¶¶ 47-49.]
5th
Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
Defendant
contends the complaint lacks support for the formation of a contract and
consideration. Defendant also challenges the lack of terms. Plaintiff maintains
the contract is properly pled as stated in the purported written partnership
agreement.
“To state a cause of action for breach of contract, [a plaintiff] must plead the
contract, his performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance,
[defendant’s] breach and the resulting damage. (Citation.) Further, the complaint
must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or
implied by conduct. (Citation.)” (Otworth
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458–59;
Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388.) In examining a
breach of contract claim, the court is required to examine the terms, or at
least the legal effect of the contract. (Blank
v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p.
318 [“we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole
and its parts in their context”]; Otworth
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra,
166 Cal.App.3d at p. 459 [“If the action is based on an alleged breach of a
written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the
complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated
by reference”]; Construction Protective
Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189,
198–199 [“In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead
the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language”].) Formation of a
contract requires four elements: The parties
capable of contracting, the parties consent, the contract is for a lawful
object, and sufficient consideration is given. (Civ. Code, § 1550.) Consent of
the parties must be free, mutual and communicated by each to the other. (Civ.
Code, § 1565.)
The
agreement is summarized as an itemized statement of partnership ownership
interests. [Comp., ¶ 20.] The
terms are sufficient. The court finds no legal or factual support for the
arguments regarding lack of assent and consideration. The court declines to
state the arguments for Defendant.
6th
Cause of Action: Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Afshin
relies on the lack of a contract as the only basis for the demurrer to the
instant cause of action. Plaintiff maintains a valid contract is stated. Given
the valid contract, the court declines to find an invalid cause of action on
this basis. (See Careau
& Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395.)
The
demurrer is overruled.
Motion to Strike: Denied.
Defendants
move to strike all punitive damages claims. Plaintiff counters that the fraud
claims support the punitive damages claims.
Plaintiff
seeks punitive damages in the fraud and breach of fiduciary causes of action.
Defendants lack any specific challenge beyond reliance on the fraud
allegations. Civil Code Section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive
damages upon a showing of malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined as follows:
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended
by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which
is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.
(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct
that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of
that person’s rights.
(3) “Fraud” means an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
The
fraud causes of action support punitive damages. The court finds the
incorporated fraud claims in the breach of fiduciary duty claims also support
punitive damages. The motion to strike is denied.
In
summary, the demurrer is overruled, and the motion to
strike is denied. Defendants are ordered to answer within 10 days of this
order.
Defendants to give notice.