Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCV00941, Date: 2023-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CHCV00941 Hearing Date: April 3, 2023 Dept: F49
Dept.
F-49
Date:
4-3-23
Case
# 22CHCV00941
Trial
Date: Not Set
ARBITRATION
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants, Valencia H. Imports, Inc. dba Autonation Honda Valencia
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Tarek Sbitani
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Motion
to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Tarek Sbitani alleges employment with defendant Valencia H. Imports, Inc. dba
Autonation Honda Valencia from May 19, 2019 to February 21, 2020. On October 20,
2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for wage and hour violations, including
failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, failure to pay commissions, meal and
rest period liability, failure to provide accurate wage statements, inspection
of personnel records, and lack of timely payment of final wages.
RULING: Granted.
Defendant Valencia H. Imports, Inc. dba Autonation Honda
Valencia moves to compel arbitration and stay the action. Plaintiff in
opposition contends the prior rejection of Plaintiff’s demand for arbitration
now constitutes a repudiation and waiver, plaintiff requests attorney fees and
costs, and alternatively requests the appointment of an arbitrator in
compliance within American Aribtration Association rules. Defendants in an
extensive reply reiterates the enforceability of the arbitration agreement,
cites to the language regarding the mutual agreement upon an arbitrator, denies
the selection of an arbitrator language in any way prevents reinforcement, and
denies any claimed defense preventing enforcement of the agreement,
specifically repudiation and waiver.
In a motion to
compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence
the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by
the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a
preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability,
etc.). (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin'l Securities Corp. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 394, 413-414; Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Ctr., Inc. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 754, 758.) Any challenges to the formation of the arbitration agreement
should be considered before any order sending the parties to arbitration. The trier of fact weighs all evidence, including
affidavits, declarations, documents, and, if applicable, oral testimony to
determine whether the action goes to arbitration. (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Ctr.,
Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 758.)
Defendant cites to the May 13, 2019 executed Arbitration
Agreement. [Declaration of Cynthia Diaz, Ex. 1.] The agreement identifies
claims for “employment by, termination of employment from, or other association
with the Company, shall be resolved through mandatory, neutral, binding
arbitration on an individual basis only. For purposes of this Arbitration
Agreement (“Agreement"), the ‘Company’ is defined as the entity Employee
is employed by, together with its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates,
predecessors, successors and assigns, and each of their respective owners,
directors, officers, managers, employees, vendors, and agents. This Agreement
covers all theories and disputes, whether styled as an individual claim, class
action claim, private attorney general claim or otherwise, and includes, but is
not limited to, any claims of discrimination, harassment, breach of contract,
tort, or alleged violations of statute, regulation, or ordinance, or any claims
in equity. …” [Id.] Defendant contends the subject complaint arises from the
terms of the agreement. The existence of and entry into the agreement remains
undisputed by Plaintiff. [Declaration
of Alexander Perry, ¶ 5, Ex. A.]
Plaintiff relies on an argument of
repudiation and waiver, due to prior rejections of the demand to arbitration by
Plaintiff before the filing of the instant complaint. [Perry Dec., ¶¶ 7-9.] Waiver generally occurs upon a
finding of prejudice against the challenging party. Examples include the
propounding discovery or service of an answer, where such action reveals the
strategies or theories that would not otherwise be available to the party in
arbitration. (Berman v. Health Net (2000)
80 Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1367; Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (1997)
59 Cal. App. 4th 205, 212.) Where an agreement lacks a specific time
frame, an excessive and unreasonable delay in a demand for arbitration can support
a finding of a waiver. (Spear v. California State Auto. Assn. (1992) 2
Cal.4th 1035, 1043; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th
783, 790.) “‘[W]hat constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact,
depending on the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and
the facts of the particular case.’ Among the facts a court may consider is any
prejudice the opposing party suffered because of the delay. [Citation.]” (Spear v. California State Auto. Assn. supra, 2 Cal.4th
at 1043.) The determination of diligence applicable to an arbitration motion
commences upon the filing of the action. (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at 790; Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d
598, 603.)
The subject complaint was filed on October 20, 2022, and
the motion to compel arbitration was December 6, 2022. The court finds no
improper conduct supporting an argument for waiver upon the following of the
complaint. The court also finds no basis of waiver under the pre-complaint
filing conduct of Defendant. Plaintiff
characterizes the pre-filing response of Defendant as a rejection of the
demand, and therefore the basis of waiver. The dispute in fact appears to be
over the lack of specifically articulated criteria for selection of an
arbitrator other than the imposition of FAA rules, which Defendant represents
in reply encompasses arbitrator selection guidelines in case of a dispute.
Defendant apparently rejected the demand by Plaintiff for arbitration on
condition of the use of American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules and
guidelines. [Perry Decl., ¶¶ 8, 10-20, Ex. B-C.] The correspondence from moving
counsel distinctly denies any claims of waiver raised prior to the filing of
the complaint and instant motion.
“Private
arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties and is governed by
contract law. (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th
307, 313; Jones v. Jacobson (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1, 17.) Contracts are interpreted under certain rules.
“‘A contract must be
so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it
existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable
and lawful.’ (Civ. Code, § 1636.) ‘The language of a contract is to govern its
interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an
absurdity.’ (Civ. Code, § 1638.) ‘When a contract is reduced to writing, the
intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if
possible; subject, however, to the other provisions of this Title.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1639.) “The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect
to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the
other.’ (Civ. Code, § 1641.) ‘A contract must receive such an interpretation as
will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being
carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the
parties.’ (Civ. Code, § 1643.) ‘The words of a contract are to be understood in
their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal
meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special
meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.’
(Civ. Code, § 1644.) ‘However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends
only to those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to
contract.’ (Civ. Code, § 1648.) ‘Repugnancy in a contract must be reconciled,
if possible, by such an interpretation as will give some effect to the
repugnant clauses, subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the whole
contract.’ (Civ. Code, § 1652.) ‘Stipulations which are necessary to make a
contract reasonable, or conformable to usage, are implied, in respect to
matters concerning which the contract manifests no contrary intention.’ (Civ.
Code, § 1655.)”
(Siligo v.
Castellucci (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 873, 880–881.)
“A contract term should not be construed to render some of
its provisions meaningless or irrelevant.” (Estate
of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1754 (footnote 4).) “A
well-settled maxim states the general rule that ambiguities in a form contract
are resolved against the drafter. (Citations.) But that is a general rule; it
does not operate to the exclusion of all other rules of contract
interpretation. It is used when none of the canons of construction succeed in
dispelling the uncertainty.” (Oceanside
84, Ltd. v. Fidelity Federal Bank (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448.)
Accepting
the implied reference/requirement for reference to Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
rules regarding arbitrator selection, and given California law on such
situations, infra, the court finds no
basis of support for the argument of lack of performance by Defendant or repudiation
of the arbitration clause. “An express repudiation is a clear, positive,
unequivocal refusal to perform (Citations); an implied repudiation results from
conduct where the promisor puts it out of his power to perform so as to make
substantial performance of his promise impossible.” (Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130, 137.) Nothing prevents
performance of the ultimate agreement—submission of the claim to the
arbitrator. Again, Defendant the pre-litigation correspondence demonstrates an
explicit rejection of any claim of repudiation. California law allows for the
selection of an arbitrator where the terms remain silent or insufficient. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1281.6.) The court therefore finds the agreement enforceable pending
selection of an arbitrator based on the parties impasse over the selected
arbitrator.
Although Plaintiff only challenges
the agreement on grounds of enforcement, the court acknowledges the statutory
provisions for wage and hour claims. Labor Code section 229 prohibits
arbitration for wage and hour claims. “Actions to enforce the provisions of
this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an
individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private
agreement to arbitrate.” (Lab. Code, § 229; Ware
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 35,
45.) State law exclusions are preempted where Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
preemption occurs. (Carbajal v. CWPSC,
Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238; Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
676, 688.)
Moving Defendants hold “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other
evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life
Ins. Co., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207.) The agreement contains a
clause providing for the exclusive reliance on FAA regulations. [Arbitration
Agreement.] Plaintiff submits no opposition to this. The subject agreement is
enforceable pursuant to the FAA. (Aviation Data, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Services
Co., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
1522, 1535.) The court finds no basis of preemption under California
law.
Plaintiff also raises no objection on grounds of
unconscionability. The court therefore finds the agreement compliance with the
employment arbitration requirements. (Stirlen
v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1531-1532; Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29
Cal.4th 1064, 1071-1072; Armendariz v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102,
117-118.)
The court therefore finds the agreement valid and
enforceable. The only disputed issue remains arbitrator selection.
The law consistently upholds the rights of parties to agree in
contract regarding the determination of the arbitrability of a controversy,
which may also include selection of an arbitrator. (Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288; see Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (2019)
139 S.Ct. 524, 527–528.)
The agreement itself only requires the appointment of a
qualified arbitrator with no other specific criteria other than adherence to
FAA rules and a right to disqualification. Given the absence of selection
criteria, the court cites to the applicable code section:
If
the arbitration agreement does not provide a method for appointing an
arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom
arbitration is sought may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator and
that method shall be followed. In the absence of an agreed method, or if the
agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator
appointed fails to act and his or her successor has not been appointed, the
court, on petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the
arbitrator.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.6.)
The motion to compel is brought under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1281, et seq. The court therefore finds the language of
section 1281.6 applicable, but also consistent with the cited FAA provisions in
the reply.
The participating parties are therefore ordered to select an
arbitration organization and individual arbitrator within the organization, or
an individual arbitrator with no affiliation. If the parties cannot agree on an
organization, and/or arbitrator, the court orders the parties to submit a list
of one to two organizations and/or arbitrators from each party, where the court
will select the organization or individual. In other words, the parties may
submit up to a total of two nominations per side. If the parties select an
organization, which still further requires selection of an individual within
the organization, the court will reject this proposal, and the parties will
still maintain their right to disqualify any remaining submissions, if
applicable.
The parties have 30 days from the date of this order to
begin the selection process, with any proposed list due the day after the lapse
of the 30-day period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.6.) Nothing in this requirement
in any way bars the nomination of an AAA based arbitrator, but, gain, the plain
language of the agreement allows for a party to disqualify said organization/individual.
Thus, if Plaintiff continues to elect the nomination of an AAA based
arbitrator, the court can accept any disqualification.
“If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State
or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in
an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in
which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to
such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration
is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as
the court specifies.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)
The motion to compel arbitration is therefore granted and
the entire action stayed.
Moving parties to give notice.