Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCV01151, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22CHCV01151    Hearing Date: April 6, 2023    Dept: F49

DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, TBB Valley Investments, LLC, et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Plaintiffs, Akeen Bernard, et al.

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Demurrer to the Complaint for Quiet Title and Constructive Trust

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On December 19, 2022, Akeem Bernard and Tasleema, in pro per, filed a complaint for quiet title and constructive trust against defendants TBB Valley Investments, LLC, Great Western Capital, LLC and Jeff Brandolino. Plaintiffs maintain an ownership interest in 13631 Eldridge Ave., Sylmar.

RULING: Sustained with Leave to Amend in Part.

Request for Judicial Notice: Granted.

The court takes judicial notice of the trustee’s deed upon sale; the statement of decision in the unlawful detainer action, Cajina v. Bernard (1CHUD00831); the existence of the filed complaint for unlawful detainer, TBB Valley Investments, LLC v. Bernard (22CHUD00953), but not the content of the pleading for the truth of the matter asserted; and, the court issued writ of possession on the TBB Valley Investments, LLC filed unlawful detainer action.

The request for judicial notice establishes a trustee’s deed upon sale was recorded on July 15, 2021, showing the sale of the property on May 12, 2021, for $586,400 Great Western Capital, LLC, Recon Investment Fund B, LLC and Amber Investment Group, Inc. [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. 1.] Prior to the sale, on September 10, 2019, the unlawful detainer court found in favor of Bernard and Yasin in an unlawful detainer action brought by third party Cajina. [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. 2.] The court found in favor of Bernard and Yasin on grounds of a violation the City of Los Angeles Rent Stablization Ordinance (LARSO) service requirements. On August 26, 2022, TBB Valley Investments, LLC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, and obtained a writ of execution for possession of the premises. [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. 3-4.]

Defendants TBB Valley Investments, LLC (TBB), Great Western Capital, LLC, (Great Western), and Jeff Brandolino, bring a demurrer to the complaint for quiet title and constructive trust on grounds of failure to state valid claims. The court electronic filing system shows the demurrer is unopposed at the time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff. The system also shows no reply prior to the cutoff. Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]

Indispensable Parties/Misjoinder

Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to name all purchasers and therefore current title holders to the property, specifically Great Western Capital, LLC, Recon Investment Fund B, LLC and Amber Investment Group, Inc. [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. 1.]

Code of Civil Procedure section 389 provides in part:

“(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).)

"Whether a party qualifies as indispensable is ordinarily treated as a matter where the trial court has a large measure of discretion in weighing factors of practical realities and other considerations." (Kaczorowski v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 564, 568.) “[J]oinder is required only when the absentee's nonjoinder precludes the court from rendering complete justice among those already joined…” (Countrywide Home Loans v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 785, 794.)

As addressed in the request for judicial notice, the three title holders to the property are not named in the complaint, yet a claim of quiet title is pled against them. While the court appreciates that TBB is the party responsible for the unlawful detainer action, nothing in the operative pleading or judicially noticed documents establishes any other record title holder to the property. The court therefore finds the parties indispensable. (TG Oceanside, L.P. v. City of Oceanside (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1365-66; Countrywide Home Loans v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 785, 794.)

Defendants also present the demurrer on grounds that Jeff Brandolino is not a proper party to the action given the lack of identification of the trustee’s deed of sale. For purposes of the demurrer, the court finds the complaint insufficiently identifies any interest of Brandolino, but otherwise declines to make any factual findings beyond the scope of the complaint and request for judicial notice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d).)

The demurrer to all causes of action is therefore sustained on this basis.

Quiet Title

Defendants next challenge the complaint on failure to state a claim for quiet title. Defendants rely on the statement of decision in the underlying unlawful detainer action, whereby Plaintiffs were only identified as renters of the property, and therefore lack a claim to ownership of the property. Defendants also challenge the claim of adverse possession.

On a threshold note, the court notes the complaint is not verified, and therefore the quiet title cause of action is invalid. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

As for the lack of any pled ownership interest, the court takes judicial notice of the content of the statement of decision for purposes of establishing Plaintiffs were renters for purposes of opposing the unlawful detainer action, and LARSO compliance requirements, but nothing in the demurrer suggests that the decision in any way addressed an actual claimed ownership interest in the property.

“‘To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must establish five elements in connection with his occupancy of the property. [Citations.] (1) Possession must be by actual occupation under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. [Citations.] (2) Possession must be hostile to the owner's title. [Citations.] (3) The holder must claim the property as his own, either under color of title, or claim of right. [Citation.] (4) Possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for five years. [Citations.] (5) The possessor must pay all of the taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period. [Citation.] Unless each one of these elements is established by the evidence, the plaintiff has not acquired title by adverse possession.’ (Citation.)” (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 325; Buic v. Buic (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1600, 1604.)

“A possessor holds under ‘color of title’ when her possession is ‘“founded on a written instrument, judgment, or decree, purporting to convey the land, but for some reason defective. ... Color of title is received in evidence for the purpose of showing that the title is adverse and it therefore dispenses with other proof of hostile or adverse claim.” [Citation.]’ (Citation, italics in original.) The critical element of adverse possession based upon color of title is the good faith belief of the possessor that she had legal title to the property. (Citation.)”

[¶]

“The element of ‘hostility’ ‘means, not that the parties must have a dispute as to the title during the period of possession, but that the claimant's possession must be adverse to the record owner, ”unaccompanied by any recognition, express or inferable from the circumstances, of the right in the latter.’” [Citation.]’ (Citation.)”

(Buic v. Buic (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1600, 1604–1605.)

Defendants rely on the findings of the existence of the renter relationship as a basis for an inability to meet the adverse possession requirements. While the court declines to make inferences beyond the scope of the operative pleading and judicially noticeable items, the court finds the complaint insufficiently articulates a basis of any property interest.

The demurrer is therefore sustained on this basis as well.

Claim Preclusion

Defendants contend the complaint is barred under the doctrine of res judicata based on the issued writ of possession in the second unlawful detainer action.

“Claim preclusion applies when ‘(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.’” (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.) The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.  It seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.  Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit. All claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897.) “Res Judicata is not a bar to claims arising after the filing of the initial complaint.” A party may assert new claims in an amended pleading, “but if no such pleading is filed, a plaintiff is not foreclosed. [Citation.] The general rule that a judgment is conclusive as to matters that could have been litigated ‘does not apply to new rights acquired pending the action which might have been, but which were not, required to be litigated [Citation]’.” (Allied Fire Protection v. Diede Const., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 150, 155; Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at 227.)

“In general, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues litigated and decided in a prior proceeding.  (Citations.) ‘Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. (Citation.)’”

(Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 848–849.)

As addressed above, the court cannot determine whether any property interest claims were raised in either underlying unlawful detainer action, and declines to make a finding of claim preclusion. (See Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255-256.)

To the extent Plaintiffs fail to allege any basis of a property claim, the court also finds the constructive trust claim lacks support. (Campbell v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 904, 920.)

The demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs may not add any new or different causes of action, and may only add facts within the scope of the existing claims. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) Any new causes of action added without leave from court are subject to a motion to strike. If Plaintiff declines to file an amended pleading, Defendants may seek a dismissal.

Case Management Conference set for July 5, 2023.

Defendants to give notice.