Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22CHCV01350, Date: 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22CHCV01350 Hearing Date: March 10, 2023 Dept: F49
Dept. F-49
Date: 3-10-23
Case # 22CHCV01350
Trial Date: Not Set
MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Magic Mountain,
LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Jimmy Chavez
RELIEF REQUESTED
Motion to Strike Complaint
·
Prayer
for punitive damages and corresponding allegations in the first, second, third,
fourth, and sixth causes of action
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Jimmy Chavez was employed by Magic Mountain from January 2019 to October 25,
2021, in roller coaster maintenance. Plaintiff characterizes a back
injury(ies), as a disability for which Defendant refused accommodation wrongful
termination, and instead terminated Plaintiff.
On
December 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Disability Discrimination,
Disability Retaliation, Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process, Failure
to Accommodate, Violation of the California Family Rights Act, Wrongful
Termination, Failure to Provide Personnel Files, and Failure to Provide Wage
and Hour Statements.
RULING: Granted
Defendant
Magic Mountain LLC moves to strike the punitive damages allegations from the first,
second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth, causes of action for Disability
Discrimination, Disability Retaliation, Failure to Engage in the Interactive
Process, Failure to Accommodate, Violation of the California Family Rights Act,
Wrongful Termination. Defendant contends the complaint both fails to allege
facts supporting the punitive damages allegations in general, as well as the
specificity required against the corporate employer. Plaintiff counters in
opposition that the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for punitive damages
based on the conduct articulated in the complaint. Plaintiff specifically
emphasizes paragraph 21(a) regarding the false and unjust accusation of
Plaintiff being a “no call, no show” to work, while he was in fact out on
medical leave, thereby leading to termination. Defendant in reply reiterates
the basis of the motion, especially the lack of corporate direction.
Civil Code Section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive
damages upon a showing of malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined as follows:
(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause
injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.
(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the
part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights
or otherwise causing injury.
As to a corporate employer, Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) states:
An employer shall not be
liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee
of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of
the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which
the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and
conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud,
or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation.
Whether a supervisor
is a “managing agent” turns on whether “they exercise substantial discretionary
authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563,
576–577; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
160, 168.)
Punitive damages require more than the mere commission of a
tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pled in support of
punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins
Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient
to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be
circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.
[Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. Omitted [emphasis added].)
Any negligence based causes of action in and
of themselves will not support the claim for punitive damages. Plain
unintentional carelessness, characterized as negligence or recklessness, is not
sufficient to support punitive damages. (Nolin
v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 285-286 [“Conduct
classified only as unintentional carelessness, while it may constitute
negligence or even gross negligence, will not support an award of punitive
damages”]; G. D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 32 (“When nondeliberate injury is
charged, allegations that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, willful,
wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice”]; Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111
Cal.App.3d 82, 87 [“Inasmuch as Civil Code section 3294 requires
as a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages that the defendant “has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,” the cases have uniformly
recognized that proof of negligence, even gross negligence, or recklessness is
insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages’]; Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 891; McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 CA2d 296, 300 [Awareness
of a potential condition under a negligence not sufficient to support a claim
for punitive damages].)
To the extent Plaintiff relies on an intentional standard of
conduct, the court finds the challenged causes of action constitute a series of
conclusions. As addressed above, reliance on the circumstances that because the
termination allegedly occurred during medical leave, all said actions were done
with malice or oppressive motive, insufficiently meets the required standard
for corporate employer punitive damages. Nothing in the alleged situation expresses
actual corporate policy directing termination of employees seeking medical
leave or accommodation, thereby supporting a claim for punitive damages. [Comp.,
¶¶ 21-22, 28, 34-35, 37, 45, 56-57, 65-67, 73, 84-85, 90-91, 97, 110-111,
115-116, 132, 137.]
The motion to strike is granted without prejudice. Plaintiff
is granted 30 days leave to amend. Plaintiff may not add any new causes of
action, and only add facts supporting the punitive damages claims. If Plaintiff
elects to forego filing an amended complaint, Defendant is ordered to answer
the operative pleading within 10 days of the lapse of the amendment deadline.
Case Management Conference set for July 26, 2023.
Defendant to give notice.