Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22STCV09680, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09680    Hearing Date: March 5, 2025    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Calendar #2

Date: 3-5-25

Case: 22STCV09680

Trial Date: 10-13-25

PROTECTIVE ORDER

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, April Pisano

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants, California Institute of Technology, et al.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Protective Order

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On September 26, 2006, Plaintiff April Pisano (“Plaintiff”) was hired by California Institute of Technology (CalTech) as the International Offices Coordinator. Plaintiff was subsequently promoted to International Scholar Advisor in 2008 and Associate Director of International Scholar Services in 2016.

From November 2019 through the present, Plaintiff began having health problems due to stress and was recommended to take leave from work. During this time, Ilana Smith (Smith), Director of International Offices at CalTech and JPL began accusing Plaintiff of mishandling cases. On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff was terminated and told it was due to a lack of confidence in her ability to continue to do her job duties.

On May 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC) against Defendants California Institute of Technology (CalTech), Ilana Smith (Smith), and DOES 1 through 50. The FAC asserts causes of action for Violations of Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Family Rights Act (CFRA), Labor Code, and Business and Professions Code.

On June 7, 2023, Defendants answered the FAC.

RULING:  Granted in part and Denied in part

Here, Plaintiff April Pisano and third-party witnesses Linda Williams and Phillip Williams (collectively, “The Williamses”) move for a protective order prohibiting Defendants California Institute of Technology (“CalTech”), Ilana Smith (“Smith”), and their counsel from questioning the Williamses at deposition regarding (1) events from plaintiff’s childhood; (2) any allegations of child abuse concerning plaintiff; and (3) their health and medical conditions.

Plaintiff April Pisano’s Motion for Protective Order is Granted in part as to questions concerning the Williamses’ health and medical conditions and Denied in part as to questions concerning Plaintiff’s childhood and any related abuse allegations by the Williamses.

In so ruling, the Court notes that Defendants objected to portions of Brandon P. Ortiz, Esq.’s declaration in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order. The court rules on the objections as follows:

Overruled: 3 (not relevant to ruling)

Sustained: 1, 2

The subject motion is made on the grounds that the line of questions are invasive of the Williamses’ right to privacy, intrusive, and will unnecessarily annoy, embarrass, or harass the Williamses and plaintiff.

Defendants in opposition argue that the information sought after is relevant to determine alternative causes for Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress damages claimed in this case. Specifically, Defendants contends the Williamses have factual knowledge regarding a request Plaintiff made for time off work approximately three months before the separation of her employment and the physical and mental abuse they caused Plaintiff in her youth, which led to her being clinically diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Defendants also contend that Plaintiff sought treatment for her PTSD as recently as August 2024, which is more than two and half years after the separation of her employment.

A Court may make any order that justice requires to protect a party from “unwanted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (b), 2031.060, subd. (b), 2033.080, subd. (b).) The burden of proof is on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” for the order he or she seeks. (Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4^th 245, 255.)  A motion for a protective order “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090.) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) The parties met and conferred on August 29, 2024, and did not resolve the issues now presented in the moving papers. (Ortiz Decl., ¶¶5-6.)

“But ‘[f]or discovery purposes, information is relevant if it “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement….” [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases. [Citation.]’ (Citations.)” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653–654 (Cruz).) The court adheres to the liberal standard as a matter of court policy. The questions regarding events from Plaintiff’s childhood and any allegations of child abuse concerning Plaintiff are tangentially relevant to prove an alternate cause to Plaintiff’s claimed emotional distress damages. However, Defendants failed to show how information concerning the Williamses’ health and medical conditions are relevant to prove any aspect of the case.

On a burdensome objection, objecting parties must file evidence detailing the amount of work involved, in order to support objections based upon burden and oppression. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 (West Pico Furniture Co.).) “[S]ome burden is inherent in all demands for discovery. The objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (Id. at p. 418.) Although Plaintiff raises undue burden and expense as an objection in the notice of motion, Plaintiff raises no legal arguments in the memorandum of points and authorities addressing this objection. Thus, the objection lacks support.

“Privacy interests generally fall into one of two categories: (1) an interest in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (‘autonomy privacy’); and (2) an interest in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’).” (Ortiz v. Los Angeles Police Relief Assn. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1301 (Ortiz).) A party “alleging an invasion of privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish each of the following: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by [a party] constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39–40 (Hill).) The objecting party has the burden to file evidence of the preliminary facts establishing a privilege exists. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557; HLC Properties, Limited v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 59 (Williams).) The Williamses and Plaintiff hold their own interest in their autonomy or informational privacy as a general matter.

However, the court finds that the Williamses do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in questions pertaining to Plaintiff’s childhood upbringing that relate to allegations of abuse from the Williamses. Although parental autonomy is a constitutionally protected privacy interest, it is not absolute. (In re Phillip B. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 796, 801 (In re Phillip B.).) Where  a child’s emotional well-being, health, and educational development is at risk, the state may interfere to safeguard the child. (Id.) Similarly, Plaintiff’s mental and emotional condition is directly relevant to her claim for emotional distress damages against Defendants, thus questions concerning her childhood upbringing including the abuse allegations are essential to a fair resolution of the case, i.e., for Defendants to properly investigate whether an alternate source of stress exists as they claim. (See Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 (Vinson).) Also, these questions would not constitute a serious invasion of privacy as Plaintiff has already disclosed this information during her independent medical examination and did not object to the subpoena of her therapist records where she discussed these issues extensively. Additionally, this instant case is distinguishable from Vinson where the court found that the plaintiff’s sexual history was not directly relevant to her claim because she had not alleged the acts affected her present sexuality. In this instant matter, Plaintiff concedes that her childhood mental and physical abuse still affects her present mental and emotional state. (Mot. at 10:28-11:1; Reply at 2:22-23.)

The motion for protective order is granted as to questions concerning the Williamses’ health and medical conditions. The motion is denied as to questions concerning Plaintiff’s childhood and any related abuse allegations by the Williamses.

Plaintiff to give notice.