Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22STCV12566, Date: 2024-04-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV12566 Hearing Date: April 4, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept.
68
Date:
4-4-24
Case
#22STCV12566
VACATE DEFAULT
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant, Kap Moon
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Young Lim, pro per
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Motion
to Vacate Default
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Young Lim alleges defendant Kap Moon entered into an investment agreement
whereby Moon agreed to invest $100,000 Leading Town SDUS Inc. dba Music Café
Chorus. Plaintiff alleges the agreement was in fact with third party Kyonga
Nam, though the agreement attached to the complaint lists the name Jongju Na.
Notwithstanding,
Lim alleges the rights to enforcement of the agreement were assigned, and Lim
obtained a $27,000 judgment in a prior action. Lim alleges two other “related
cases” 19STCV14007[1]
and 19STCV08038.[2] Lim
appears to now seek execution on the judgment, and maintains Moon fraudulently
continues to evade collection.
On
April 14, 2022, Lim filed the instant action for Fraud, Fraudulent Interference
with Economic Advantage, Fraudulent Concealment, Fraudulent Abuse of Process,
and Fraudulent Malicious Prosecution. On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a
first amended complaint.
On
April 20, 2023, the clerk entered a default against Moon. On August 25, 2023,
the court granted the motion to vacate the default on grounds of improper
service. On December 27, 2023, a second default was entered by the clerk
against Moon.
RULING: Denied.
Request
for Judicial Notice: Granted.
·
The
court takes judicial notice of the filed first amended complaint, but not the
content of the pleading for the truth of the matter asserted.
·
The
court takes judicial notice of the entry of the default by the clerk on
December 27, 2023.
·
The
court takes judicial notice of the December 27, 2023, filed proof of service,
and considers the document for purposes of the motion.
Specially Appearing Defendant Kap Moon moves to vacate the December
27, 2023, entered default on grounds of improper service. Moon in conjunction
or alternatively moves to quash service as well. Lim in opposition contends the
motion relies on “fraud” to the court regarding the service, without any
specific address regarding the substantive claims raised in the motion itself.
The opposition also includes a declaration from the process server disputing
the circumstances relied upon in the motion. In reply, Kap Moon asserts that
Plaintiff failed to prove service of process.
Moon moves for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section
473, subdivision (d) regarding a void order. A trial court can set aside a judgment pursuant to 473,
subdivision (d) on a void judgment. (Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132, 146.) “A court can lack
fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party,
making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or
defined power, rendering the judgment voidable.” (In
re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56.) “A judgment is void if the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter or parties, for example, if the defendant was not
validly served with summons.” (Johnson
v. E-Z Ins. Brokerage, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 86, 98.)
A plaintiff has the initial burden to establish valid
statutory service of a summons and complaint. (Dill v. Berquist Const. Co., Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426,
1439-40; Floveyor Internat. v. Sup. Ct. (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 789, 794.) Three proofs of service were filed. The first filed
on September 21, 2023, indicates substituted service on September 17, 2023. The
proof of service lacks any identification of prior attempts, and instead
indicates service on Kap Moon. An October 3, 2023, filed proof of service
indicates direct service also on September 17, 2023, at the same time. On
December 27, 2023, Plaintiff a third proof of service again indicating service
on September 17, 2023, at 1:15 p.m. The court considers the last filed item as
the intended operative proof of service.
The proof of
service was signed by Curi Kenmark, a registered process server. “The return of
a process server registered [under] Division 8 of the Business and Professions
code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing
evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” (Evid. Code, § 647.)
Kap Moon only denies any service
of the summons and complaint. [Declaration of Kap Moon.] Bryan Moon, son of Kap
Moon, acknowledges a female process server came to the correct address, but
contends the process server left the summons and complaint with a four year old
child “Hajoon” who answered the door at the time. Bryan Moon maintains the
process said nothing and also denies the papers ever reached Kap Moon, as “He
was not at the premises at this time.” [Ibid.] Process server Curi Kenmark, in a
counter declaration attests to speaking with someone with a “male voice” asking
“Who are you?” The process server asked if the person speaking was Kap Moon,
which was purportedly confirmed with “Yes. What’s up?” The process server
explained the service of legal documents, and was instructed to “just put it
[the documents] there.” The declaration contains a represented picture of the
home with the envelope on the counter and the child. All communications
occurred in Korean.
The declaration of Kap Moon
specifically omits any reference to the location and presence of Defendant at
any and all relevant times, especially including any denial of communicating
with the process server. Nothing denies the correct address as well. Instead
Kap Moon apparently seeks to imply that all communications only occurred with
Bryan Moon. The court declines to make this finding in direct contradiction to
the declaration of the process server given the specificity of the process
server, vagueness of the supporting declarations, and now second motion to
vacate a default following based on challenges to service. The court finds the
declaration of the process server credible, and Defendant seeks to evade
service.
“It is
established that a defendant will not be permitted to defeat service by
rendering physical service impossible. In In re Ball (1934)
2 Cal.App.2d 578 [38 P.2d 411], it was held that effective service was made
when the process server informed the defendant that he had ‘“another one of
those things for you,”’ and when the defendant moved away, threw the summons
and complaint so that it fell a few feet away from the defendant. ‘We take it
that when men are within easy speaking distance of each other and facts occur
that would convince a reasonable man that personal service of a legal document
is being attempted, service cannot be avoided by denying service and
moving away without consenting to take the document in hand.’ (Citation.)”
(Khourie,
Crew & Jaeger v. Sabek, Inc. (1990)
220 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1013–1014.)
The court also declines to
consider any argument for substituted service and proper service on a competent
member of the household, such as the four year old. (Code of Civ. Proc.,
415.20, subd. (b).) Plaintiff alleges direct service, not substituted service.
The representation of Bryan Moon denying service relies on inapposite argument
and conclusion. Kap Moon also argues in reply that the court should not
consider the process server’s declaration given that the actual communication
was in Korean, and the court is unable to assess what was actually said. Kap
Moon also asserts that while the process server had the opportunity to
photograph at will, he only took a picture of the child. However, these
arguments are unavailing because the process server, Curi Kenmark, testifies
under penalty of perjury that he and Kap Moon’s communication was true and
correct. Further, the photograph attached shows the legal documents, summons,
and amended complaint, which is more important than showing a picture of
Defendant. It is reasonable to assume that Kenmark took this picture following
the discussion with Kap Moon.
The court therefore finds completed
service upon leaving the papers with a person representing themselves as Kap
Moon and instructing the server to leave the papers in the house. Continued
evasion will only lead to Plaintiff either pursuing substituted service or
service by publication, and further delayed adjudication of the action.
Defendant will not evade service simply by taking advantage of the rules for
service and seek to enforce substituted service on a person in the house
apparently in charge, or via publication.
The motion is therefore denied.
Because public
policy disfavors defaults, Kap may still file an alternative, timely request
for relief from the December 27, 2023, entered default, with a proposed
responsive pleading constituting an appearance in the action, as part of the
motion.
Before any
further filings occur however, the court orders Plaintiff Lim to file a notice
of related cases in the courtroom(s) of the earlier filed cases identified as
related, and in fact involving the underlying judgment apparently the subject
of collection in the subject action.
Kap Moon to give
notice to all parties.
[1]Lim v. Moon. June 1, 2021, judgment in favor of Lim
for $27,000.
[2]Moon v. Na, et al. November 26, 2019, default judgment
entered in favor of Kap Moon against Sung Joo Na, Kyonga Nam, Jongju Na, and
Leading Town SDUS, Inc. for $1,098,518.99.