Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22STCV28853, Date: 2024-09-09 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 22STCV28853    Hearing Date: September 9, 2024    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 9-9-24 a/f 9-19-24 (via ex parte order 7-2-24)

Case # 22STCV28853

Trial Date: 10-14-24

 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Los Angeles Unified School District

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, K.A.

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication on the Complaint

·         1st Cause of Action: Negligence

·         4th Cause of Action: Negligent Hiring, Supervision

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff K.A., was a student at Value Schools and/or Downtown Value Schools, a charter and school within the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). Plaintiff alleges sexual molestation during an unspecified period of time from an unnamed employee perpetrator

 with defendant San Marino Unified School District (SMUSD). Defendant Howard Cheung was a teacher in SMUSD. Cheung was also an employee for defendant River Way Ranch Camp, an overnight camping facility in Sanger, California.

 

On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Negligence (DISTRICT) 2. Negligence (CHARTER) 3. Negligence (SCHOOL) 4. Negligence (DOES 3 through 25) 5. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision (DISTRICT) 6. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision (CHARTER) 7. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision (SCHOOL) 8. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision (DOES 3 through 25).

 

RULING: Denied

Request for Judicial Notice: Granted as to LAUSD/Denied as to Plaintiff.

 

Evidentiary Objections: Overruled/Not Relied Upon (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

 

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) brings the subject motion for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication to all claims named against the entity: the first cause of action for Negligence and the fourth cause of action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention. LAUSD moves on grounds of denial of any special relationship between LAUSD and K.A., a bar under the California Tort Claims Act, and immunity. Plaintiff in opposition challenges the timeliness of the motion, maintains LAUSD owed a duty to Plaintiff as a student within the district, and triable issues exist as to said negligence claims. LAUSD in reply reiterates the factual basis of the motion, including identification of Plaintiff as a student of the charter school, the existence of said charter school at all relevant times, and immunity of said charter school. LAUSD also challenges the untimeliness argument regarding the instant motion.

 

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)”  (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) 

 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) 

 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence.  It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

 

Timeliness

Plaintiff challenges the motion as untimely based on the previously set trial date of March 18, 2024, which was subsequently continued to May 28, 2204, by ex parte order on February 13, 2024. On May 3, 2024, the court entered the stipulation of the parties to continue the trial to October 3, 2024. Section 5 of the order states: “All parties agree and stipulate that discovery and motion cut-off dates will be based upon the new trial date.”

 

While Plaintiff challenges the timing of the motion [Declaration of Alicia Corbin], the argument itself lacks any actual address of the plain language of the stipulation or legally supported argument precluding such a motion. The cutoffs for discovery and discovery related motions found in Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020 and 2024.050 can bar discovery motions, no such limitation applies to a motion for summary judgment. (See Polibrid Coatings, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 920, 923.) Mediterranean Const. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 257, 262.)

 

California Tort Claims Act

LAUSD contends the California Tort Claims Act bars any claims of liability, due to the lack of any statutory basis. Plaintiff maintains a duty to protect students.

 

“Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183; de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 253-256.) The California Supreme Court allows for a finding of vicarious liability based on claims arising from negligence. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868–869.)

 

The collective authority imposes a duty of care to all personnel responsible for contributing to student welfare on campus. (Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 292, 295 [“Case law in California has established that school districts have a duty to exercise ordinary care in supervising students on the school premises”].) California Education Code section 48200 requires children between the ages of six to 18 years of age attend a full time school subject to an exemption. (Ed. Code, § 48200.) “‘Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others’ the ‘duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally,’ including ‘injuries to a student resulting from a teacher's sexual assault.’” (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 126 accord C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th 861, 870 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

 

“California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to ‘supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.]’ (Citations.) The standard of care imposed upon school personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the performance of their other duties. This uniform standard to which they are held is that degree of care ‘which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.’ (citations) or ineffective supervision (citation) may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision. Under section 815.2, subdivision (a) of the Government Code, a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by such negligence.” (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747.) The court reiterates that the subject cause of scope of duty falls under the mandatory attendance in loco parentis imposed standard, thereby restricting duty to on campus or potentially related off-campus events, where causation can be established. (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 515-516; Brownell v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 787, 795; Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 295.)

 

LAUSD offers no apparent challenge to the standard imposing a duty of care for student welfare while on campus, and instead focuses on the lack of alleged any relationship established by a staff member of a charter school to LAUSD. The position depends on extensive deposition testimony of the LAUSD Person Most Knowledgeable, Marla Wilmott, regarding the charter school operations. [Declaration of Frederick Ufkes, Ex. B: Deposition of LAUSD Person Most Knowledgeable, Marla Willmott.]

 

Willmott testifies that affiliated charter schools are operated by LAUSD staff [25:7-11], and considered LAUSD students [26:3-8]. Independent charter schools receive independent funding based on attendance from the State of California. [29:2-9.] Affiliated charter schools remain governed by LAUSD policy, while independent charter schools are only governed by state law, and not required to follow LAUSD policies. [30:12-16, 31:7-10.]

 

Downtown Value School is an identified independent charter school. [51:8-12.] While the charter school adheres to different minimum standards compared to a LAUSD chartered school, LAUSD admits to exercising some form of “chartering authority” over said independent schools in the form of audits, including assignment of a person to conduct annual visits and legal compliance with applicable (state) laws. [85:16-86:10.]

 

The deposition testimony presented by LAUSD categorically establishes the audit process. Without actually addressing the legal or factual effects of any and all audits, LAUSD contends said process demarcates an effective boundary in operations between LAUSD and any independent charter school. The separation decouples human resources operations, and implicitly any potential mandatory reporting notice requirements. LAUSD refers to discovery responses by Downtown Value School for support that the alleged perpetrator was hired by the charter school. [Ufkes Decl., Ex. D.] Nevertheless, other than the 1122 pages of exhibits attached to the Ufkes declaration, the motion lacks any actual legal argument regarding the scope of audit and charter responsibilities admitted to by LAUSD PMK Willmott. The reply reiterates the posture with a dismissal of any “daily” supervision responsibility regarding the “actions” of the perpetrator, and description of the opposition as “intellectually flawed” due to “erroneous legal assumptions.” LAUSD links said lack of liability with a follow-up denial of any vicarious liability for the alleged conduct of the perpetrator.

 

The law in the state of California categorically and undeniably imposes liability on the school district for the safety of its students during school hours. While LAUSD in reply specifically cites to the standard for the determination of duty as a matter of law, the court finds the gap in legal and factual argument regarding charter school operations and the scope of the audits insufficiently addresses findings regarding compliance with state law. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 620.) In other words, LAUSD apparently still assumes a certain level of duty over the “independent” charter school to which the court cannot determine the impacts to daily operations via the audit process.

 

Again, the PMK testimony demonstrates that LAUSD apparently accepts some form of ongoing supervision responsibility, but the court refuses to conclude said voluntarily undertaken responsibility comes without accepting potential negative consequences from conduct of faculty and staff based on the conclusive arguments in the motion and reply. The court finds no legal or public policy support for this position. The court therefore finds triable issues of material fact on the issue of negligent duty based on the admitted responsibility for audits of the charter school by LAUSD staff. [Deposition of Wilmott.]

 

The triable issues of material fact also preclude any finding of a lack of vicarious liability based on the lack of direct supervision position. The court also finds no support for the argument of conduct occurring outside the course and scope of conduct. LAUSD offers insufficient factual and legal support for the circumstances establishing said conduct occurring away from the campus or otherwise removing it from the scope of in loco parentis vicarious liability.

 

The court otherwise declines to speculate on unmade arguments.

 

4th Cause of Action: Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention of Unfit Employee: Granted.

A district may be imputed with liability for the actions of a teacher “if individual District employees responsible for hiring and/or supervising teachers knew or should have known of prior sexual misconduct toward students, and thus, that he posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to students under his supervision.” (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855; C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875.) The subject cause of action falls under the Education Code 44808 imposed special duty standard.

 

Again the subject argument strictly and exclusively depends on a denial of any employment relationship notwithstanding the disputed “audit” requirements. The court continues to lack any information regarding the audit standards, such as whether reports were made of staff or faculty engaging in sexually inappropriate conduct with students, and whether any action was undertaken. It also remains unstated whether LAUSD reviewed any and all personnel hires or undertook background checks for said hires as part of the audit process. (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 135-136; Federico v. Superior Court (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1216; Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855; C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 875.) Like the negligence cause of action, the court therefore again finds triable issues of material fact as to negligent, hiring, supervision and retention of unfit employees. [Deposition of Willmott.]

 

Finally, the court rejects the immunity argument based on the operation of the charter school in and of itself. “A chartering authority that grants a charter to a charter school to be operated as or by a nonprofit public benefit corporation is not liable for the debts or obligations of the charter school or for claims arising from the performance of acts, errors, or omissions by the charter school if the chartering authority has complied with all oversight responsibilities required by law, including, but not limited to, those required by Section 47604.32 and subdivision (m) of Section 47605.” (Ed. Code, § 47604, subd. (d).)

 

Nothing in the plain language of the statute or extensive case law in any way equates a breach of duty arising from a alleged child molestation to a debt or obligation. The motion is denied on this legally unsupported argument.

 

In summary, the court denies the motion for summary judgment.

 

Trial remains set for October 14, 2024.

 

LAUSD to give notice to all parties