Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 22STLC05464, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC05464 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept.
68
Date:
1-24-24
Case
#: 22STLC05464
Trial
Date: Not Set/NA
FURTHER DOCUMENTS & ADMISSIONS
MOVING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Rick Ladd
RESPONDING
PARTY: Defendant, County of Los Angeles, et al.
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Motion
to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents and Requests
for Admissions
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff
Rick Ladd owns certain real property identified as 3912 West 106th
St., Inglewood. Plaintiff alleges the County of Los Angeles improperly assessed
property taxes for the years 2019 through 2022, for a balance in excess of
$16,781.52.
On
August 17, 2022, and May 1, 2023, Plaintiff, in pro per, filed a complaint and
first amended complaint for Refund of Property Taxes, Accounting, and
Declaratory Relief. On May 2, 2023, the action was reclassified as unlimited.
On September 5, 2023, the cou35rt (Department 85) sustained the demurrer to the
accounting and declaratory relief cause of action without leave to amend,
overruled the demurrer to the refund of property taxes causes of action, and
determined the action was not properly before the writ department. On September
7, 2023, the action was transferred to Department 68.
RULING: Denied as to
Documents/Granted as to Admissions.
Plaintiff Rick Ladd, in pro per, moves to compel further
responses to Request for Production of Documents, numbers 3, 5-10, and Requests
for Admissions, numbers 8-11, 14, 18-21, and 30-33, from defendants County of
Los Angeles, et al. Ladd maintains Defendants continue to provide non-code
compliant responses to the document demand and admissions. Defendant in
opposition counters the motions are not timely filed, and Plaintiff is not
entitled to any information beyond the prior administrative proceeding.
Plaintiff in reply maintains to only seeking documents promised in response to
the operative set of discovery and code-compliant responses. The court
consolidates the rulings on both motions, due to the similarity of objections
and scope of consideration applicable to the subject action.
Responses to the request for production and admissions were
served on September 26, 2023. The motions were filed on December 26, 2023,
which is more than 45 days from the date of service of the responses. (Code
Civ. Proc., 2031.310, subd. (c), 2033.290, subd. (c).) The parties agree that a
filing extension deadline was agreed upon for December 15, 2023. Plaintiff
represents the inability to file the motion at an earlier date, due to Informal
Discovery Conference requirement, thereby leading to the late filing. The court
accepts the representations of Plaintiff regarding the pre-filing requirements
in the court, and will therefore consider the merits of the motion.
The responses to both sets of discovery consist of a series
of objections on grounds of relevance, overbroad, vague, ambiguous and
unintelligible, and unduly burdensome and harassing. Subject to the objections,
Defendant agreed to produce all non-privileged documents, whereas the
admissions consist of objections and a statement whereby “Responding Party
declines to respond to this request.”
The court adheres to a liberal standard for discovery in
order to insure the robust adjudication of all claims. The court therefore
addresses the objections.
The form of question objections lack merit. Defendant may
not intentionally misconstrue a work for obstreperous purposes. “Indeed, where the question is somewhat
ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper
solution is to provide an appropriate response.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 superseded by
statute on unrelated ground as stated in Guzman
v. General Motors Corp. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 438, 444.) Defendant
lacks support for the objections on vague, ambiguous and unintelligible given
the clearly understood period of dispute, and defined provisions for electronic
storage production in the Code of Civil Procedure, as applicable.
The
burdensome and oppressive objections also lack merit. Objecting parties must
file evidence detailing the amount of work involved, in order to support
objections based upon burden and oppression. (West Pico Furniture Co. v.
Sup. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) “[S]ome burden is inherent in
all demands for discovery. The objection of burden is valid only when that
burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (Id. at p. 418.)
“But ‘[f]or discovery purposes,
information is relevant if it “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating
the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement….” [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and
information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to
admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of
discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are
permissible in some cases. [Citation.]’ (Citations.)” (Cruz
v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653–654.)
The subject objection
appears to be the core of the dispute itself. As
provided above, relevance constitutes a generally disfavored objection barring
privilege or other exceptional circumstances. The uniqueness of the administrative
process underlying the claim requires address of the circumstances.
“The
assessment of property for the purpose of taxation is a function of the
executive branch of the government and the judiciary has no power or
jurisdiction to inquire as to the actual value of property to determine whether
or not it has been properly assessed. (Citation.) ... The duty of determining the value of the property
and the fairness of the assessment is confided to the appropriate county board
of equalization. In discharging this duty, the board's determination upon the
merits of the controversy is conclusive. The taxpayer has no right to a trial
de novo in the superior court to resolve conflicting issues of fact as to the
taxable value of his property. (Citation.) If a plaintiff taxpayer claims only that the assessor and
the board of equalization erroneously applied a valid method of determining
full cash value, the decision of the board is equivalent to the determination
of a trial court and the trial court in turn may review only the record
presented to the board. The trial court may overturn the board's decision only
when no substantial evidence supports it, in which case the actions of the
board are deemed so arbitrary as to constitute a deprivation of property
without due process. (Citation.) In those
cases where the substantial evidence test is to be applied, the trial court
does not weigh the evidence in the administrative record nor does it exercise
its independent judgment. Rather, it reviews the entire record to determine if
there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the administrative
agency. (Citation.)
“Where
the legality of the valuation method used by the assessor is in issue, the
scope of judicial review is not limited to the evidence. (Citation.) When the
taxpayer challenges the validity of the valuation method itself, the issue
raised is a question of law. That question is whether the challenged method of
valuation is arbitrary, in excess of discretion, or in violation of the
standards prescribed by law. (Citation.) Reviewing courts must presume the
assessing officers have performed their duties and have assessed all properties
fairly and upon an equal basis. (Citation.) Where taxes are claimed to be
excessive, before they can be set aside there must be evidence to show the
assessments were fraudulently or mistakenly made or that an improper method of
valuation was pursued. Put another way, specific valuations and methods of
valuation employed are reviewable only for arbitrariness, abuse of discretion,
or failure to follow the standards prescribed by the Legislature. (Citation.)
“When a
board of equalization purports to decide a question of law or refuses to hear a
case on the ground it involves only a question of law to be decided by the
courts, a taxpayer has the right to resort to the courts for determination of
such question. (Citation.) Thus, if the issue is a legal one the judicial
inquiry is pursued independently of the board's decision and unrestricted by
the usual limits on the scope of review. The court is not restricted to the
transcript of the proceedings before the board, but may receive additional
evidence bearing on the legal question. (Citations.)”
(Norby
Lumber Co. v. County of Madera (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 1352, 1362–1363.)
The gravamen of the first amended
complaint specifically articulates a challenge regarding the correction of a
property valuation from $590,000 to $275,000. [First Amend. Comp., ¶ 9.]
Plaintiff maintains the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board failed to
timely comply with the provisions of California Revenue and Taxation
Code sections 1604, et seq. [First Amend. Comp., ¶ 10.]
The remaining first cause of action specifically and exclusively alleges
an “unlawful method of assessment” seeking “de novo review of the method of
assessment applied...” [First Amend. Comp., ¶ 16.]
In ruling on the demurrer to the
first amended complaint, the writs and receivers court wrote in relevant part:
“The demurrer to the FAC is overruled for the first cause of action,
which is construed as a taxpayer refund claim, and sustained without leave to
amend for the remaining two causes of action.” The court specifically reviewed
the administrative record, and categorically found no
challenge to the actual wrongfulness of any assessment, but in fact a sole
claim for miscalculation of the properly refunded amount. The court therefore held
the case shall only proceed on the issue of the tax refund. A tax refund case
is properly filed in the superior court. (Little
v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bds. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 915, 923 accord Sunrise Retirement Villa v. Dear (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 948, 955 (footnote 2.) Given the propriety of the
tax refund claim itself before the court, the court declines to dismiss the
motion.
Nevertheless,
given the definition of the action as one exclusively for reimbursement of
purportedly overpaid taxes, discovery remains limited to the boundaries of the substantial
evidence test standard. (Norby Lumber Co. v. County
of Madera, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1362-1363; Kaiser Center, Inc. v. County
of Alameda (1987)
189 Cal.App.3d 978, 983.) The court finds no basis for discovery beyond the
administrative record, in that Plaintiff lacks a basis for seeking de novo
review of the entire underlying assessment process.
The court
therefore finds the demand properly requested “relevant” information. It
remains undisputed however that all non-privileged material was produced, as
constituted in the administrate record. It remains undisputed the information
was either produced or Plaintiff holds possession of the entire administrative
record. The court therefore finds no basis for ordering further of said
documents otherwise equally available to Plaintiff. (Bunnell v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 720, 723–724.) The motion
is therefore denied in its entirety as to the documents.
On the requests
for admissions however, while the court finds no right to discovery beyond the
administrative scope of the proceeding, the “decline” to provide a response
still constitutes a non-code compliant response. (Code Civ. Proc., 2033.220,
subd. (b-c).) Again, Plaintiff lawfully brought the civil action for a tax
reimbursement, which submits the action to conventional discovery rules. The
court therefore grants the motion to compel further responses to requests for
admissions. Defendant is ordered to provide code compliant responses within 30
days of this order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).)
The
motion is therefore denied as to the documents request and granted as to
admissions. The court reviews this action as one of first impression and
therefore declines to impose sanctions based on a finding of meritorious
inquiry into the scope of permissible discovery, clarification of the claim,
and partially prevailing on the admissions portion of the motions.
Case
Management Conference set for January 29, 2024.
Defendant
to give notice.