Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 23CHCV01029, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 23CHCV01029, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV01029 Hearing Date: September 6, 2023 Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 9-6-23

Case #23CHCV01029

Trial Date: N/A

FURTHER DOCUMENTS

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, K L Ventures, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, L.A. Hardwood Flooring, Inc. dba Eternity Floors

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (set one)

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff K L Ventures, Inc. developed 88 residential homes from May 2019 to January 2022, and utilized $326,100 in “Livingston Collection, Rigid Core Flooring” purchased from defendant L.A. Hardwood Flooring, Inc. dba Eternity Floors. At the time of purchase, it was represented that the flooring was both “100% waterproof” and came with a 25-year warranty. Plaintiff subsequently started receiving notices of defects in the flooring, which prompted Plaintiff to exercise the warranty provision. Defendant refused to comply with the purported warranty term(s) or refund the purchase price. Plaintiff subsequently incurred damages replacing the defective flooring.

On April 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Breach of Express Warranty, Breach of Implied Warranty – Merchantability, Breach of Implied Warranty – Fitness of Purpose, and Fraud. On May 15, 2023, Defendant answered. On May 15, 2023, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Roes for Implied Equitable Indemnity, Breach of Implied Warranties, Contribution, and Declaratory Relief.

RULING: Denied.

Evidentiary/Amended Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Robert Wiener: Overruled.

Plaintiff K L Ventures, Inc. moves to compel further responses to request for production of documents (set one), number 11, from defendant L.A. Hardwood Flooring, Inc. dba Eternity Floors. The request states in part: “A copy of each warranty claim … from any purchaser other than Plaintiff that was submitted in the past 7 years stating any ‘Eternity’ and/or ‘Eternity Flooring’ branded flooring materials had a manufacturing defect, by… the type of flooring … and the type of defect claimed.” Defendant responded with “overbroad, burdensome, harassing,” relevance, and third party privacy rights. Notwithstanding, Defendant agreed to produce bates stamp number pages 295-955 in response.

Plaintiff maintains the “boilerplate” objections lack merit and sufficient particularity as to the particular documents. Any third party names can be redacted. Defendant in opposition first summarizes the action and challenges the factual basis of the warranty. Based on said factual challenges, Defendant maintains the motion lacks “good cause” for further production or sufficient “specific facts.” Defendant supports the extensive factual arguments with inclusion of a 27 paragraph supporting declaration constituting both ostensible expert opinion regarding the improper installation of the product; the basis for the rejection of any and all warranty claims due to both the lack of any defect in the product and said improper installation; a conclusion of irrelevance based on said opinion and product difference discussion; and, a final conclusive statement regarding the burden of researching seven (7) years worth of warranty claims (identified as 154 separate products). [See Declaration of Isaac Lee.]

As part of the meet and confer process, Plaintiff acknowledges the offer to production limited to “substantially similar flooring materials” alleged to be defective, which Plaintiff’s counsel defines as “products with the click locking system in a stone polymer composite core flooring products.” [Declaration of Robert Weiner, ¶ 4.] The offer was rejected, and hence the court now considers the dispute.

“But ‘[f]or discovery purposes, information is relevant if it “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement….” [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases. [Citation.]’ (Citations.)” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653–654.)

The court adheres to the liberal standard as a matter of court policy, but given the specific challenge as articulated in the Lee declaration, the court considers the subject matter further. Lee validly describes some products as not fitting the terms “stone polymer composite flooring products.” The court appreciates the factual distinctions articulated in the Lee declaration, including identification and agreement of the product in dispute as a “Stone Polymer Composite” form of flooring. [Lee Decl., ¶ 19.] The court however remains unclear on why Lee addresses products not identified in the meet and confer efforts with references to items such as “wood plastic composite (WPC),” flexible vinyl sheets (LVT or LVP), Multi-Layer Flooring (MLF), Hybrid Vinyl Floorins (HVF), Traditional Vinyl Sheet Flooring (TVSF), Vinyl Plank Flooring (VPF) [Lee Decl., ¶¶ 20-26.]

The summary list while elucidating into the world of composite flooring constitutes somewhat of a strawman argument in that a number of seemingly unrelated products are identified for purposes of establishing irrelevance, and as discussed further below, overbroad, burdensome, etc. In other words, the court cannot determine from the opposition why “11 categories” remains at issue given the offer to limit production to “stone polymer composite,” as distinguished and defined by the well articulated differences between non-stone polymer composite products. The court therefore finds the apparent agreement by the parties as to the properly identified product—"stone polymer composite”—remains relevant. The objection is overruled on this basis.

“When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an intent to harass and improperly burden. When a judge evaluates such factors to determine whether a party has acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting informal resolution, a factual component of decision, derived from the trial judge's knowledge of the case, is inevitably involved.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) Again, the parties apparently agree on the product in dispute, and the court otherwise finds no necessity in addressing the unrelated products. Thus, given the vast majority of the products identified by Lee were never utilized by Plaintiff, the court finds the objection unsupported in regards to unrelated products.

On the burdensome and harassing objections, objecting parties must file evidence detailing the amount of work involved, in order to support objections based upon burden and oppression. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) “[S]ome burden is inherent in all demands for discovery. The objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (Id. at p. 418.) “When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an intent to harass and improperly burden. When a judge evaluates such factors to determine whether a party has acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting informal resolution, a factual component of decision, derived from the trial judge's knowledge of the case, is inevitably involved.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) Again, the court finds no support based on reference to a number of uninvolved products.

Finally on third party privacy rights, any identifying customer information is presumptively protected. Neither party may waiver third party privacy rights. While production can be compelled, the court orders the parties to craft a solution protecting the confidential information, if necessary. The parties may enter into a protective order to redact information, or may create a third party notification system allowing for an opt out of the disclosure of any identifying information. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 370; Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center v. Superior Court (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 288, 307, 311; Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 561-562.) If the parties are unable to determine a solution for notice and opt out, the court can order the appointment of a discovery referee for the limited purpose of examining the information and reviewing the results.

Given the narrowed scope of the product involved, the offer of limited production, the rulings on the objections from the perspective of narrowing the claims through distinctions between “stone polymer composite and non-stone composite flooring, and potential solutions regarding third party privacy, the court finds an entitlement to discovery as to “stone polymer composite core flooring products” ONLY. All other items are excluded from discovery.

Relative to this framework however, the court cannot determine why the 660 pages of documents presumably related to “stone polymer composite” remains insufficient. [Lee Decl., ¶ 17.] It remains unclear from the motion why said production was insufficient barring though the court accepts production may not have occurred at the time of the filing of the motion. The court therefore denies the motion on the assumption that production is forthcoming or produced. Because supplemental responses allow for a renewed motion, Plaintiff may file a second motion, if deemed necessary. The court advises the parties to meet and confer under the guidelines provided. If any applicable documents are withheld on grounds of privilege, Defendant is ordered to produce a privilege log. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c)(1).)

The motion is denied. Request for sanctions denied due to the validity of the dispute between the parties, and lack of communication on both sides regarding the ability to agree to a scope of production that should have been worked out before appearing before the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Case Management conference currently remains set for March 27, 2024.

Plaintiff to give notice.