Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 23PDU02724, Date: 2024-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PDU02724    Hearing Date: February 15, 2024    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date:  2-15-24 c/f 1-17-24

Case #: 23PDUD02724

Trial Date: Not Set

STAY OR CONSOLIDATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Kelly Pelton, et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Norma Salceda

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Stay or Consolidate

SUMMARY OF ACTION

In October, 2001, Plaintiff Norma Salceda, commenced leasing 13672 Van Nuys Blvd., Pacoima, for operation of an OB/GYN medical practice on the premises. The premises were owned by Nance Malmrose. Plaintiff and Malmrose were also personal friends.

In 2010, Plaintiff offered to purchase the property from Malmrose. Two weeks later, Malmrose rejected the purchase offer, and instead promised to bequeath the property to Salceda at the time of death in to be reflected in an updated will/estate plan. Following the promise, Plaintiff suggested conversion of the property into a community healthcare center instead of continuing as an OB/GYN clinic. Malmrose agreed. Plaintiff subsequently engaged in plans to convert the premises, and began investing funds for the remodel plus working with government agencies.

On January 23, 2019, passed away intestate with no spouse or offspring. No will was ever found, and Plaintiff accuses a private nurse to Malmrose, Ken Preston, with absconding it.

On October 12, 2022, Ginger Brandenburg (Ginger), child of decedent’s “late husband” Earl Malmrose (stepdaughter of Malmrose?) was awarded “100% of Malmrose’s” estate valued at approximately “11 million dollars” (19STPB09601). Ginger Brandenburg however passed away on September 24, 2022, two weeks before the award. Ginger’s surviving husband, Joe Brandenburg, was designated trustee. Joe subsequently resigned as trustee, thereby leading to the designation of Kelly Brandenburg Pelton (Pelton) as successor trustee. A later probate proceeding (23STPB00795) facilitated the transfer of all assets into the Brandenburg family trust.

Plaintiff alleges that prior to Ginger being awarded the estate, Plaintiff nevertheless informed Ginger Brandenburg about the purported agreement to leave the commercial premises for the community clinic. The wish of the property was confirmed by a third party “financial advisor” affiliated with the Malmrose estate. Ginger purportedly assured Plaintiff that the property would be transferred in accordance with Malmore’s wishes upon appointment as administrator.

Plaintiff elected to forego making any claim with the probate court (presumably in the 19STPB09601 action), though nothing in the operative complaint alleges any actual forbearance agreement with any identified person.

Plaintiff also later met with counsel for Ginger in December 2020, Richard Hoefflin, who also purportedly acknowledged the agreed upon transfer of the clinic. Notwithstanding the purported “agreement,” Hoefflin informed Plaintiff that as counsel for Ginger, representation was solely limited to the interests of Ginger, and specifically disclaimed any representation of the interests of Plaintiff in any capacity. Hoefflin also purportedly told Plaintiff that any statute of limitations on a probate claim lapsed either way.

On February 6, 2021, Ginger demanded a rental payment from Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently began paying rent. Following other communications, the parties entered into a seven month lease for the premises beginning on May 1, 2022, and ending November 30, 2022. Following the death of Ginger, and assumption of trustee duties by Pelton, a notice of termination of the lease was later delivered stating that a month to month tenancy now existed on the property as of June 30, 2023 (notwithstanding the lapse of the actual lease on November 30, 2022).

On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Quasi Specific Performance/Constructive Trust, Promissory Estoppel, and Unjust Enrichment, and Elder Financial Abuse. On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Related Cases for the instant action with Pasadena unlawful detainer action, 23PDUD02724. On October 24, 2023, the court declined to find the complaints related. On October 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for Quasi Specific Performance/Constructive Trust, Promissory Estoppel, and Unjust Enrichment. On December 14, 2023, Department 1 deemed the unlawful detainer action related to the instant complaint.

RULING: Granted.

Request for Judicial Notice: Granted in Part/Denied in Part.

·         The court takes judicial notice of the request for dismissal.

·         The court takes judicial notice of the Department 1 order for the existence of the order deeming the cases related, but not any factual findings. (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 147-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)

·         The court denies judicial notice of the Declaration of Richard Hoefflin.

Plaintiff Salceda moves to stay the related unlawful detainer action or alternatively consolidate the cases. Plaintiff moves for relief on grounds both cases involve claims regarding ownership and possession of the property. Defendant in opposition challenges the motion on grounds the instant action and the pending unlawful detainer complaint lack common questions of law and fact. Defendant specifically relies on the concurrently scheduled demurrer in support of the argument, as well as a claim of prejudice. Defendant concludes that any stay requires a preliminary injunction and posting of an undertaking. Plaintiff in reply reiterates the propriety of consolidation. Plaintiff denies the necessity of any application for preliminary injunction.

“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 grants discretion to the trial courts to consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact.” (Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978.) The section states in relevant part:

“(a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

“(b)  The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.”

“Consolidation is not a matter of right; it rests solely within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 402.) There are two types of consolidation under §1048: “a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.)

The court finds the allegations of the complaint sufficiently support a claim for disputed title, thereby supporting a basis for consolidation. “Because of its summary character, an unlawful detainer action is not a suitable vehicle to try complicated ownership issues involving allegations of fraud.” (Mehr v. Superior Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1049; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255 [“For our present purpose, it is sufficient to note that the proceeding is summary in character; that, ordinarily, only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession are cognizable”]; Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159; Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385.) The arguments in opposition in fact affirm the inability of the UD court to address the title issues, thereby prompting consolidation without any finding of collateral estoppel. (Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326-1327.)

The court finds no basis for denial of consolidation simply based on the pending demurrer. The issues regarding ownership and possession remain to be adjudicated. The court therefore grants the motion to consolidate.

Given the consolidation of the actions, the court stays the unlawful detainer proceeding pending adjudication of the action. The court also finds no basis of necessity for any request under Code of Civil Procedure section 526, including the posting of an undertaking, given the authority of this unlimited jurisdiction court to stay the action. (Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 146.)

The unlawful detainer case is therefore transferred from the unlawful detainer court to this department. The two cases will now be captioned under one case number, with the unlimited case number serving as the lead number. All dates in the Unlawful Detainer Court are now vacated.  All documents filed going forward shall only be filed using the lead case number.

The court, however, will consider requests for the continued payment of rent on the premises pending adjudication of the underlying action. Nothing in the consolidation and stay pending adjudication of the property right claims in any way relieves any current rent obligations for use of the premises. The court will also concurrently conduct the Case Management Conference.

Plaintiff to give notice.