Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 23STCV11602, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 23STCV11602, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV11602 Hearing Date: January 13, 2025 Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 1-13-25 a/f 1-15-25

Case 23STCV11602

Trial Date: 1-21-25

SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Mohawk Industries, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Wendy Viridinia Solano-Castro

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary Adjudication

· 4^th Cause of Action: Fraudulent Concealment

· Claim for Punitive Damages

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Wendy Viridinia Solano-Castro, et al. alleges the wrongful death of Raul Garcia-Leon caused from as a stone fabricator and installer. Plaintiffs contend working with “toxic” stone products led to the development of silicosis and death of Garcia-Leon on February 16, 2023.

On May 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a 582 paragraph complaint for negligence, strict liability – warning defect, strict liability – design defect, fraudulent concealment, and breach of implied warranties. On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff a 235 page first amended complaint for negligence, strict liability – warning defect, strict liability – design defect, fraudulent concealment, and breach of implied warranties. The action names a multitude of parties comprised of suppliers, sellers, etc. The case was deemed non-complex on June 5, 2023, and assigned to Department 68 on June 7, 2023.

On October 11, 2023, the court sustained the demurrer to the first amended complaint brought by MS International, Inc. to the fourth cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. On October 18, 2023, the court overruled the demurrer to the fourth cause of action brought by M S International, Inc. On November 2, 2023, Caesarstone USA, Inc. filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, declaratory relief and apportionment. On December 29, 2023, Lowes Home Centers, LLC filed a cross-complaint indemnity, declaratory relief and apportionment.

On September 5, 2024, the court granted the motion for trial preference based on the age of Rebecca Garcia at the time of the filing of the motion.

RULING: Denied.

Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Valerie Barney: Overruled.

Defendant Mohawk Industries, Inc. (Mohawk) moves for summary judgment on the entire complaint, and alternatively, summary adjudication on the fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment, and the claim for punitive damages. Mohawk moves on grounds that it only operates as a holding company of entities that distribute and sell the some of the products at issue, but otherwise denies any direct liability. Plaintiffs in opposition challenge the motion on grounds that Mohawk fails to shift the burden of proof on grounds of lack of sufficient competent evidence, and liability based on the marketing of the subject stone slabs containing crystalline silica. The court electronic filing system shows no reply on file at the time of the tentative publication cutoff. The court reserves the right to take any matters under submission for purposes of addressing timely filed replies and evidentiary objections, if applicable.

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

A defendant may alternatively move for summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence, and cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence in support of the claims.¿(Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 587; Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 101 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 229, 234] 855Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.) The court adheres to this standard for product liability cases, such as asbestos and crystalline silica (e.g. latent exposure leading to mesothelioma or silicosis).

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence. It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

Mohawk relies entirely and exclusively on the declaration of Valerie Barney for the establishment of the parent company relationship to other Defendants, including Dal-Tile, LLC, Dal-Tile International, Inc., Dal-Tile of Tennessee, LLC, and Dal-Tile Distribution, LLC. Mohawk also cites to the lack of any identification of Mohawk in the operative complaint, and insufficient discovery responses other than a reference of Dal-Tile being acquired by Mohawk. The only identified witness, co-worker Manuel Gonzalez Quiroz recognized the Dal-Tile name, but was not familiar with Mohawk. Plaintiff offers no substantive opposition to this position, and instead relies on evidentiary objections and claims of marketing by Mohawk, thereby imposing liability as part of the chain of distribution basis of liability.

Parent-Subsidiary analysis arises under agency principles. “We start with the firm proposition that neither ownership nor control of a subsidiary corporation by a foreign parent corporation, without more, subjects the parent to the jurisdiction of the state where the subsidiary does business. (Citations.) ‘Control’ in this context means the degree of direction and oversight normal and expected from the status of ownership; it comprehends such common characteristics as interlocking directors and officers, consolidated reporting, and shared professional services. ...

“However, the case law identifies one situation when the acts of the parent may be found to trespass the boundaries of legitimate ownership and control of the subsidiary and expose the parent to the power of the state in which the subsidiary does business. Thus, where the nature and extent of the control exercised over the subsidiary by the parent is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered nothing more than an agent or instrumentality of the parent, notwithstanding the maintenance of separate corporate formalities, jurisdiction over the parent may be grounded in the acts of the subsidiary/agent. (Citation.) In this instance, the question is not whether there exists justification to disregard the subsidiary's corporate identity, the point of the alter ego analysis, but instead whether the degree of control exerted over the subsidiary by the parent is enough to reasonably deem the subsidiary an agent of the parent under traditional agency principles. ...

“Control is the key characteristic of the agent/principal relationship. ... [¶] The nature of the control exercised by the parent over the subsidiary necessary to put the subsidiary in an agency relationship with the parent must be over and above that to be expected as an incident of the parent's ownership of the subsidiary and must reflect the parent's purposeful disregard of the subsidiary's independent corporate existence. ...” Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 540–542.)

The declaration of Valerie Barney admits to the manufacture of stone products by Dal-Tile Tennessee with sales made by Dal-Tile Distribution, LLC. Barney denies any successor liability or responsibility for daily management. Plaintiffs counter with identification of specific Mohawk marketing materials for certain products, including “One Quartz Surfaces” under the presumed manufacturing and/or sales and distribution umbrella. [Declaration of Brian Barrow.] Plaintiffs also specifically identify certain products manufactured by unaddressed co-defendant Dal-Tile, LLC. [See Declaration of Raphael Metzger, Ex. F-J.]

The Barney declaration lacks any specific address of Dal-Tile, LLC, and its purported role in the manufacture and distribution of the allegedly harmful product. Given the association of Dal-Tile products, albeit not categorically sorted by Barney, the court finds support for the existence of a relationship with any and all entities sharing the “Dal-Tile” base, and therefore a basis of potential product liability via distribution, sales, and/or marketing. (Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 466, 477, 481-482; Arriaga v. CitiCapital Commercial Corporation (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1535 [“Strict liability [] applies where a nonmanufacturing party is ‘outside the vertical chain of distribution’ of the product, but plays ‘an integral role in the “producing and marketing enterprise” of a defective product and profit [s] from placing the product into the stream of commerce. (Citation.)’”]; see Bay Summit Community Association v. Shell Oil Company (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762, 776 [A defendant can be found strictly liable if: “(1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant's role was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant's conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process”].)

Dal-Tile, LLC is also in fact identified in discovery responses, and a recognized brand by coworker and percipient witness, Cesar Quiroz, thereby placing the product(s) in proximity to Decedent. [Declaration of Cesar Quiroz; Brust Decl., Ex. 1-18: Deposition of Cesar Quiroz.] Plaintiffs present specific claims regarding both Dal-Tile, LLC and marketing materials of products manufactured and distributed by at least two, unnamed entities under the Mohawk parent tent. The absence of address of Dal-Tile products yet reliance on a claim of insufficient evidence even when countered by the liability claims against Dal-Tile, LLC and Dal-Tile Distribution, LLC, undermines any finding for Mohawk shifting the burden of proof based on absence of evidence. The court therefore denies the motion on the failure to establish insufficient evidence in support of the claims against Mohawk. (See McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104; Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 81.)

Even if Mohawk shifted the burden, the court finds triable issues of material fact as to the marketing of at least certain products encountered by Decedent. Mohawk otherwise offers no denial of exposure to said marketed products by Decedent, thereby also precluding any finding of sufficient proof of lack of causation evidence. [See Declaration of Kenneth Rosenman, ¶¶ 89, 95-96, 102-104, 129.] The motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED.

On Fraudulent Concealment, Mohawk challenges the lack of any basis of duty to disclose any specific potential harms from the (marketing of the) product(s). Plaintiffs present no specific opposition other than the general reliance on the failure to shift the burden, challenge to the Barney declaration, and marketing positions.

“[T]he elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: ‘(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. [Citation.]’” (Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830, 850 (internal quotation marks omitted.)

“There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) “Each of the other three circumstances in which nondisclosure may be actionable presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise. … As a matter of common sense, such a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties.” (Id. at pp. 336–337.)

Again, Plaintiffs provide no substantive legal address, but the court notes the standard for certain types of product potentially applicable, and considered in a demurrer on the subject cause of action brought by a different co-defendant. “The requirement's purpose is to inform consumers about a product's hazards and faults of which they are unaware, so that they can refrain from using the product altogether or evade the danger by careful use.” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198.) Users include persons responsible for processing materials not privy to information regarding necessary safety protocols. The withholding of said information subjects a defendant to potential fraudulent concealment liability. (Id. at pp. 1199-1200.)

The operative complaint present allegations regarding knowledge of the allegedly toxic substance, crystalline silica, dangers to workers engaged in the cutting, grinding, fabrication, polishing, etc. with the product, and failure to disclose potential toxicity upon working with said products. Decedent was specifically exposed and harmed as a result of the non-disclosed hazards and continued work with the supplied product. [First Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 535-564.] The allegations meet the standard for fraudulent concealment. (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 78-79.)

Under the consideration for product liability standards applicable to summary judgment, the court again finds insufficient address of this standard by Mohawk for purposes of shifting the burden. The court therefore denies the motion for summary adjudication on both the failure to shift the burden. The court also finds triable issues of material regarding failure to warn on allegedly known hazards caused by fabrication of products containing silica. [Index of Exhibits, Responses to Specially Drafted Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; Metzger Decl., Ex. E-I; Rosenman Decl.]

On punitive damages, Mohawk challenges the sufficiency against the corporate entity. Plaintiff again lacks substantive address and instead relies on the integrated challenges.

On punitive damages, Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined as follows:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

“‘[M]alice does not require actual intent to harm. [Citation.] Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. [Citation.] Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.’ [Citations.]” (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)

Consistent with the prior part of the order, the court again finds the motion insufficiently addresses the evidence presented by Plaintiff regarding the knowing distribution of the silica containing product, including corporate knowledge and direction for the manufacture and distribution of an allegedly harmful product, without sufficient warning. [Index of Exhibits, Responses to Specially Drafted Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.] (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576–577; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168.) Such conduct establishes the right to seek punitive damages under the malice standard. The motion for summary adjudication is therefore denied in its entirety.

In summary, the court denies the motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication.

Mohawk to give notice to all parties.

Dept. 68

Date: 1-13-25

Case 23STCV11602

Trial Date: 1-21-25

SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Stoneville USA, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Wendy Viridinia Solano-Castro

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary Adjudication

· 1^st Cause of Action: Negligence

· 4^th Cause of Action: Fraudulent Concealment

· 5^th Cause of Acton: Breach of Implied Warranties

· Claim for Punitive Damages

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On September 5, 2024, the court granted the motion for trial preference based on the age of Rebecca Garcia at the time of the filing of the motion.

RULING: Denied.

Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Ignatius Ravi Kasturiraj: Overruled.

Defendant Stoneville USA, Inc. (Stoneville) moves for summary judgment on the entire complaint, and alternatively, summary adjudication on the first cause of action for negligence, fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment, fifth cause of action for breach of implied warranties, and the claim for punitive damages. Stoneville moves on two grounds: Lack of evidence establishing causation, and sophisticated intermediary/user doctrine. Plaintiffs in

opposition challenge the motion on grounds that Stoneville fails to shift the burden of proof on grounds of lack of sufficient competent evidence, and denial of application of the sophisticated user defense. The court electronic filing system shows no reply on file at the time of the tentative publication cutoff. The court reserves the right to take any matters under submission for purposes of addressing timely filed replies and evidentiary objections, if applicable.

The pleadings frame the issues for motions, “since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. (Citation.)” (Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

A defendant may alternatively move for summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence, and cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence in support of the claims.¿(Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 587; Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 101; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.) The court adheres to this standard for product liability cases, such as asbestos and crystalline silica (e.g. latent exposure leading to mesothelioma or silicosis).

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inference that may be drawn form that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence. It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.” (Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1041 (citation omitted).)

Stoneville relies on denial of any supply, manufacture or distribution of silica containing products utilized by Decedent, during the decades’ long employment period. The position relies at least in part on an admission to distribution of stone products, but Plaintiffs’ inability to present any evidence of Stoneville distributed silica containing product(s) causing exposure to Decedent while performing as a stone fabricator. The position depends on the declaration of

Ignatius Ravi Kasturiraj, founder of Stoneville, attesting to a business focus on end users and consumers, rather than fabricators like Decedent. Stoneville and Kasturiraj also emphasize the distribution of natural rather than fabricated stone, provision of safety information, denial of any records of direct supply to Decedent or the former employers (San Remo Marble & Granite and Bernadino Sanchez), and no actual distribution of any products until the founding of the business in 2006. [Declarations of Ignatius Ravi Kasturiraj and Vivian Zambrano, Ex. 3.]

Again, the court addresses the action under the product liability latent injury standard, and therefore applies the substantial factor standard in the subject action. (Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Company (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415, 1419.) “In the context of a cause of action for asbestos-related latent injuries, the plaintiff must first establish some threshold exposure to the defendant's defective asbestos-containing products and must further establish in reasonable medical probability that a particular exposure or series of exposures was a “legal cause” of his injury, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. In an asbestos-related cancer case, the plaintiff need not prove that fibers from the defendant's product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually began the process of malignant cellular growth. Instead, the plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure to defendant's product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that in reasonable medical probability it contributed to the plaintiff or decedent's risk of developing cancer.” Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 982. “[W]e conclude that the proper analysis is to ask whether the plaintiff has proven exposure to a defendant's product, of whatever duration, so that exposure is a possible factor in causing the disease and then to evaluate whether the exposure was a substantial factor.” (Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Company, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.) Exposure by a contributing party, among many, is sufficient to establish triable issues of material fact. The calculation of the probabilities of whether even limited exposure constituted a substantial factor is more appropriately addressed before the trial court. (Id. at pp. 1417-1419.)

“In the context of a cause of action for [silica]-related latent injuries, the plaintiff must first establish some threshold exposure to the defendant's defective [] products and must further establish in reasonable medical probability that a particular exposure or series of exposures was a ‘legal cause’ of his injury, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. In a[] [silicosis] case, the plaintiff need not prove that [particulate] from the defendant's product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually began the process of malignant cellular growth. Instead, the plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure to defendant's product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that in reasonable medical probability it contributed to the plaintiff or decedent's risk of developing [silicosis].” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 982.)

The representations of Kasturiraj regarding “less than 20%” of overall sales of artificial stone and an emphasis on end users/consumers in no way establishes a lack of liability under the applicable causation standard. The court also finds the evidence regarding a review of records “dating back ten years” from the October 30, 2024, date of the declaration only addresses potential supplies to October 30, 2014. Plaintiff alleges exposure beginning in 1996. Given the undisputed representation that Stoneville only commenced operations in 2006, eight (8) years of potential supplies remains unaccounted for as part of the showing for lack of causation. The court finds no means to definitively determine during said eight-year period that silica containing artificial stone products, even if only 20% of business inventory, were never delivered and fabricated by Decedent. The gap of evidence and reliance on denial of sufficient evidence therefore undermines any finding establishing a shift the burden. (See McGonnell v. Kaiser

Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104; Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 81.)

The court alternatively finds triable issues of material fact based on the presence of Stoneville vehicles and products on the premises of Decedent’s place of employment during some or all of the relevant time period. Plaintiffs present testimony identifying Stoneville vehicles and products for Bernadino’s shop. [Declaration of Scott Brust: Deposition of Cesar Quiroz, 339:8-15, 997:8-24.] Plaintiffs also referencs a project involving 47 slabs of Sapien White Calcatta Polished artificial stone supplied to the Bernadino shop in 2021 for a hotel project involving third party Simonetta Marshall through emails identified as “GQ_0389 through GQ_0398.” [Declaration of Simonetta Marshall.] The emails with “Ravi Raj” and Stoneville in fact identify the product, but it remains unclear whether said products are silica containing. Regardless, the court finds Stoneville fails to shift the burden regarding NO Stoneville products in proximity to Decedent, or alternatively triable issues of material fact on the basis of causation exist based on the identification of Stoneville products on the premises at the relevant time of Decedent’s employment. The motion for summary judgment and motion for summary adjudication reliant on the absence of sufficient evidence of causation is therefore DENIED.

On the second ground, sophisticated/intermediate user, the court reviews the standard. “In general, a manufacturer or supplier has a duty to warn consumers about the dangers and risks inherent in the use of its product. (Citations.) The sophisticated user defense is an exception to the general duty to warn. (Citation.) The defense concerns warnings and does not apply to a cause of action for design defect. (Citation.) ... [¶] Under the sophisticated user defense, a manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn about the product's dangers if the sophisticated user knew or should have known of the dangers. (Citation.) The ‘should have known’ portion of the formulation is an objective standard. (Citation.) ... The rationale supporting the defense is that the failure to warn about risks already known to a sophisticated user usually is not a proximate cause of the user's injuries. (Citation.)” (Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 601–602.)

Stoneville relies on an apparent denial of any necessity to warn based on OSHA/Cal OSHA regulations regarding employer responsibility to provide safety equipment, due to an admittedly known hazard of silica particulate matter from stone fabrication. Other than an admission to the hazards of silica dust, the motion lacks legal support actually addressing the standard for exposure warning(s), and instead offers deflection of any responsibility to other parties, person and/or entities. To the extent Stoneville suggests a sophisticated intermediary defense, the court also finds no legal or evidentiary support, including any citation to OSHA and Cal OSHA standards. Again, reliance and deflection to other purportedly responsible persons and entities insufficiently establishes the basis for a finding of application of this complete defense. (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 187-188.)

Stoneville also moves for summary adjudication on punitive damages, but subsumes any such challenge within the above addressed positions. The court addresses the standard. On punitive damages, Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined as follows:

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

The court finds the motion insufficiently addresses the evidence presented by Plaintiff regarding the knowing distribution of the silica containing product, including corporate knowledge and direction for the manufacture and distribution of an allegedly harmful product. [Zambrano Decl.: Responses to Specially Drafted Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.] (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576–577; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168.) Such conduct establishes the right to seek punitive damages under the malice standard. The motion for summary adjudication is therefore denied in its entirety.

The court therefore DENIES the motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication on the failure to establish both insufficient evidence or a complete defense on this basis. Plaintiff additionally establishes triable issues of material fact on the known hazards of silica particulate matter resulting from fabrication. [Declaration of Kenneth Rosenman.]

Stoneville to give notice to all parties.