Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 23STCV16376, Date: 2024-05-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 23STCV16376, Date: 2024-05-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16376 Hearing Date: May 29, 2024 Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 5-29-24

Case #23STCV16376

Trial Date: Not Set

FURTHER DEPOSITION

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Claudia Salazar

RESPONDING PARTY: Oceanside Laundry LLC, et al.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Compel Further Deposition Testimony

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On August 20, 2021, plaintiff Claudia Salazar began employment with Defendants Oceanside Laundry LLC dba Emerald Los Angeles, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and Emerald Textiles Services, Northern California, LLC, as a Laundry Worker in Defendants city of Commerce facility. Plaintiff informed Defendants of her pregnancy. Plaintiff maintains Defendants offered no notice of any rights, such as a request for accommodation to avoid certain strenuous duties and pregnancy leave time. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff subsequently requested an accommodation upon the advice of her medical provider, limiting any lifting to no more than 20 pounds. No accommodation was made, and Plaintiff alleges the work strain caused a miscarriage at six months. Plaintiff was subsequently terminated in December 2022.

On July 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Discrimination (Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(a)) 2. Retaliation in Violation of The FEHA and Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov. Code §§ 12940, et seq.) 3. Interference in Violation of the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Violation of Gov. Code § 12945) 4. Violation of California Sick Leave Laws (Labor Code §§ 233, 246, 247.5, and 248 et seq.) 5. Failure to Engage in a Timely, Good Faith, Interactive Process (Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(n)) 6. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation (Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(m)) 7. Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Violation of Gov. Code § 12940(k)) 8. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 9. Declaratory Relief, and 10. Injunctive Relief.

RULING: Denied

Plaintiff Claudia Salazar moves to compel further deposition questions and answers for individual Steven Beach, and to compel the deposition of Laura Hardy. Defendant maintains sufficient discovery took place, and further depositions no longer required. Plaintiff in reply reiterates the goal of identifying the parties “entitled to seek arbitration.”

Steven Beach

If a deponent fails to answer any question … the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).) A party may also move for production of documents. (Ibid.) A motion to compel answers to a deposition must be filed within 60 days of the completion of the “deposition record,” and accompanied by a meet and confer letter. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subds. (a-b).) The deposition session occurred on January 30, 2024. The limited transcript lacks contains a stenographer certification dated February 2, 2024. [Declaration of Ashtyne Cofer, ¶¶ 21, 28, Ex. D.] Sixty days from the deposition date is April 2. 2024. The motion was filed on April 3, 2024. The motion was timely filed given the court does not count the date of the stenographer certification for purposes of calculating service dates. (Code Civ. Proc., § 12.)

Deposition testimony time is limited to seven hours, unless the court allows additional time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290.) It’s not clear how long the first session lasted. The deponent otherwise raises no objection to the time limit.

The origin of the dispute arises from the parties’ December 8, 2023, stipulation, whereby it remains agreed that Plaintiff would conduct limited discovery into facts for opposing the motion to compel arbitration without any waiver of the right to seek arbitration by defendant employer(s). The stipulation itself lacks defined terms of the scope of discovery necessary to oppose the deposition. The deposition was either unilaterally halted by Plaintiff or stipulation of the parties. [Cofer Decl., Ex. D.]

Plaintiff maintains Defendants are improperly withholding information necessary for an opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. Defendants Emerald Los Angeles, LLC, Emerald Textiles Services, Northern California, LLC, and Wash Encore Holdings, LLC, in opposition maintain full compliance in providing sufficient information regarding agreement itself and the onboarding process. Defendants both presented a witness for deposition, but also provided 149 pages of documents. [Declarations of Raina Sharma and Alison Lynch.] Defendants challenge any necessity for further deposition of Beach or the deposition of Hardy. Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of the meet and confer effort.

On the deposition of Beach, the limited deposition transcript includes the presumed source of the dispute: an instruction not to answer based on an objection to questions represented as beyond the scope of the stipulation for limited discovery into the onboarding process. The questions specifically inquired into operations for Emerald Northern California, and inquiry into the greater onboarding procedure(s). Beach testified to separate Southern California operations, e.g. the city of Commerce facility, and apparently denied relationship to Northern California operations. This led to the second basis of objection and eventual suspension of the deposition— the specific question of a “uniform onboarding policy for Emerald facilities.” Plaintiff announced the suspension of the deposition on grounds of an inability to obtain “information regarding the corporate structure, the onboarding.” Defendant maintained sufficient information was provided. [Cofer Decl., Ex. D.]

The relationship between Northern California versus Southern California human resources operations remains at the core of the dispute. Plaintiff references the potential relationship between the entities, Emerald Textile Services Northern California, Oceanside Laundry LLC, and Emerald Los Angeles LLC. According to Plaintiff, the onboarding documents identify Oceanside Laundry as the employer, though said entity no longer exists. [Cofer Decl., Ex. F.] Plaintiff states that “records” show Oceanside changed its name to Emerald Textile Services Northern California. Defendants on the other hand seek a dismissal of Emerald Textile Services Northern California based at least in part on the representation that Oceanside interests were in fact transferred to defendant Emerald Los Angeles, LLC. [Cofer Decl., ¶¶ 13-19.]

Plaintiff remains skeptical of the purported shared business interests between Oceanside and Emerald Los Angeles, LLC due to the lack of any signature by an Emerald entity to the arbitration agreement and the unspecified “records.” Plaintiff therefore seeks greater information regarding the interrelationship of the parties, especially between Oceanside and Emerald Textile Services Northern California notwithstanding the representations of Defendants. [Ibid.] Steven Beach in opposition specifically denies any employment relationship with Emerald Textile Services Northern California, LLC or Oceanside Laundry, LLC, and maintains Plaintiff was only and exclusively employed by Emerald Los Angeles, LLC. [Declaration of Steven Beach.]

The court generally adheres to a policy of robust discovery in order to allow the best presentation of all claims and defenses, but acknowledges the limited scope of the inquiry for purposes of both opposing the motion to compel as well as avoiding potential arguments of waiver. The court agrees with Defendants that the discovery dispute apparently frames the subject challenge to the arbitration under two potential arguments—proper party to the agreement and unconscionability. An argument can be made that the subject discovery dispute somewhat conflates the determination of the proper defendant(s) to the entire action with the limited inquiry into the circumstances regarding the proper parties to the arbitration agreement. Consideration of all parties relationship could require address of concerns into discovery and legal consideration beyond the intended scope of the stipulation and the instant motion. The court seeks to avoid issuing an advisory opinion on the impending motion to compel.

Plaintiff concedes to executing an arbitration agreement with Oceanside, an entity no longer in existence. Plaintiff potentially seeks to challenge the lack of any agreement with moving party(ies), the circumstances and practices of the boarding process relative to Plaintiff’s understanding of the existence of the arbitration agreement itself, or both. The scope of discovery into subject situation however apparently remained at the discretion of the parties within the terms of the stipulation. The subject motion apparently requests the court interpret the parties’ intended boundaries, and consider a definitive boundary.

Defendants raise a valid challenge on grounds that Plaintiff has conducted all necessary discovery into the two possible bases of a defense to arbitration on formation and/or unconscionability. The burden falls on the party seeking to compel arbitration to establish all parties to the agreement for arbitration.

The parties agreed to allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery into the relationship of the parties, but it remains unclear how further discovery will yield new information required to challenge the existence of the admitted employment contract and arbitration agreement with Oceanside. In other words, the entity acquiring the rights to the Oceanside contractual agreement and seeking arbitration must establish its basis for arbitration, or risk denial of the motion. Plaintiff already seemingly challenges the lack of any relationship given the alleged assignment of rights from Oceanside to Emerald Textile Services Northern California, and statement from Beach attesting to separate operations in Commerce from the Emerald Textile Services Northern California business.

The court seeks to balance the unique circumstances presented by the instant motion in order to prevent full pre-arbitration discovery and potential waiver versus limited, sufficient discovery to oppose the motion on grounds of proper parties and unconscionability. Given the understanding of the dispute over the ownership of Oceanside rights and liabilities, the court finds circumstances provide no basis for compelling further questioning on this particular item. The court finds Plaintiff completed sufficient discovery in both the deposition and apparent document review.

The second area of inquiry and presumably the basis for the suspension of the deposition also presents a valid dispute. Corporate policy on onboarding may present a valid basis of inquiry for purposes of challenging an arbitration motion on the basis of formation and unconscionability.

The motion itself lacks limited support for any purported deficiency. Defendants’ declarations specifically attest that the 149 pages of discovery included copies of English and Spanish versions of the agreement, the employee handbook, and the onboarding packet used at the time of hire.

The subject documents appear to address the procedures and circumstances of the onboarding process at the time of hiring. The court finds no basis justifying further inquiry.

Laura Hardy

Other than the notice of motion seeking the deposition of Laura Hardy, the points and authorities and declaration lack an actual basis of support to compel the deposition of Laura Hardy, as either a representative of the employer or third party witness. A party may file a motion to compel deposition upon a non-appearance or refusal to proceed by the noticed party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, 2025.450, subd. (a).) A party must present a qualified person for each deposition. (Maldonado v. Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1398.) The motion lacks any proof of service of a notice of deposition. The court declines to otherwise declines to determine the necessity of Laura Hardy as a witness, even if proof of service is presented given the lack of any substantive basis for further discovery.

The court therefore denies the entire motion.

Sanctions are mandatory unless the court finds justified action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).) The court accepts the difficulty in precisely crafting the stipulation and the scope of the dispute in trying to resolve the issue, and the request for clarification. The court finds good faith efforts from all participants at all times. The court therefore declines to impose sanctions given the underlying dispute.

On the motion to compel arbitration currently set for June 5, 2024, the scheduling of the subject motion precluded timely submission of any opposition reflecting the holding in the subject motion. On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a face page of the opposition on the opposition due date (it’s not clear whether the face page constituted the entire opposition or if there was a submission error). On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a revised opposition. Both documents were late filed. At the time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff, the court shows no reply on file to the late filed opposition to the motion to compel arbitration.

The court elects to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to fully brief the motion taking into account the subject order. Due to both court dark days and impacted calendars, the court continues the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration to July 24, 2024. Plaintiff may rely on the May 23, 2024 opposition or submit a revised opposition. Any revised opposition and reply shall be due pursuant to statutory deadlines.

Plaintiff to provide notice.