Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 23STCV21188, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV21188 Hearing Date: August 2, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept.
68
Date:
8-2-24 c/f 7-23-24 a/f 9-23-24 (Ex Parte Order of 4-19-24)
Case
# 23STCV21188
Trial
Date: Not Set
DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendants, Airgas USA LLC, et al.
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiffs, Lorraine Guillen, et al.
RELIEF
REQUESTED:
Demurrer
to the First Amended Complaint
·
1st
Cause of Action: Wrongful Death, Survival
·
2nd
Cause of Acton: Negligence Per Se
·
3rd
Cause of Acton: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
·
4th
Cause of Acton: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
·
5th
Cause of Acton: Concealment
·
6th
Cause of Action: Intentional Misrepresentation
·
7th
Cause of Action: Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of
FEHA
·
8th
Cause of Acton: Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code section 11102.5
·
9th
Cause of Acton: Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of California Labor Code
section 6300, et seq.
·
10th
Cause of Acton: Violations of California Labor Code section 232.5, subd. (c)
Motion
to Strike
·
Allegations
in support, and claim for, punitive damages
SUMMARY
OF ACTION:
Decedent
Derrick Lute worked as a driver for Defendant Airgas USA, LLC delivering
medical grade gasses and oxygen to certain medical facilities. Lute was exposed
to Covid-19 during the course of employment, and subsequently passed away from
the virus. Lute is survived by Lorraine Guillen, Jaiden Lute, a minor, Jada
Lute, a minor, Devin Lute, a minor, and Katherine Lemond.
Plaintiffs
allege individual Defendants Michelle Hernandez, Adrienne Johnson, Marjorie
Chapman, and Charles Goodman, improperly designated Decedent as an “essential
worker,” thereby risking exposure without sufficient safety protocols in place.
On
September 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their form complaint for Negligence,
Premises Liability, Intentional Tort, and Fraud. On December 18, 2023, the
court sustained the demurrer to the entire complaint with leave to amend.
On
February 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for 1. Wrongful
Death, Survival; 2.Negligence Per Se; 3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 4.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 5. Concealment; 6. Intentional
Misrepresentation [Fraud]; 7. Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation in
Violation of FEHA; 8. Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of California Labor
Code §1102.5; 9. Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of California Labor Code
§6300, et seq.; and, 10. Violation of California Labor Code §232.5(c).
On
April 11, 2024, the case was reassigned from Department 27 to Department One
for transfer. On April 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a 170.6 challenge to
Department 12, thereby leading to assignment to Department 68.
RECOMMENDED
RULING
Demurrer: Sustained with Leave
to Amend
Request
for Judicial Notice: Granted
·
The court takes judicial notice of state
agencies orders, but not any factual findings for the truth of the matter
asserted. (Rea v. Blue Shield of
California (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
1209, 1223; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
471, 482; Kilroy v. State of California (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 140, 147-148; Sosinsky v. Grant
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)
·
The court takes judicial notice of the
September 1, 2023, filed complaint only for the filin itself and not the truth
of any matter asserted within the pleading.
Defendants
Airgas USA LLC, Airgas Inc., Michelle Hernandez, Adrienne Johnson, Marjorie
Chapman, and Charles Goodman submit the subject demurrer to the entire first
amended complaint for 1. Wrongful Death, Survival; 2.Negligence Per Se; 3.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 5.
Concealment; 6. Intentional Misrepresentation [Fraud]; 7. Discrimination,
Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; 8. Unlawful Retaliation in
Violation of California Labor Code §1102.5; 9. Unlawful Retaliation in
Violation of California Labor Code §6300, et seq.; and, 10. Violation of
California Labor Code §232.5(c). Defendants present numerous arguments,
including: Workers Compensation Act preclusion, statute of limitations, lack of
standing by Lorraine Guillen, failure to obtain leave to add the breach of
fiduciary cause of action, and failure to plead the elements of certain claims.
Plaintiffs in opposition challenge any Workers’ Compensation law preclusion on
grounds of improper reliance on extrinsic evidence, the survivor claims are in
no way barred by the workers compensation statutes, denial of any statute of
limitations bar, claim of standing by Lorraine Guillen, and all properly pled
claims. Defendant in reply deny any exception to workers compensation
exclusivity, describe the opposition as containing “blatant
misrepresentations,” the opposition exceeds the page limit, and the court
should deny any leave to amend.
Plaintiffs
also submitted a “supplemental opposition” after the case was fully briefed and
without leave of court. The court declines to consider the supplemental
arguments.
A
demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from
either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take
judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading
“by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v.
Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the
court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action
has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
726, 733.)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly
construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because
ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the
complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising
defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty
should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
Workers’
Compensation Preclusion
Injury claims are subject to the exclusive provisions of the
Workers’ Compensation statutory provisions, where the injury to the employee
occurs as a result of a “service growing out of and incidental” to employment,
and the employee is “acting within the course” of employment. (Lab. Code, §§
3600, subd. (a)(2), 3602; Charles J.
Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 813.) “The employee is afforded relatively swift
and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial
injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range
of damages potentially available in tort.” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 708; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1,
16.)
Defendants specifically rely on
the request for judicial notice Executive Order N-62-20, whereby the
State of California proclaimed Covid-19 exposure constitutes a recoverable
illness under the Workers’ Compensation statutes. Plaintiff counters that
reliance on said order constitutes extrinsic consideration beyond the scope of
the pleading. The court finds the order declaring Covid-19 a recoverable form
of damages within the Workers’ Compensation laws allowable, and the operative
complaint in fact specifically relies on Covid-19 exposure during delivery work
as the cause of death for Derrick Lute. The plain
language of the operative complaint indicates that Plaintiff sustained the
injury (Covid-19 exposure) while performing job duties. Thus, the activity
clearly falls within the scope of employment.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs in opposition challenge statutory
preclusion on the basis of the fraudulent concealment exception. “An employee … may bring an action at law for damages
against the employer, as if this division did not apply, in the following
instances: … (2) Where the employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's
fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection with
the employment, in which case the employer's liability shall be limited to
those damages proximately caused by the aggravation. The burden of proof
respecting apportionment of damages between the injury and any subsequent
aggravation thereof is upon the employer.” (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (b)(2).) “[A]n employee seeking to state a cause of action
against an employer under section 3602(b)(2) must ‘in general terms’ plead facts that if found true by the trier of fact,
establish the existence of three essential elements: (1) the employer knew that
the plaintiff had suffered a work-related injury; (2) the employer concealed
that knowledge from the plaintiff; and (3) the injury was aggravated as a
result of such concealment.” (Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 80, 89–90.)
Plaintiffs cite to no specific
sections of the operative complaint in in support of the fraudulent concealment
exception. The court notes certain allegations of awareness and intentional concealment
of Covid-19 risks as a result of deliveries to medical care facilities with
Covid-19 patients. The incentive to suppress said known dangers was the result
of company priorities on keeping their work force engaged in delivery work rather
than adherence to safety protocols [First Amend. Comp., 18, 20, 22, 24, 35-40.]
The court finds the subject allegations sufficient for purposes of the subject
demurrer, and therefore an exception to workers compensation preclusion for
purposes of ruling on the demurrer. (Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306, 309-310.)
The court therefore overrules the demurrer to the survivor causes of action
only on this basis, and separately addresses the individual claims.
Individual Claims
As addressed in the standing section below, Plaintiffs
bring the action as both a survival action and individually. While an employer
owes no duty of care to prevent the spread of Covid-19 from an employee to
family members, workers’ compensation preclusion in no way bar individuals from
pursuing claims as well. (Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks,
Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1003.) The
demurrer is therefore overruled as to the right to proceed on the claim without
workers’ compensation preclusion as to the individual Plaintiffs. The court
declines to address the sufficiency of any individual claims under the relied
upon standard, as the arguments are not specifically and separately articulated
in the demurrer. The court overrules the demurrer to all claims relying on
workers’ compensation exclusivity, including the “negligence” cause of action,
breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as
to the survival action.
Statute of Limitations
Defendant contends the complaint
was filed more than two years after the death of Derrick Lute. Plaintiffs
maintain their September 1, 2023, form complaint for Negligence,
Premises Liability, Intentional Tort, and Fraud “relate back” to the original
complaint. Defendant in reply challenges relation back doctrine on grounds that
the first amended complaint addition of the breach of fiduciary cause of action
somehow changed the basis of the cause of action, thereby preventing any
finding of a timely complaint.
“An amended
complaint relates back to the original complaint, and thus avoids the statute
of limitations as a bar against named parties substituted for fictitious
defendants, if it: (1) rests on the same general set of facts as the original
complaint; and (2) refers to the same accident and same injuries as the
original complaint.” (Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 151.) The original complaint alleges
the exposure of Derrick Lute to Covid-19 as a result of workplace operations.
The form complaint alleges a date of September 3, 2021. The complaint both
alleges a common core of facts, and was filed within two years of the date of
death. The argument regarding the breach of fiduciary as tangential,
insufficiently establishes a bar on the basis of the statute of limitations for
the entire action as stated in the demurrer. The court declines to consider the
single breach of fiduciary claim under the limited argument presented on
relation back doctrine. The court overrules the demurrer on the statute of
limitations argument.
Standing
Defendant
next challenges the standing of Lorraine Guillen, who is neither a descendent nor
surviving spouse of Derrick Lute. Lorraine Guillen brings the action in the
capacity as a “domestic partner.”
A
successor-in-interest must file a declaration with specified elements and a
death certificate (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32). The operative complaint in no
way identifies the status of Lorraine Guillen as a party. Plaintiffs brings
this action individually and/or as the surviving heirs and/or dependents of
Decedent, pursuant to CCP § 377.60 (Wrongful Death) and/or as successors in
interest of Decedent pursuant to CCP § 377.30 (Survival Action). [First Amend.
Comp., ¶¶ 1-2.] While the original complaint in fact contains a declaration
from Lorrain Guillen declaring a domestic partnership with the decedent, as
well as the required death certificate, the operative first amended complaint
lacks compliance with either statutory requirement. The court declines to rely
on the previously incorporated documents of the now inoperative original form
complaint. Plaintiffs must file a complete claim within the operative pleading
in order to allege a claim. The demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED, due to the
lack of the required elements in the operative complaint. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130.)
3rd
Cause of Acton: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
On the breach of fiduciary duty
claim, Plaintiffs in fact improperly added new causes of action without any
apparent leave of court. The court therefore sustains the demurrer to the
subject cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to add the claim in the second
amended complaint.
5th
Cause of Acton: Concealment
6th
Cause of Action: Intentional Misrepresentation
Both parties present single paragraph arguments in
support and opposition to the subject claims. The court declines to make the
arguments for the parties. “‘The elements of
fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation
(false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity
(or “scienter”); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable
reliance; and (e) resulting damage.’” The
operative complaint lacks facts indicating a direct misrepresentation or
concealment to the individual, surviving plaintiffs. Again, the court declines
to consider unmade arguments. The court SUSTAINS the demurrer on this basis
7th
Cause of Action: Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of
FEHA
8th
Cause of Acton: Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code section 11102.5
9th
Cause of Acton: Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of California Labor Code
section 6300, et seq.
10th Cause of Acton: Violations of
California Labor Code section 232.5, subd. (c)
On
the remaining individual seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action
addressing the sufficiency of the employment claims, the court overrules the
demurrer on grounds of workers’ compensation preclusion. On the individual
challenges, the actual causes of action only presents a series of conclusions
regarding standing and presumption of damages without any effort towards
factual distinction as to any and all of the individual causes of action.
[First Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 133-157.] Plaintiffs cite to precursor paragraphs 14-28
for the eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action, again, without any specific
distinction between the varying claims.
The
cited paragraphs only appear to address the concealment allegations with a
single reference to alleged use of “derogatory” racially discriminatory
language in paragraph 26. The two sentences insufficiently articulate any and
all of the individual claims. Again, the court declines to make the arguments
for Plainiff The demurrer is SUSTAINED on this basis as well.
The
motion to strike punitive damages is MOOT.
In
summary, the demurrer is overruled as to the statute of limitations and
workers’ compensation preclusion, and sustained with leave to amend, due to the
failure to properly allege the requirements for standing, adding a new cause of
action without leave of court, and failure to state sufficient facts in support
of the fraud and individual employment claims. Plaintiff is given leave to
amend as to ONLY the claims presented, including leave to amend to add in the
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. Plaintiffs may NOT add any new causes
of action and later seek to label as split off from an existing prior claim,
without clear and explicit leave of court. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) People By and Through Dept. of Public Works v. Clausen (1967) 248
Cal.App.2d 770, 785.) Any new causes of action added without leave will be
subject to a motion to strike.
Defendant may raise substantive challenges to the breach of
fiduciary claim, if applicable in any new challenge to the next iteration of
the complaint. Arguments otherwise remain limited only to previously raised
challenges. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (b).)
“In response to a demurrer and prior to the case being at
issue, a complaint or cross-complaint shall not be amended more than three
times, absent an offer to the trial court as to such additional facts to be
pleaded that there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured to state
a cause of action. The three-amendment limit shall not include an amendment
made without leave of the court pursuant to Section 472, provided the amendment is
made before a demurrer to the original complaint or cross-complaint is filed.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (e)(1).) While the subject motion constitutes
the first review of the subject action, the court cites to the standard upon
the potential for a future challenge to the second amended complaint.
Motion to Strike: Moot.
Plaintiffs shall file any new amended pleading within 30
days of this order.
Moving
Defendants to give notice.