Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 23STCV27977, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27977    Hearing Date: February 19, 2025    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 2-19-25

Case #23STCV27977

Trial Date: Not Set

DEMURRER/STRIKE

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Drake Real Estate Group

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Rachel Manning

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurrer to the Complaint

·         4^th Cause of Action: Private Nuisance

Motion to Strike

·         Punitive Damages

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On May 1, 2020, Plaintiff Rachel Manning entered into a 12 month lease for certain residential premises located at 3318 Rowena Ave., Apt. 1, with Defendants 3312 Rowena Limited Partnership and Drake Real Estate Group, Inc. Plaintiff alleges habitability issues, including plumbing, weather proofing, indoor environmental, and fire related safety issues. Plaintiff “elected” to vacate the premises, due to health and safety concerns, and Defendants refusal to rectify the maintenance concerns.

On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability 2. Breach of Contract 3. Negligence 4. Private Nuisance 5. Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 and 6. Constructive Eviction. On April 3, Darryl Wong, WDW Management, LLC, and 3312 Rowena Limited Partnership answered the complaint. On May 21, 2024, Michael Shaar, Inc. dba S.I.G. Property Management, answered the complaint.

On May 23, 2024, the court entered the parties’ stipulation to dismiss the fifth cause of action for Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 against Michael Shaar, Inc. dba S.I.G. Property Management.

RULING

Demurrer: Overruled

Defendant Drake Real Estate Group submits a demurrer to the fourth causes of action for private nuisance in the complaint on grounds of a redundant claim with the third cause of action for negligence. Plaintiff in opposition maintains the complaint properly alleges a separate and distinct cause of action for private nuisance. Defendant in reply reiterates the basis of the demurrer.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]

Defendant challenges the nuisance claim as redundant or otherwise lacking distinguishing facts from the negligence cause of action. (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) Plaintiff counters that even with overlapping claims, a party may allege both forms of relief. (Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1337, 1356.)

A private nuisance arises from the interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of land. (Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Services (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 521, 534.) “Anything which is injurious to health, including … an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property…” constitutes a private nuisance. (Civ. Code, §§ 3479, 3481.) “A nuisance may be both public and private, but to proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintiff must prove an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land.” (Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041.)

The complaint relies on incorporation of the prior negligence cause of action allegations regarding uninhabitable conditions [Comp., ¶¶ 60-61, 65], with a conclusive follow-up of the nuisance elemental standard [Id., 66-67]. An argument can be made that such a pleading constitutes one cause of action with split counts/claims for damages. “‘[N]uisance is a field of tort liability, rather than a type of tortious conduct. It has reference to the interests invaded, to the damage as harm inflicted, and not to any particular kind of act or omission that has led to the invasion. The attempt frequently made to distinguish between nuisance and negligence, for example, is based upon an entirely mistaken emphasis upon what the defendant has done rather than the result which has followed, and forgets completely the well established fact that negligence is merely one type of conduct which may give rise to a nuisance.’ Accordingly, nuisance is not a separate tort but a species of damage occasioned by conduct which is tortious because it falls into the usual categories of tort liability.” (Van Zyl v. Spiegelberg (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 367, 372–373.)

The nuisance cause of action clearly shares a common core of facts with the negligence claim, but for purposes of the demurrer, the court declines preclude said separately available avenues of recovery on the basis of identified causes of action as opposed to separately pled damages or separate counts within the negligence cause of action. Any challenges to the basis of recovery remain subject to challenge, but are not precluded as a function of pleading.

The demurrer is overruled as to this cause of action.

Motion to Strike: Denied.

Defendant Drake Real Estate Group moves to strike allegations in support of, and claim for, punitive damages. Civil Code, Section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined as follows:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

Punitive damages require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. Omitted [emphasis added].)

The disregard for safety standards constitutes a showing of a reckless disregard for the rights and safety of tenants by a landlord legally obligated to provide habitable premises. The corporate entity was responsible for decision thereby supporting a finding of corporate direction and ratification. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576–577; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168.) The motion to strike is therefore denied as to punitive damages.

In summary, the demurrer is overruled, and the motion to strike denied. Defendant Drake Real Estate Group to answer the complaint within 10 days of this order.

The court will concurrently conduct the Case Management Conference and two OSCs re: Sanctions.

Moving Defendant to give notice.