Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 24STCV01461, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV01461, Date: 2024-11-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV01461 Hearing Date: November 6, 2024 Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date:11-6-24

Case #24STCV01461

Trial Date: 4-14-25

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Yoshinoya America, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Christina Mendoza

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurrer to the Complaint

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On January 19, 2024, Christina Mendoza filed a Private Attorney Generals Act (PAGA) action against Yoshinoya America, Inc. On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a 170.6 challenge, thereby leading to the reassignment of the complaint from Department 52 to Department 68. Defendant answered the complaint on February 23, 2024.

RULING: Sustained with Leave to Amend and Stay of the Action

Requests for Judicial Notice: Granted.

Defendant Yoshinoya America, Inc. (Yoshinoya) submits a demurrer to the PAGA complaint on grounds of other pending actions. Plaintiff in opposition challenges abatement of the instant action on grounds of differing claims between the courts brought by different plaintiffs. Defendant in reply reiterates the basis for abatement. Defendant also reiterate the relation back of the PAGA claim in the first amended complaint preceding the subject action.

The demurrer was filed on June 12, 2024, 110 days or three months and 20 days after the answer.

A court may sustain a demurrer on grounds of abatement, where “There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (c).) Yoshinoya seeks to abate the instant action due to a concurrent class action complaint, Martinez v. Yoshinoya America, Inc., 23STCV28516, filed on November 20, 2023. On April 19, 2024, the Martinez complaint was amended to add in a representative (PAGA) action for wage and hour violations. Plaintiff Mendoza filed the instant action for enforcement under the private attorneys general act on January 19, 2024.

According to Yoshinoya, the amended complaint in the complex courtroom was the result of the judicial officer deeming a separately filed PAGA action filed by Martinez, 24STCV02032, related to the class action. The court subsequently ordered the filing of said first amended complaint combining the claims. While no judicial notice was provided for this, the court accepts this unchallenged representation.

Yoshinoya follows with the position that the order relating the cases and amended complaint renders the merged PAGA action dated back to the older class action filing date under the doctrine of relation back, thereby rendering the instant complaint later filed and subject to abatement. Plaintiffs only represent the amended complaint was filed after the filing of the instant action, but otherwise offers no legally citable substantive challenge to the relation back point. (The court will not consider unpublished opinions, especially district court opinions interpreting federal civil procedure statutes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a); Rittiman v. Public Utilities Com. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1018, 1043 (footnote 18).) The court finds support for Defendant’s position regarding relation back for purposes of establishing an earlier filing date. (Hutcheson v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932, 940.) By extension, the determination of the previously filed complaint renders the subject action later filed notwithstanding the amended pleading date succeeding the subject action.

Given the separate complaints, the court considers abatement. Yoshinoya contends both actions allege PAGA claims and penalties against the exact same defendant. Plaintiff acknowledges the Martinez amended complaint adding in the representative wage and hour claims, but maintains the Mendoza action only seeks to enforce PAGA penalty provisions, thereby constituting a separate cause of action. Contrary to the representation of Plaintiff, the Martinez action also seeks “Statutory Penalties under PAGA.” [Req. Jud. Not., Ex. C: Mendoza v. Yoshinoya America, Inc., Prayer ¶ 2.] Mendoza also seeks “Statutory Penalties under PAGA.” [Comp., Prayer ¶ 2.]

Plaintiff seeks to justify the admitted “split” (notwithstanding the double pled claims in both actions) on the basis that the PAGA claim constitutes a “small portion” of any recovery...likely to be allocated” as part of the greater class action complaint, thereby somehow supporting a separate PAGA penalty only claim. This position lacks any legal support.

Plaintiff however also presents published authority from a district court whereby the court found no bar to concurrent PAGA litigation brought by separate private parties. (Tan v. GrubHub, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 171 F.Supp.3d 998, 1012-1013 “Tan.”) The court relied on the omission of any language barring such a practice within Labor Code section 2699 subdivision (h). The District Court was careful to note that a settlement of one claim prior to completion of the adjudication of the separate action may preclude relief on the parallel action. (Ibid. accord Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 985; see Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Company (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476, 483.)

Defendant in reply presents new authority distinguishing Tan, and addresses the existing California on exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, as it relates to PAGA. “The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 255.)

“The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar to the common law plea in abatement now codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c). (Citation.) Under the statutory plea in abatement, ‘[t]he pendency of another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same parties is a ground for abatement of the second action.’ (Citation.) A statutory plea in abatement requires that the prior pending action be ‘between the same parties on the same cause of action.’ (Ciation.)” [¶] ‘Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, it has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea [in] abatement do not exist. [Citation.] Unlike the statutory plea [in] abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions. [Citations.] If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule. Moreover, the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.’” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 770.)

The argument under Tan depends on the omission of any reference barring parallel claims proceeding in separate courts under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (perhaps also assuming no double pled statutory penalty claims). (Tan, supra, 171 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1012-1013.) The subject actions before the Superior Court name separate individual plaintiffs and potentially different aggrieved employees per PAGA action. Plaintiff Mendoza representing to only seeking “penalties” in the instant action without any compensatory damages, still presents concern due to the split of all necessary and dispensable parties represented in a single action thereby increasing the possibility of conflicting or contradictory decisions. (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.)

While the hypothetical possibility allowing a split in recovery (assuming the removal of the penalty claim in the Martinez action), coupled with separate employees per action limits a direct finding for abatement due to the lack of identified aggrieved employees, the court finds the California exclusive concurrent rule precludes parallel PAGA actions relied upon under the “omission” analysis in the federal authority. (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 255; People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 770.) The court therefore declines to follow the federal court precedent, and in its discretion finds the subject cases violates concurrent exclusive jurisdiction rules. The demurrer is therefore Sustained with Leave to Amend. The court also stays the case.

Defendant may file a notice of related cases regarding the subject action with the complex court.

Trial set for April 14, 2025, is vacated. The court will set an OSC re: Status of the Stay/Martinez PAGA Action/Scope of Leave to Amend.

Defendant to give notice.