Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV06256, Date: 2025-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV06256    Hearing Date: February 5, 2025    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 2-5-25

Case #: 24STCV06256

Trial Date: Not Set

VACATE DEFAULT

MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Shimin Ja, pro per & Yamei Yang, pro per

RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed, Plaintiff, Aitan Segal

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion to Vacate Default

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Aitan Segal leased certain residential premises from Defendants Shimin Ja & Yamei Yang from June 1, 2021 to May 31, 2023 for a rental rate of $12,500/month, with a certain rental payment schedule. Plaintiff alleges upon taking possession of the premises the discovery of certain undisclosed, unhealthful conditions, including radon gas contamination, thereby requiring mitigation, as well as other alleged failures to maintain the premises.

On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of Habitability, Breach of Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, and Common Counts. On June 13, 2024, the clerk entered defaults against both Defendants.

RULING: Denied without Prejudice/Continued following Proof of Service

Defendants  Shimin Ja, pro per & Yamei Yang, pro per, move for relief from the June l3, 2024, entry of default, due to mistake, inadvertence, and/or excusable neglect. The court electronic filing system shows no opposition or reply at the time of the tentative ruling publication cutoff.

Code of Civil Procedure section 473 subdivision (b) provides in part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”

“The six-month time limit for granting statutory relief is jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief made after that period has elapsed. (Citation.) The six-month period runs from entry of default, not entry of judgment.” (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42.) The motion was filed 99 days after entry of the judgment. The motion is therefore timely.

A discretionary standard applies to the motion given the parties’ in pro per appearance. (Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1251-1252; see Rodriguez v. Brill (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 715, 727.) Public policy favors adjudication of claims on the merits. Nevertheless, where conduct by the party acting in pro per represents a deliberate, strategic decision, public policy vests the court with discretion to find no basis for relief. (Benedict v. Danner Press (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 923, 929-930; Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1251-1252.)

Defendant Ja denies proper service; Yang lacks any apparent explanation for the basis of relief. The court accepts Defendants’ willingness to appear and finds the public policy supports relief from the default. Nevertheless, the motion lacks any proof of service. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1005, subd. (b), 1013.) The court therefore must deny the motion without prejudice. The court however notes that denial of the motion and requiring a refiling would lead to the renewed filing beyond the six month the mandatory relief deadline window. The court will therefore alternatively consider a continuance of the motion upon service of an amended hearing date and service of the actual underlying motion.

The court will concurrently conduct an OSC re: Sanctions, Dismissal, etc.

Plaintiff to give notice.