Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV06555, Date: 2025-03-12 Tentative Ruling


Case Number: 24STCV06555    Hearing Date: March 12, 2025    Dept: 68

Dept. 68            

Date: 3--12-25

Case: 24STCV06555

Trial Date: Not Set

 

DEMURRER

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, William S. Hart Union High School District, et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Oscar Cervantes

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurrer to the Complaint

·         1st Cause of Action: Discrimination

·         10th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 

Motion to Strike the Claims for Punitive Damages

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On December 2, 2021, Plaintiff Oscar Cervantes suffered an injury to his left elbow while performing employment duties for Defendant (former) employer William S. Hart Union High School District. Plaintiff returned to work on March 2, 2022, with a “light duty” restriction, though Plaintiff alleges two additional “early” returns to work on February 14, and 18, 2022.

 

Following a requested early work departure on March 11, 2022, Plaintiff was informed of limited available time off remaining and a threat to employment by Defendant Carl Manly. Plaintiff disputed the representation and was affirmed by District as to the representations of Manly.

 

On an unspecified date, Plaintiff sustained an injury to his right shoulder, thereby imposing a second “light duty” restriction. Plaintiff was assigned to certain school campus, whereby Plaintiff was “reprimanded” by Defendant David Cambaliza for calling out late on May 15, 2023, due to illness. The notice was presented through Defendant Ron Baber.

 

On December 8, 2023, Plaintiff was denied leave to take his daughter to the hospital. Meanwhile, presumably preapproved family leave commenced on December 22, 2023. Plaintiff was scheduled to return on January 5, 2024, and apparently requested both vacation time to an unspecified date as well as family leave extension time, but no such time was apparently granted under either category. Plaintiff was terminated on January 23, 2024, for job abandonment without contact to the District employer.

 

On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Discrimination; 2. Failure to Engage in Interactive Process (Govt. C. §12940(n)) 3. Failure to Accommodate (Govt. C. §12940(m)) 4.Harassment (Govt. C. §12940(j) 5.Retaliation (Govt. C. §12940(h) 6. Retaliation (Lab. C. §1102.5) 7. Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation (Govt. C. §12940(k) 8. CFRA (Gov. Code, § 12945.1 et seq. 9. CFRA (Gov. Code, § 12945.2 10. IIED (Common Law).

 

RULING

Demurrer: Sustained with Leave to Amend.

Defendant William S. Hart Union High School District, Carle Manley (Carl Manley), Ron Barber (Ron Baber), and David Camabliza, submit a demurrer to the first and tenth causes of actin for discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the complaint on grounds of factual insufficiency. Plaintiff in opposition counters the challenged causes of action are properly pled. Defendants in reply reiterate the deficiency positions and requests the court sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. Defendants in reply reiterate the lack of sufficient facts and present new argument as to administrative compliance and factual uncertainty as to the individual defendants.

 

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

 

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]

 

1st Cause of Action: Discrimination

Defendants maintain the complaint lacks identification of the basis of any alleged discrimination. Plaintiff counters the complaint articulates disability discrimination based on the failure to accommodate the light duty medical restrictions. Defendants in reply challenge the lack of facts supporting disability discrimination based on a “temporary” condition, and lack of facts establishing an adverse employment action as result of said disability. Defendants present additional new argument as well on grounds the DFEH pre-filing requirements.

 

“The specific elements of a prima facie case [for discrimination] may vary depending on the particular facts. (Citation) Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) Disability discrimination requires a plaintiff show he “(1) suffered from a disability, (2) could perform the essential duties of a job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. (Citation.) To establish a prima facie case, the employee must show ‘actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were “based on a [prohibited] discriminatory criterion ....”’ (Citation.) The employee's burden of proving a prima facie case is not onerous, and very little evidence is required at this step.” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 37 [internal quotation marks omitted].) “[C]ourts considering the question of what constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of a statutory retaliation claim have uniformly held an intermediate retaliatory employment action may suffice: ‘The legislative purpose underlying FEHA's prohibition against retaliation is to prevent employers from deterring employees from asserting good faith discrimination complaints, and the use of intermediate retaliatory actions may certainly have this effect.’ (Citations.) However, courts also have been united in the view that an employer's intermediate decision or action ‘constitutes actionable retaliation only if it had a substantial and material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment.’ (Citations.)” (Pinero v. Specialty Restaurants Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 635, 641.) A pattern of conduct, rather than a single incident can support a finding of adverse employment. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1056.)

 

The court can defer consideration of uncertainty based deficiency positions where further discovery may improve clarification, and amended pleading orders only delays adjudication. The court also generally rejects new argument raised in reply. While the subject cause of action will most certainly benefit from further discovery, and Plaintiff was arguably deprived of the opportunity to respond to all new positions raised in the reply, the court finds the paucity of facts regarding the alleged disability discrimination basis, lack of specific facts regarding the basis of responsibility as to the individual defendants, and prequalifying establishment of DFEH compliance renders the Discrimination cause of action too vague and conclusive to withstand demurrer. The demurrer is therefore sustained with leave to amend.

 

10th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants challenge the lack of facts supporting a finding of “outrageous” conduct. Plaintiff cites back to the introductory allegations for support of emotional distress. Defendants in reply again introduce new argument regarding potential workers’ compensation bars to the emotional distress claim in that the alleged conduct occurred on the job.

 

“‘The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.’ [¶] Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society, and is of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 617.)

 

The general allegations describe the circumstances and disputed viewpoints, but again the court finds a lack of sufficient facts regarding outrageous conduct. The court again hesitates to consider new positions in the reply, but finds the potential concerns under workers’ compensation preclusion also warrants address by Plaintiff. The demurrer is therefore sustained with leave to amend.

 

Motion to Strike: Moot where Applicable/Granted without Prejudice/Granted With Leave to Amend

Defendants move to strike the claims for punitive damages against the individual defendants. Plaintiff in a combined opposition with the demurrer presents extensive response and identification of allegations within the complaint. Defendant again introduces new argument regarding lack of corporate district supporting punitive damages.

 

Civil Code, Section 3294, subdivision (c) authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, oppression, or fraud, which are defined as follows:

 

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

 

Punitive damages require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. Omitted [emphasis added].)

 

Individual defendants seek to seemingly reverse apply the standard for application against a corporate entity responsible for ratification or direction of policy. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576–577; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168.) While the court declines to make such a finding based on new argument in the reply, the court still finds the allegations insufficient for purposes of articulating the claims against the individual defendants. The motion to strike is moot where applicable, and and granted without prejudice/with leave to amend as to the remainder.

 

In summary, the demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend as to the discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action. The motion to strike is also granted without prejudice/with 30 days leave to amend as to the challenged punitive damages claims. Plaintiff may NOT add any new causes of action, and may only amend introductory allegations as they relate to the two causes of action. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)  Any additional language may be subject to a motion to strike. If Plaintiff elects to forego filing an amended complaint, Moving Defendants are ordered to answer the remaining operative causes of action within 10 days of the lapsed amendment pleading deadline.

 

Any future demurrers should include any and all arguments in the demurrer itself, with no new positions raised on reply. Plaintiff is also instructed to separately file any and all oppositions to separately filed motions, such as a demurrer and motion to strike. Combined oppositions may lead to a demand for separate filing and fee payment, and continuance of the motions.

 

The court will concurrently conduct the case management conference.

 

Moving Defendant to give notice.