Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV09817, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV09817    Hearing Date: March 13, 2025    Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 03-13-2025

Case: 24STCV09817

Trial Date: Not Set

 

DEMURRER

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Universal Protection Service, LP dba Allied Universal Security Services

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Claudia Avitia

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Demurrer to the Complaint

·         1st Cause of Action: Negligence

·         2nd Cause of Action: Negligent Training & Supervision

·         3rd Cause of Action: Assault

·         4th Cause of Action: Battery

·         5th Cause of Action: Bane Act Violation

·         6th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On July 14, 2022, Defendant Ashley Sanchez, a person employed for the provision of security services by Defendant Universal Protection Service, LP dba Allied Universal Security Services at Los Angeles County Medical Center on Marengo Street allegedly made unlawful violent contact to the body of Plaintiff while Plaintiff was on the premises as an employee.

 

 

On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Negligence; 2. Negligent Training & Supervision; 3. Assault; 4. Battery; 5. Bane Act Violation; 6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 

On December 16, 2024, County of Los Angeles filed a notice of lien on wages and benefits paid to Plaintiff for a claimed amount of $134,303.29.

 

On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of Allied Universal, Allied Universal Security Services, Universal Protection Service, LLP, and Universal Protection Service, LLC without prejudice. On January 7, the parties stipulated to dismiss the punitive damages claim against Universal Protection Service, LP dba Allied Universal Security Services.

 

On February 18, 2025, Ashely Sanchez answered the complaint, and filed a cross-complaint for (1) Total Equitable Indemnity (2) Comparative Indemnity (3) Declaratory Relief (4) Express Indemnity. On February 20, 2025, Los Angeles County filed an amended notice of lien now seeking $141,322.54.

 

RULING: Sustained with Leave to Amend in Part/Overruled in Part/Moot in Part.

Defendant Universal Protection Service, LP dba Allied Universal Security Services submits a demurrer to the entire complaint for Negligence, Negligent Training & Supervision, Assault, Battery, Bane Act Violation, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Defendant presents the demurrer on grounds of factual insufficiency. Plaintiff in opposition counters that all causes of action are properly pled. Defendant in reply reiterates the deficiency positions and requests the court sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

 

The demurrer was originally scheduled for August 28, 2025, but advanced to the current date at the time of the January 22, 2025, Case Management Conference. Defendant served amended notice on January 23, 2025.

 

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

 

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]

 

1st Cause of Action: Negligence

2nd Cause of Action: Negligent Training & Supervision

Defendant challenges both the negligence and negligent training and supervision claims as a single, unified claim. Defendant presents extensive discussion of the authority and policy regarding employer liability for the actions of employees apparently acting within the scope of duties, and challenges the claim on grounds of lack of facts establishing the nexus of purported knowledge of any violent proclivities to the alleged unwelcomed contact on the premises of the hospital. Plaintiff counters the complaint sufficiently articulates vicarious liability.

 

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established … (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) Negligent hiring and supervision “[l]iability is based upon the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.) “Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.)

 

Plaintiff cites to paragraph 14 of the negligence cause of action, which states in part: “ASHLEY SANCHEZ was under the mistaken impression that she was authorized by the EMPLOYER Defendants to use such force and that it was appropriate for ASHLEY SANCHEZ to use such force while working at the Hospital. Plaintiff alleges further that ASHLEY SANCHEZ mistakenly exercised poor judgment when striking Plaintiff and that ASHLEY SANCHEZ was improperly supervised, counseled or taught by the EMPLOYER Defendants on how to provide safe and effective security guard services at the Hospital.”

 

Paragraph 22 of the second cause of action continues: The EMPLOYER Defendants’ and DOES’ hiring and/or retention of ASHLEY SANCHEZ was negligent. ASHLEY SANCHEZ was incompetent and/or unfit to be a security guard. Plaintiff is informed that ASHLEY SANCHEZ had a prior history of violent behavior of which the EMPLOYER Defendants were aware or should have been aware had proper background checks been conducted before hire and assignment to the Hospital. In the guarding industry it is below the standard of care to hire guards with violent propensities or past incidents of criminal misconduct. Plaintiff alleges further that if ASHLEY SANCHEZ was not unfit for hire, she was negligently retained as ASHLEY SANCHEZ violated the EMPLOYER Defendants and DOES’ rules regarding romance at the workplace, the violations of which EMPLOYER Defendants and DOES were aware or should have been aware had reasonable and prudent practices been in place or if protocols were in place, said protocols were not followed. Had EMPLOYER Defendant’s and DOES followed protocol, action would have been taken based on EMPLOYER Defendant’s Director of Security, Miguel Santos’ knowledge that ASHLEY SANCHEZ was having multiple conflicts with Hospital staff and personnel long before Plaintiff was improperly contacted by ASHLEY SANCHEZ. There were many missed opportunities for the EMPLOYER Defendants to appreciate that ASHLEY SANCHEZ was a grenade with the pin pulled, ready to explode had defendants taken the time to act on or appreciate the signals and repeated outbursts by ASHLEY SANCHEZ on Hospital grounds.

 

The negligence cause of action itself apparently only addresses the conduct of Sanchez, and it remains unclear how “Employer” Defendant was under a duty of care based on prior knowledge of certain violent propensities. The court finds insufficient support for negligence as to the Employer defendant, and sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action with leave to amend.

 

 On the other hand, Paragraph 22 clearly articulates knowledge of alleged prior conduct indicating the potential for workplace violence. The alleged disregard of both purported warning signs in the hiring process and following workplace incidents supports the subject claim for purposes of the demurrer. The demurrer is overruled as to the second cause of action.

 

3rd Cause of Action: Assault

4th Cause of Action: Battery

Defendant challenges the assault cause of action on grounds that any such threats were not within the course and conduct of job duties, and denial of any ratification of such conduct.

 

 

Defendant challenges the battery cause of action on grounds that any such unwelcome contact was not within the course and conduct of job duties, and denial of any ratification of such conduct.

 

Vicarious liability requires allegations that the tortfeasor was acting within the course and scope of employment duties. (Civ. Code, § 2338; Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 297 [“While the employee thus need not have intended to further the employer's interests, the employer will not be held liable for an assault or other intentional tort that did not have a causal nexus to the employee's work”].) . “A principal is responsible for no other wrongs committed by his agent … unless he has authorized or ratified them, even though they are committed while the agent is engaged in his service.” (Civ. Code, § 2339.) Nothing in the operative complaint specifically alleges that moving defendants were actually aware of the conduct Dr. Castillo with other patients, including Plaintiff, or even other employees, and yet still allowed Dr. Castillo to examine patients in private. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110-1111.)

 

Employer Defendant relies on a description of the conduct as personally motivated as opposed to Plaintiff citing to the allegations in the complaint regarding the threat and use of force as within the scope of providing security services. The allegations regarding the provision of security services for purposes of maintaining access and control of the premises, and Sanchez’s alleged improper use of force during the provision of employment duties sufficiently articulates the claim for purposes of the demurrer. [Comp., ¶¶ 33, 44.] (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004.) The court declines to engage in qualitative distinctions based on extrinsic reference, as emphasized in the reply. Defendant may conduct discovery into the motivations. (See Juarez v. San Bernardino City Unified School District (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1222.) The demurrer is overruled as to assault and battery.

 

5th Cause of Action: Bane Act Violation

Employer Defendant challenges the subject claim on grounds of a failure to allege a basis of wrongful violation of the Bane Act against it, and only stating a claim against Sanchez. Plaintiff concedes as much and declares the demurrer moot. The complaint in fact only identifies Sanchez in the subject cause of action. The demurrer to this cause of action is moot and taken off-calendar.

 

6th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The parties again dispute the subject cause of action on grounds of vicarious liability. “‘The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.’ [¶] Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society, and is of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 617.) Consistent with the assault and battery causes of action, the court finds the complaint sufficiently articulates vicarious liability and overrules the demurrer. [Comp., ¶¶ 63-68.]

 

In summary, the demurrer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend as to the negligence cause of action, moot and taken off-calendar as to the Bane Act claim, and overruled as to the remainder. If Plaintiff elects to forego filing an amended complaint, Moving Defendant is ordered to answer the remaining operative causes of action within 10 days of the lapsed amendment pleading deadline. Plaintiff may NOT add any new causes of action, and may only amend introductory allegations as they relate to the negligence claim. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) Any additional language may be subject to a motion to strike.

 

The court will concurrently conduct the case management conference and OSC re: Sanctions.

 

Moving Defendant to give notice.