Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV09835, Date: 2024-12-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV09835 Hearing Date: December 11, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept.
68
Date:
12-11-24
Case
#24STCV09835
Trial
Date: Not Set
DEMURRER/STRIKE
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant, Glendale Properties
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Narine Davtyan
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Demurrer
to the Complaint
·
1st
Cause of Action: Negligence
·
2nd
Cause of Action: Breach of the Warranty of Habitability
·
3rd
Cause of Action: Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
·
4th
Cause of Action: Nuisance
·
5th
Cause of Action: Breach of Contract
·
6th
Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
·
7th
Cause of Action: Violation of Cal. Civil Code §1942.4
Motion
to Strike
·
Punitive
Damages
·
Attorney
Fees
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff Narine Davtyan entered into a lease for certain
residential premises with Defendant Trumark Services, Inc. in December 2019.
Plaintiff alleges habitability issues, including water/weather proofing issues
thereby allowing water intrusion and toxic contaminants such as mold to develop,
as well as pest infestation. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for
(1) Negligence (2) Breach of the Warranty of Habitability (3) Breach of the
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment (4) Nuisance (5) Breach of Contract (6) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (7) Violation of Cal. Civil Code §1942.4.
RULING
Demurrer:
Overruled
Defendant
Glendale Properties, Inc. submits a demurrer to the entire complaint on grounds
of failure to state sufficient facts in support of all identified causes of
action. Plaintiff in opposition maintains the complaint
sufficiently pleads all causes of action. Defendant in reply reiterates the
uncertainty basis of the demurrer.
A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for
which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which
the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see
also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a
pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley
v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a
pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v.
Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the
court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action
has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
726, 733.)
“A demurrer for
uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects
uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery
procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules,
where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently
apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for
uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]
Although the
motion identifies a challenge to all causes of action, the motion itself lack
specific address to the first cause of action for negligence, the third cause
of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and fifth cause of
action for breach of contract. The court therefore only considers the second,
fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action for Breach of the Warranty of
Habitability, Nuisance, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and
Violation of Cal. Civil Code §1942.4.
2nd
Cause of Action, Breach of the Warranty of Habitability: Overruled.
The
complaint sufficiently alleges the breach of warranty of habitability. (Green
v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 627.) Any qualitative
distinctions rely on extrinsic inference. The complaint sufficiently
articulates Defendants’ awareness of the defects based on both complaints and
the City code enforcement inspection. [Comp., ¶¶ 25-46.] Plaintiff may
additionally and alternatively allege the subject claim. (Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North
Entertainment Insurance Services, LLC (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1323; Rader Co. v.
Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 29.)
The demurrer is overruled as to this cause of action.
4th
Cause of Action, Nuisance: Overruled.
Defendant
challenges the claim as lacking facts to support “public nuisance.” The cause
of action is simply entitled “nuisance.” Plaintiff in opposition identifies the
cause of action as one for private nuisance. A private nuisance arises from the
interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of land. (Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Services (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 521, 534.) “Anything which is injurious to health, including … an obstruction
to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property…” constitutes a private nuisance. (Civ. Code, §§
3479, 3481.) “A nuisance may be both public and
private, but to proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintiff must prove
an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land.”
(Koll-Irvine
Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041.) The complaint
sufficiently alleges nuisance. The court again declines to consider extrinsic
considerations of unpled claims, such as public nuisance. The demurrer
is overruled as to this cause of action.
6th
Cause of Action, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Overruled.
The elements of [intentional infliction of
emotional distress] are ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant
with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme
emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’” (Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 129.) “The tort calls for
intentional, or at least reckless conduct—conduct intended to inflict injury or
engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Id. at p. 130.) “The modern rule is that there is liability for
conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society, of a nature
which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress (citation).
‘Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or
position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows
the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts
intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to
result in illness through mental distress.’” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck
(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.) The refusal to rectify the substandard
conditions meets the standard for outrageous conduct. The court declines to
consider qualitative distinctions based on “passive conduct” as excusing the
intentional disregard to the quality of the premises and welfare of Plaintiff
tenant. The argument under the economic loss rule is inapposite as well. The
demurrer is overruled as to this cause of action.
7th
Cause of Action, Violation of Cal. Civil Code §1942.4: Overruled.
The complaint
sufficiently articulates substandard conditions, notice to the landlord, and
therefore a basis for damages under the statute. The demurrer is overruled as
to this cause of action.
Motion to Strike
Defendant Glendale Properties, Inc. move to strike allegations
in support of, and claim for, punitive damages claim. Civil Code, Section 3294,
subdivision (c) authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice,
oppression, or fraud, which are defined
as follows:
(1) “Malice” means
conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) “Oppression”
means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
(3) “Fraud” means an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
Punitive damages require more than the mere commission of a
tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pled in support of
punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins
Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient
to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be
circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.
[Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. Omitted [emphasis added].)
The disregard for safety standards
constitutes a showing of a reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
tenants by a landlord legally obligated to provide habitable premises. The corporate entity was responsible for
decision thereby supporting a finding of corporate direction and ratification. (White v. Ultramar,
Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576–577; Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168.) The motion to strike is
therefore denied as to punitive damages.
Defendant also challenges the
recovery of attorney fees. Paragraph 25 of the incorporated lease specifically
provides for the recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party. The motion
to strike is denied.
In summary, the demurrer is
overruled, and the motion to strike denied. Defendant to answer the
complaint within 10 days of this order.
Demurrer of Trumark Services, Inc. scheduled for March 19,
2025.
Moving Defendant to give notice.