Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV12254, Date: 2024-10-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12254    Hearing Date: October 21, 2024    Dept: 68

DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Los Angeles Unified School District

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Carolyn Johnson

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Demurrer to the Complaint

·         1^st Cause of Action: Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq.

·         2^nd Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq.

·         4^th Cause of Action: Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code 12940, et seq.

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiff Carolyn Johnson began work as a schoolteacher for Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) in 1999. On July 26, 2021, Plaintiff underwent surgery for treatment of a brain tumor, which led to Plaintiff’s designation as a disabled employee requiring accommodation. Plaintiff subsequently began remote instruction for remote students. In June 2022, LAUSD required Plaintiff to start physically reporting to school premises for work. Plaintiff requested continued remote work. Notwithstanding the recommendation of the medical director for LAUSD recommending continued remote work, and submission of additional supporting documentation, the request was denied.

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code 12940, et seq., and Declaratory Judgment.

RULING: Sustained with Leave to Amend in Part/Overruled in Part.

“Objections” to “New Evidence” in Opposition: Overruled/Not Relied Upon (See Standard)

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) brings a demurrer to the first, second and fourth causes of action for Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., and Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code 12940, et seq. LAUSD challenges the subject causes of action on grounds that the complaint lacks articulation of an adverse employment action, and insufficiently articulates separate and distinct claims based a common core of disability discrimination/failure to accommodate allegations. Plaintiff in opposition maintains the complaint is properly pled, and LAUSD improperly relies on extrinsic facts and inference. Plaintiff alternatively requests leave to amend. LAUSD in reply reiterates the lack of distinctive claims and sole reliance on the failure to accommodate due to the requirement that Plaintiff report in person to a LAUSD facility.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) “In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The court “ ‘ “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . .” ’ ” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.)

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 [“[U]nder our liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.]

1^st Cause of Action: Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq.

“The specific elements of a prima facie case [for discrimination] may vary depending on the particular facts. (Citation) Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) [s]he was a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)

Disability discrimination requires a plaintiff show she “(1) suffered from a disability, (2) could perform the essential duties of a job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. (Citation.) To establish a prima facie case, the employee must show ‘actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were “based on a [prohibited] discriminatory criterion ....”’ (Citation.) The employee's burden of proving a prima facie case is not onerous, and very little evidence is required at this step.” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 37 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

“[A]n adverse employment action is not limited to ‘ultimate’ employment acts, such as a specific hiring, firing, demotion, or failure to promote decision. The legislative purpose underlying FEHA's prohibition against retaliation is to prevent employers from deterring employees from asserting good faith discrimination complaints, and the use of intermediate retaliatory actions may certainly have this effect. ... [T]he retaliation must result in a substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. A change that is merely contrary to the employee's interests or not to the employee's liking is insufficient. Requiring an employee to prove a substantial adverse job effect ‘guards against both “judicial micromanagement of business practices,” [citation] and frivolous suits over insignificant slights.’ (Citation.) Absent this threshold showing, courts will be thrust into the role of personnel officers, becoming entangled in every conceivable form of employee job dissatisfaction. While the Legislature was understandably concerned with the chilling effect of employer retaliatory actions and mandated that FEHA provisions be interpreted broadly to prevent unlawful discrimination, it could not have intended to provide employees a remedy for any possible slight resulting from the filing of a discrimination complaint.” (Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1455.)

LAUSD maintains Plaintiff improperly conflates all claims on the basis of the failure to accommodate. “[T]he FEHA scheme prohibits specific unlawful employment practices by covered employers, e.g., discrimination, retaliation, failure to make reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process with the employee. We conclude that the commission of one specific prohibited employment practice does not, in and of itself, constitute commission of all other prohibited employment practices under the broad rubric of policies or practices affecting the ‘terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’ Such an interpretation would be contrary to the whole point of specifically separating conduct into individual unlawful employment practices.” (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1106–1107.)

The court appreciates the position of LAUSD in that the complaint consists of the “factual allegations” providing the foundation for the individually identified causes of action without separately articulated elemental bases. Instead, the individual causes of action consist of a series of conclusions relying on incorporation of the foundational allegations.

It remains undisputed that Plaintiff suffers from a disability as a result of the brain surgery and requires accommodation. The failure to accommodate cause of action in fact remains unchallenged. While the result of the failure to accommodate may result from discriminatory motive, the mere existence of the lack of accommodation will not excuse the required elements for the discrimination claim—the adverse action was the result of the disability itself. (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 37; Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1106–1107.) The complaint lacks any facts even alleging said element.

The demurrer is therefore sustained.

2^nd Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq.

LAUSD follows that without a separate basis of articulated discrimination, Plaintiff cannot state failure to prevent discrimination. (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1166.) The demurrer is sustained.

4^th Cause of Action: Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code 12940, et seq.

LAUSD challenges the instant cause of action on grounds that while the complaint alleges engagement in the interactive process, the substance of the cause of action only pleads a failure to accommodate in different form, rather than an actual claim of improper process. Plaintiff counters that the complaint articulates bad faith engagement in the process, and no reasonable accommodation occurred. “The purpose of the interactive process is to determine what accommodations is required. Once a reasonable accommodation has been granted, then the employer has a duty to provide that reasonable accommodation.” (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109.)

The complaint alleges the ultimate denial of the request to accommodate (e.g. continued remote work). The process leading to the apparent denial of the requested accommodation constitutes the issue. The court declines to engage in any qualitative determination as to the reasonableness of the conduct by LAUSD in the subject demurrer. The court finds the allegations sufficient for purposes of alleging the subject cause of action.

The demurrer is overruled.

In summary, the demurer is sustained with 30 days leave to amend as to the first and second causes of action for Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., and Failure to Prevent Discrimination in Violation of Government Code section 12940, et seq., and overruled as to the fourth cause of action for Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code 12940, et seq.

Plaintiff may only amend the existing causes of action. Plaintiff may not add any new causes of action or damages claims. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) If Plaintiff declines or fails to file a first amended complaint, moving defendant shall answer the operative complaint within 10 days of the lapsed deadline. Any new causes of action or allegations outside the scope of the order may be addressed via a motion to strike.

LAUSD to give notice to all parties.