Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 24STCV18679, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV18679, Date: 2025-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV18679 Hearing Date: January 8, 2025 Dept: 68

Dept.-68

Date: 1-8-25

Case: 24STCV18679

Trial Date: Not Set

PREJUDGMENT POSSESSION

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, The People of the State of California

RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendant, Southern California Edison

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Prejudgment Possession

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On July 26, 2024, The State of California, by and through its Department of Transportation (DOT) filed a complaint in eminent domain for property identified as Parcel No. 81664-1 against Defendant Southern California Edison Company (Edison). On September 13, 2024, DOT filed a Notice of Deposit and Declaration Regarding Summary Basis for the Appraisal indicating a deposit of $15,000 with the State Treasurer. On October 14, 2024, Edison answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint for Quiet Title and Declaratory Relief.

RULING: Granted.

Plaintiff DOT moves for prejudgment possession of Parcel No. 81664-1. DOT seeks to move an Edison utility pole sitting located on an easement now secured by a DOT easement over private landowner, third party Lancantel Investment Co. in order to complete a highway safety improvement. DOT represents the $15,000 deposit compensates Edison for costs of relocating the pole within the parcel. Edison in myriad opposition maintains its prescriptive easement over the parcel for the utility pole, challenges the basis of the proposed highway improvement as insufficiently supported, failure to comply with prejudgment eminent domain requirements, and an unfair balance of equities imposed on Edison. DOT in reply concedes to the prescriptive easement, but represents full compliance with eminent domain requirements, an appropriate basis to proceed, and denial of any hardship.

“The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if all of the following are established: (a) The public interest and necessity require the project. (b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. (c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1240.030.) “(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to this article conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030. ...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.250.) “(a) At any time before entry of judgment, the plaintiff may deposit with the State Treasury the probable amount of compensation, based on an appraisal, that will be awarded in the proceeding. The appraisal upon which the deposit is based shall be one that satisfies the requirements of subdivision (b). The deposit may be made whether or not the plaintiff applies for an order for possession or intends to do so. ...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.010.)

“(a) At the time of filing the complaint or at any time after filing the complaint and prior to entry of judgment, the plaintiff may move the court for an order for possession under this article, demonstrating that the plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain and has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article. ... (d)(2) If the motion is opposed by a defendant or occupant within 30 days of service, the court may make an order for possession of the property upon consideration of the relevant facts and any opposition, and upon completion of a hearing on the motion, if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain. (B) The plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article. (C) There is an overriding need for the plaintiff to possess the property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and the plaintiff will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited. (D) The hardship that the plaintiff will suffer if possession is denied or limited outweighs any hardship on the defendant or occupant that would be caused by the granting of the order of possession. ...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410.)

DOT represents the necessity of the project for a traffic public safety improvement. The resolution was adopted during a public hearing. [Declaration of Gregory Farr, Ex. A.] The deposit was completed pursuant to the appraisal summary. [Declaration of Katherine Chen, Ex. A.] DOT represents the overriding need on the basis of public safety concerns and intended traffic improvement/danger mitigation in the area. The project was approved, and DOT seeks an expedited time frame to complete the project. [Declaration of Dan Murdoch.]

DOT also represents Edison is obligated to move the utility pole under statutory law. “The department and any utility required to remove a utility facility or to relocate any utility facility may, by agreement, provide for the respective amounts of the cost to be borne by each. The department may, without prejudice to its rights under Section 707, advance the cost of removal or relocation and if the department advances such cost, it is the duty of the utility to move its facilities as soon as reasonably possible so as not to delay freeway construction. In the case of any utility which is not financially able to bear the costs of removal or relocation, the department may by agreement provide for the work to be done on condition that the utility's portion of the costs be repaid to the department over a period of time not exceeding 10 years.

Either party may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction for an adjudication as to the obligations and costs to be borne by each party under such provisions of said contract at any time within four years after the cause of action first arose thereunder. Such a cause of action shall be deemed to arise upon and at the time of the completion by the utility of the removal or relocation in question, or at the time of breach of the agreement by either party. The filing of a claim with any state agency shall not be deemed a condition precedent to the maintenance by the utility of any such action.” (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 706.) “In the event of failure to reach an agreement as provided in Section 706, the utility or the department may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction for apportionment of the cost between them in accordance with the provisions of this article. Such an action may be commenced within three years from the date of completion by the utility of the removal or relocation in question. The filing of a claim with any state agency shall not be deemed a condition precedent to the maintenance by the utility of any such action.” (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 707.)

Given the concession to the prescriptive easement position of Edison, the court foregoes addressing the standard, and instead concentrates on the core dispute—the terms of the relocation. Edison concedes that a pole relocation cost estimate totals $11,315.63 for labor and materials without any additional costs, such as real estate acquisition and potential power outages to customers. The DOT offer to relocate the poll on the existing parcel already under control of DOT somewhat undermines the inadequacy of the $15,000 deposit dispute. The court otherwise finds no articulation regarding the costs of customer disruption. [Declaration of Eric Park.] Thus, Edison establishes no additional net costs and in fact concedes to coverage in excess of the required amount from DOT for relocation.

Edison presents no specific challenge to the necessity of the relocation, and instead seeks a greater bargaining position with DOT. Edison depends on the lack of a Joint Use Agreement with DOT, whereby DOT will only provide a license thereby reserving a right to demand relocation a second time at the cost to Edison. DOT offers no specific rebuttal or even address to this position in reply, and instead reiterates the rights to eminent domain and denial of any hardship in that DOT holds certain statutory rights for this project.

Edison seeks to elevate the lack of a Joint Use Agreement and only offer for a license as integral to its position of unequal hardship imposed on Edison. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1255.410, subd. (d)(2)(D); Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 704; People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 315, 324.) The argument relies on a potential scenario of inadequate payment based on a potential future required second location, and lack of more secured compensation in case of a potential second relocation. Edison takes this position based on the lack of a business as usual Joint Use Agreement, and notwithstanding the concession of proper costs compensation for the instant project.

The court appreciates the position of Edison, but finds no basis of legal support under the statutes or supporting law that a potential contingency imposed due to changed business practice positions undermines the otherwise conceded adequate for the immediate required solution to facilitate the project. The court declines to find a potential undue hardship based on a potential second, speculative possibility for purposes of determining the validity of the prejudgment possession motion. Furthermore, DOT specifically concludes that any and all further compensation rights are subject to determination at trial, whereby Edison can raise said concerns.

The court therefore finds the application sufficiently complies with all requirements. The entitlement to the relocation is well supported, and the compensation for the single relocation more than adequate. Any resolution of rights as to potential contingent costs is subject to further adjudication. (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 706, 707.) The court otherwise finds no justification for delaying the sought after expedited improvement project simply based on a speculative contingency not currently before the court, and brought on due to dissatisfaction with new business protocols.

The motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff to give notice.