Judge Stephen P. Pfahler, Case Number: 24STCV24989, Date: 2025-04-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV24989, Date: 2025-04-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24989 Hearing Date: April 1, 2025 Dept: 68

Dept. 68

Date: 4-1-25 a/f 6-4-25

Case: 24STCV24989

Trial Date: Not Set

PROTECTIVE ORDER

MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Forest Law Mortuary, et al.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Minas Fournouzian

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Protective Order

SUMMARY OF ACTION

On September 26, 2024, Plaintiff Minas Fournouzian filed a complaint for

(1) Sex Harassment in Violation of Feha; (2) Sex Plus Harassment and Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (3) Sex Discrimination In Violation of FEHA; (4) Failure to Prevent Harassment in Violation Of Feha; (5) Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of Public Policy against Defendants Forest Lawn Mortuary, Forest Lawn Memorial-Park Association, Hilda Carabes, and Nectar Luz Ramirez. Defendants answered the complaint on November 19, 2024.

RULING: Denied.

Defendants Forest Lawn Memorial-Park Association, Hilda Carabes, and Nectar Luz Ramirez move for a protective order allowing for remote depositions, rather than in-person deposition on the nine outstanding remaining depositions. Defendants maintain the in person requirements are burdensome, and especially compounded in that depositions seek duplicative and redundant information with the intent of increasing expended resources defending the action. Plaintiff in opposition emphasizes the statutory entitlement to in person deposition barring an agreement for alternative means, and no basis for any “arbitrary” limit on in person versus remote depositions. Defendants reiterate their position of duplicative and harassing intent as a means of increasing costs to Defendants. Defendants then deny any “existing” authority to demand witnesses subject to a protective order, and Plaintiff additionally cites to an “outdated version” of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants then address the individual positions of six different witnesses, including Grasciella Alvarado, Lousine Katrdzhyan, Salpy Khoury, Valerie Lopez, Maggie Megerdichian, and Rina Steinke. Finally, Defendants reiterates the sanctions request.

On February 11, 2025, the court granted Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to advance the hearing from June 4, 2025 to April 1, 2025. Defendants served amended notice on February 13, 2025.

A Court may make any order that justice requires to protect a party from “unwanted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) A deponent may seek that the deposition is not taken at all, the deposition only taken on specified terms and conditions, or only certain matters are allowed for inquiry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b)(1)(5)(9).) The burden of proof is on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” for the order he or she seeks. (Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

A motion for a protective order “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) The motion contains a sufficient meet and confer effort. [Declaration of Nicole Golob, Ex. G-

N.]

The right of Plaintiff to conduct discovery remains undisputed. The party noticing the deposition must indicate the location of the deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.220, subd. (a)(1).) The location restrictions indicate the right to notice an in person deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.260.)

The subject motion in no way constitutes a motion to compel deposition. Following the Covid-19 pandemic, and lapse of the emergency provisions limiting in person contact, the legislature amended the deposition requirements allowing for agreed upon remote depositions or by protective order, including consideration of public health and safety ordinances.

(b) Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent. If a party or attorney of record elects to be physically present at the location of the deponent, all physically present participants in the deposition shall comply with local health and safety ordinances, rules, and orders. (c) The procedures to implement this section shall be established by court order in the specific action or proceeding or by the California Rules of Court. (d) An exercise of the authority granted by subdivision (a) or (b) does not waive any other provision of this title, including, but not limited to, provisions regarding the time, place, or manner in which a deposition shall be conducted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.310.) “A deponent must appear as required by statute or as agreed to by the parties and deponent.” (Cal. Rules Ct., rule 3.1010(c).)

The court interprets the statute as allowing the noticing party to choose the means, in person or otherwise, but the deponent cannot impose conditions barring a protective order. Defendants rely on certain logistical issues, such as regular payment into a parking meters, as the basis for unnecessary difficulty in conducting nine (9) additional in person depositions, though Defendant seemed to revise the number of potential remaining witnesses down to six (6) in the reply. [Golob Decl.; See Declaration of Serineh Terzyan.] The court appreciates the frustration they noted with the demands of Plaintiff’s counsel, but finds inconvenience and increased expense caused from parking meter fees and transportation as opposed to a preferred remote technological means, an insufficient basis to warrant a protective order under the circumstances.

More importantly, the court also finds the conclusive position in the motion and reply regarding redundant witnesses inadequate. The court declines to preemptively adjudicate the validity of the course of discovery. A defendant may always object during the course of the deposition regarding the course and scope of the questioning. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420.) Whether Plaintiff will still seek the depositions of the six or nine identified witnesses after completing certain preliminary witness depositions remains to be determined in the meantime. Litigation tactics intended to increase resource allocation remains a potential basis for a protective order, but the court declines to preemptively review any potential witness list based on a summary determination of qualified witnesses. Such a review constitutes a premature determination and beyond the policy of this court. The court adheres to a program encouraging robust discovery practices in order to allow for the presentation of the best positions for all sides unless and until a showing of excessive, abusive practices is made with factual support.

The motion is therefore DENIED. If the parties require further guidance following the completion of the initial items, the parties may schedule an informal discovery conference with the court before filing any (renewed) motions for protective order.

The court declines the request for sanctions by Plaintiff. Because of a potential return or even potential appointment of a referee to conduct a supervised deposition in case of excessive questioning, the court in its discretion refrains from imposing sanctions at this time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (h).)

Case Management Conference and OSC re: Proof of Service on May 9, 2025. Motion to compel supplemental responses on October 22, 2025.

Defendants to give notice.