Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: 24STCV26240, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV26240 Hearing Date: December 9, 2024 Dept: 68
Dept.
68
Calendar
# 7
Date:
12-9-24
Case
#24STCV26240
Trial
Date: Not Set
MOTION FOR TRIAL SETTING PREFERENCE
MOVING
PARTY: Plaintiff, Penny Perry
RESPONDING
PARTY: Defendants, Hallmark Media United States, LLC, Lisa Hamilton Daly, Randy
Pope, and Paul Hodgkinson
RELIEF
REQUESTED
Plaintiff
moves for an order granting trial setting preference pursuant to CCP § 36.
SUMMARY
OF ACTION
Plaintiff Penny Perry (Plaintiff) alleges that she has been
subject to torment, harassment, and discriminatory conduct by Defendants.
Plaintiff is 79 years old and is a casting director, producer, and director of
programming with decades of experience. Plaintiff alleges that her career
abruptly ended when she was harassed, discriminated against, and then fired by
Hallmark. Plaintiff alleges that she was wrongfully terminated and that her
requests for reasonable accommodations due to two serious health conditions
were ignored by Defendants.
On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint for 1. Age
Harassment; 2. Age Discrimination; 3. Disability Harassment; 4. Disability
Discrimination; 5. Failure to Accommodate/Engage in the Interactive Process; 6.
Retaliation under FEHA; 7. Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, and
Retaliation; 8. Wrongful Termination; 9. Defamation; 10. Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress; 11. Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; 12. Violation of
Labor Code § 98.6; and 13. Unfair Business Practices.
On October 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion
for trial setting preference.
On November 19, 2024, after hearing, the Court continued the
hearing on Plaintiff’s ex parte application to grant trial preference
or, alternatively, to advance the hearing on the motion for trial preference to
November 21, 2024.
On November 20, 2024, Defendant Hallmark Media United
States, LLC (Hallmark) filed an answer to the complaint.
On November 21, 2024, after hearing, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s ex parte application in part. The Court advanced the hearing
on the motion for trial preference from January 29, 2025, to December 9, 2024.
The opposition was ordered to be filed by December 2, 2024 at 12:00 PM, and any
reply brief was ordered to be filed and served no later than 12:00 PM on
December 6, 2024. (See 11/21/24 Minute Order.) Plaintiff provided notice of the
Court’s November 21, 2024 order.
On December 2, 2024, Defendants filed an opposition to the
motion.
As of December 5, 2024, no reply brief has been filed.
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not filed a
proof of service showing service of the complaint on any of the Defendants. An
OSC Re: Failure to File Proof of Service is set for May 27, 2025.
RULING: Denied without
prejudice.
Plaintiff,
Penny Perry (Plaintiff) moves for trial setting preference on the grounds that
she is 79 years of age and her serious health conditions are such that a
preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing her interest in this litigation.
Defendants, Hallmark Media United States, LLC, Lisa Hamilton Daly, Randy Pope,
and Paul Hodgkinson (Defendants) in opposition argue that Plaintiff has failed
to establish that she is entitled to a preference and the request for trial
preference violates Defendants’ due process rights.
Evidentiary
Objections
The
Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ evidentiary objections numbers 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to
Plaintiff’s evidence in support of the motion on the grounds of lack of
personal knowledge and lack of foundation. (Evid. Code §§ 702, 800, 801.)
“[T]he testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible
unless he has personal knowledge of the matter. Against the objection of a
party, such personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify
concerning the matter.” (Evid Code. § 702.)
The
Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ evidentiary objections numbers 2, 8, and 9 to
Plaintiff’s evidence in support of the motion on the grounds of hearsay. (Evid.
Code § 1200.)
Discussion
“On petition of any party over 70, section 36, subdivision
(a), provides that the granting of calendar preference is mandatory in some
circumstances.” (Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529,
533.) A court must grant a trial
preference under Code Civ. Proc. § 36(a) where the following two factors are
present: (1) the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole; and
(2) the health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent
prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. (Ibid.) Where a motion for trial preference is
granted, the clerk shall set the case for trial not more than 120 days from
that date. (Koch-Ash v. Superior
Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 694.)
The purpose of Code Civ. Proc. § 36 is “to avoid an irrevocable loss of
a qualifying plaintiff’s substantive right to a trial during his or her
lifetime and to potential recovery of damages that would not survive
plaintiff’s pretrial death.” (Ibid.) A motion for trial preference does not
require a doctor’s declaration and “may be supported by nothing more than an
attorney’s declaration based upon the information and belief as to the medical
diagnosis and prognosis of any party.” (Fox v. Superior Court, supra,
21 Cal.App.5th 529, 534, citation omitted [explaining that an attorney
declaration under CCP § 36.5 can consist entirely of hearsay and
conclusions.].) “An affidavit submitted in support of a motion for preference
under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be signed by the attorney for the party
seeking preference based upon information and belief as to the medical
diagnosis and prognosis of any party. The affidavit is not admissible for any
purpose other than a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section
36.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36.5.)
“The application of section 36, subdivision (a), does not
violate the power of trial courts to regulate the order of their business. Mere
inconvenience to the court or to other litigants is irrelevant.” (Swaithes
v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085.) “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the court may in its discretion grant a motion for
preference that is supported by a showing that satisfies the court that the
interests of justice will be served by granting this preference.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 36, subd. (e).) “[W]hen ruling on a motion for preference in trial
setting, the trial court must consider the total picture, including the court’s
calendar, dilatory conduct by the [moving party], prejudice to the defendant in
the event of an accelerated trial date, and the likelihood of an eventual
mandatory dismissal if the request for a preferential trial date is denied.” (Mitchell
v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hospital (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404.)
Evidence in Support of the Motion
Plaintiff declares that she is currently 79 years old and is
seeking recovery solely for her own damages arising from her unlawful
termination from employment with Defendants. (Perry Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff
states that it is important for her to meaningfully participate in her case
through trial, and she requests an expedited trial date in her case. (Perry
Decl., ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff’s counsel, Josh Schein (Schein), declares that Plaintiff
is the sole plaintiff in this action. (Schein Decl., ¶ 2.)
Evidence in Opposition to the Motion
Defendants’ counsel, Leigh A. White (White), relevantly declares
that grating the motion would negatively impact Defendants due to the lack of
sufficient time to conduct discovery before trial and would not allow
sufficient time to file a motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication.
(White Decl., ¶ 7.) Counsel also states that Plaintiff served voluminous
discovery requests on November 18, 2024, and Defendants are in the process of
reviewing such requests. (White Decl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff also objected to Defendants’
subpoenas to Plaintiff’s and her husband’s medical providers even though she
placed her health and that of her husband directly at issue in this case.
(White Decl., ¶ 9.)
Analysis
The Court finds that a granting of a trial preference is inappropriate
under CCP § 36(a) or CCP § 36(e). The vast portion of the declarations
submitted in support of the motion are inadmissible. In fact, the Court opines
why Defendants did not object to the entirety of Plaintiff’s declaration given
that Plaintiff’s declaration does not state that she has personal knowledge of
the matters set forth therein. Moreover, the declaration of Dr. Louis Fishman,
M.D.—to which the Court sustained all of Defendants’ evidentiary objections
thereto—also does not state that Dr. Fishman has personal knowledge of the
matters set forth therein.
Thus, the evidence presented in support of the motion is
severely deficient. The admissible evidence submitted in support of the motion
does not allow the Court to make a finding that Plaintiff’s health is such that
a preference is warranted to avoid prejudicing her interest in this litigation.
Further, the admissible evidence presented in support of the motion does not
allow the Court to make a finding that a preference is in the interest of
justice under CCP § 36(e).
The Court reminds Plaintiff that “[a] supporting declaration
must be made on personal knowledge . . . .” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank
National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1376.)
As such, the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s
motion for trial setting preference.
Plaintiff, Penny Perry to give notice.