Judge: Stephen P. Pfahler, Case: BC709434, Date: 2023-01-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC709434    Hearing Date: January 10, 2023    Dept: F49

Dept. F-49

Date: 1-10-22

Case #BC709434

Trial Date: 2-21-23

 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

 

MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Farouk and Mary Riad

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Natasha Robinson and David Maxim, Pro Per

 

RELIEF REQUESTED

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the First Amended Complaint:

·         2nd Cause of Action: Negligence

·         7th Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

·         8th Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

·         11th Cause of Action: Nuisance

 

SUMMARY OF ACTION

Plaintiffs Natasha Robinson and David Maxim are “residents” at Paseo Dorena Townhomes. The property is governed by Defendant Paseo Dorena Owners Association. Defendants Dina Marie Gordon, Louie Bryan Gonzalez and Monique Gordon are also residents at the property. Defendants Warren Davidoff, Melissa Lopez and Mike Dukoff are member of the Owners Association board

 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants Gordon and Gonzalez acted in a verbally and physically abusive manner to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that owner association rules impose a duty of care for “protection and quiet enjoyment of [residents’] property.” Plaintiff allege seeking assistance from the Owners Association board members, but said members took no protective action.

 

Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants made and repeated false accusations against Plaintiff Maxim regarding his conduct toward Defendant Gordon.

 

On June 8, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Negligence (twice), Defamation (twice), Defamation Per Se, Breach of Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (twice), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Assault & Battery (twice), Nuisance, Discrimination, Abuse of Process and Slander. The action was reassigned to Department 49 on October 24, 2018.

 

On February 11, 2019, the court sustained the demurrer to the complaint as to one of the negligence causes of action, the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, one of the negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action, and the discrimination cause of action.  The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the 6th cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. The court sustained the demurrer to the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment cause of action without leave to amend. The court overruled the demurrer to the defamation, defamation per se, and slander causes of action.

 

The court granted the motion to strike the punitive damage allegations in all causes of action not rendered moot by the demurrer.  

 

On March 8, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for Negligence (twice), Defamation (twice), Defamation Per Se, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (twice), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Assault & Battery (twice), Nuisance, Discrimination, Abuse of Process and Slander. On May 6, 2019, the court sustained the demurrer to the first cause of action for negligence, the sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and Discrimination cause of action without leave to amend. The court overruled the demurrer to the nuisance cause of action. Defendants answered the first amended complaint on May 15, 2019.

 

On November 23, 2022, the court granted the motion of Plaintiffs’ counsel to be relieved as attorney of record.

 

RULING: Granted.

Defendants Farouk and Mary Riad move for judgment on the pleadings on the second, seventh, eighth, and eleventh causes of action for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and nuisance in the first amended complaint. Moving Defendants are named in the first amended complaint as the “absentee owners” of the condo/townhouse unit occupied by defendants Gordon and Gonzalez. The Riad defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that the first amended complaint fails to allege a factual basis of liability against them.

 

Plaintiffs, in pro per, filed a 41 page “Amended Notice of Motion and Motion…” which appears to constitute an opposition to the motion. To the extent the “amended notice…” constitutes an opposition, it is both filed three (3) court days late, and well exceeds the page limit for points and authorities. The opposition cites extensively to the CC&Rs and reliance on the argument that moving defendants insufficiently stopped the behavior of their tenants.

 

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint… [¶] The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.” (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether the factual allegations, assumed true, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452-453.)

 

2nd Cause of Action, Negligence: Granted.

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently articulate the basis of duty, and any incident thereby constituting a breach of duty, arising from the prevention of any alleged violence, trespass, or nuisance. Plaintiffs in opposition rely on the plain language of the codes, covenants and regulations governing the owner association. The first amended complaint quotes portions of the operative sections. Article III, Section 5 states in part: “No noxious or offensive activities shall be cared on…not shall anything be done thereon which may become an annoyance or nuisance…” The section bars any the service of food and beverages out of the owners unit, unless the board approved said activities in common areas.  Plaintiff also cites to Article III, Section 10, which renders any and all pet owners liable for the actions of their pets.

 

Nothing in the citations in the first amended complaint or any additional sections in the extensive opposition, including the section regarding the leasing and renting of homeowners units, sufficiently articulates a basis of duty or facts demonstrating an alleged breach of any duty, due to the alleged omissions of moving defendants, in their capacity as absentee homeowners/landlords, to prevent Gordon and Gonzalez from engaging in their alleged conduct. [First Amend. Comp., ¶¶ 24-27.] The cited CC&Rs lack sufficient support for the imposition of a duty on moving defendants to stop the neighbors from insulting Plaintiff, preventing the dog from escaping and visiting their premises, playing music in their household, and allegedly engaging in a physical altercation. The allegations regarding the alleged conduct of Gordon and Gonzalez and citation to the criminal Penal Code will not render moving defendants vicariously liable for their individual actions. The operative complaint otherwise lacks a general basis for establishing a basis of duty.

 

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with prejudice. Plaintiffs present no argument that further discovery will support a finding of a legal duty as a matter of law given the last two iterations of the complaint. (Banerian v. O'Malley (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 613.)

 

7th Cause of Action, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Granted

Defendants argue that the conduct described in the operative complaint lacks support of intentional conduct. Plaintiffs reiterate the CC&Rs, the allegedly defamatory statements, music lyrics, and reference to the dog tunneling under the backyard in order to escape, as the basis of the claim.

 

“‘[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘Conduct, to be “‘outrageous’” must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’ [Citation.] In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with ‘great [ ] specificity’ the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citation.]’” (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 160–161.)

 

Nothing in the failure to respond by the landlords supports a finding of outrageous, intentional conduct, with the intent to cause suffering. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with prejudice. Plaintiffs present no argument that further discovery will support a finding of a legal duty as a matter of law given the last two iterations of the complaint. (Banerian v. O'Malley (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 613.)

 

8th Cause of Action, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Granted.

Without a negligence claim, the emotional distress claim also falls. “[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 985.) Nothing in the failure to act supports an independent basis for relief through moving defendants’ alleged failure to act. Moving Defendants otherwise in no way participated in any manner to the alleged to the alleged course and conduct of the parties alleged interactions. Plaintiffs present no argument that further discovery will support a finding of a legal duty as a matter of law given the last two iterations of the complaint. (Banerian v. O'Malley (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 613.)

 

11th Cause of Action, Nuisance: Granted.

Defendants challenge the subject cause of action on grounds they in no way participated in the creation of the nuisance. The court cannot discern the basis of any opposition to the motion on this particular cause of action.

 

The nuisance arises from a series of alleged activities, including barking dogs, loud music, trespassing, vandalism, and ultimately assault and battery. [First Amend. Comp., ¶ 67.] The conduct constitutes third party the tenant defendants, rather than any direct action of moving defendants. Again, the court otherwise finds the alleged failure to act establishes a direct nexus with the subject claim. (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1552.) Plaintiffs present no argument that further discovery will support a finding of a legal duty as a matter of law given the last two iterations of the complaint. (Banerian v. O'Malley (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 613.)

 

Moving defendants Farouk and Mary Riad are dismissed from the action.

 

Moving Defendants are also ordered to give notice.