Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 19STCV10975, Date: 2023-09-12 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 

IMPORTANT:  In light of the COVID-19 emergency, the Court encourages all parties to appear remotely.  The capacity in the courtroom is extremely limited.  The Court appreciates the cooperation of counsel and the litigants. 

ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.




Case Number: 19STCV10975    Hearing Date: September 12, 2023    Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

 

Background

 

On March 29, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging causes of action for:  (1) Motor Vehicle; (2) General Negligence; (3) Motor Vehicle; and (4) General Negligence.  Plaintiffs allege they were involved in two separate auto accidents that occurred on April 3, 2017 and July 13, 2018.  Plaintiff Katty Yasharal alone was involved in the April 3, 2017 accident.  Plaintiffs Katty Yasharal, Minoo Yasharal, Ashley Soomekh and Aaron Soomekh were involved in the July 13, 2018 accident. 

 

On January 28, 2021, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Defendants Darron Maxtion, Anthony Saleh, Freebrandz Tourgin, LLC and Emagen Entertainment Group. 

 

On June 6, 2023, Defendants Avis Rent A Car Systems, LLC and PV Holding Corp. filed the instant motion for summary judgment.  No oppositions were filed to the motion.  On August 31, 2023, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition indicating that no opposition papers were filed.

 

Legal Standard

 

Vehicle Code § 17150

 

Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.

 

Vehicle Code § 17151

 

(a) The liability of an owner, bailee of an owner, or personal representative of a decedent imposed by this chapter and not arising through the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant is limited to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one accident and, subject to the limit as to one person, is limited to the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) for the death of or injury to more than one person in any one accident and is limited to the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) for damage to property of others in any one accident.

 

(b) An owner, bailee of an owner, or personal representative of a decedent is not liable under this chapter for damages imposed for the sake of example and by way of punishing the operator of the vehicle. Nothing in this subdivision makes an owner, bailee, or personal representative immune from liability for damages imposed for the sake of example and by way of punishing him for his own wrongful conduct.

 

49 USC § 30106 (“Graves Amendment”)

 

An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person…shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if--(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).  (49 USC §30106(a).)

 

Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof--(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or (2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.” (49 USC §30106(b).)

 

Defense Summary Judgment Standard

 

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code of Civil Procedure §437c(c).) From commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Company (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855.)

 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1), a party may properly seek summary adjudication of one or more causes of action, one or more affirmative defenses, the issue of punitive damages or the issue of duty.  (Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim of damages or an issue of duty.” Id.

 

Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.”  (Code of Civil Procedure §437c(o)(2).)  A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim.  (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.)  Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.”  (Id.)

 

Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense., the defendant has the burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense.  (Sumner v. Simpson University (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 577, 580 (defendants established each element of ministerial exception as a complete defense to tort claims but exception did not foreclose contract claims).)  “The burden on a defendant moving for summary judgment based upon the assertion of an affirmative defense is [different] than the burden to show that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established. Instead of merely submitting evidence to negate a single element of the plaintiff's cause of action, or offering evidence such as vague or insufficient discovery responses that the plaintiff does not have evidence to create an issue of fact as to one or more elements of his or her case the defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense.  If the defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied.”  (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467–468.)

 

In addition, the evidence and affidavits of the moving party are construed strictly, while those of the opponent are liberally read.  (Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.)  “All doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion (whether there is any issue of material fact [Code of Civil Procedure] § 437c) are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion (i.e., a denial of summary judgment).” (Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 502.)

 

Preemption

 

“The party who claims that a state statute is preempted by federal law bears the burden of demonstrating preemption.  An important corollary of this rule, often noted and applied by the United States Supreme Court, is that when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  (Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 956-957.)

 

“The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with the power to preempt state law.  Congress may exercise that power by enacting an express preemption provision, or courts may infer preemption under one or more of three implied preemption doctrines: conflict, obstacle, or field preemption.”  (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1059.)

 

Discussion

 

Defendants establish that the Graves Amendment preempts Vehicle Code §§17150 and 17151

 

California courts have yet to address whether 49 USC §30106 (the “Graves Amendment” applies to preclude rental car agency liability based on ownership per Vehicle Code §§17150 and 17151.  Defendants argue conflict preemption and rely entirely on federal case law from outside the Ninth Circuit to establish that the Graves Amendment preempts Vehicle Code §17150. (Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242, 1245; Graham v. Dunkley (2008) 50 A.D. 55, 58-59.) 

 

The Graves Amendment and Vehicle Code §§17150 and 17151 are in conflict and irreconcilable.  Under Vehicle Code §§17150 and 17151, an owner of a vehicle may be held liable in a certain limited amount for injuries caused by operation of the vehicle by any person.  No exemption is made for owners that are in the business of renting vehicles.  The Graves Amendment specifically exempts owners of a vehicle from liability (1) if they are in the business of leasing vehicles and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing by them. 

 

The express language of the Graves Amendment also indicates the intent to supersede state law imposing liability on vehicle owners who fall within the parameters of 49 USC §30106(a):  “An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person…shall not be liable under the law of any State….”  In addition, Congress expressly excluded from preemption state financial responsibility or liability insurance laws in subsection (b), the “savings clause.”  The express language of the statute indicates Congressional intent to preemption any conflicting state law. 

 

In addition. Defendants establish the “savings clause” does not apply to Vehicle Code §§17150 and 17151.  Vehicle Code §§17150 and 17151 do not impose any financial responsibility or insurance requirements on vehicle owners.  Section 17150 merely imposes liability on a vehicle owner for injuries “resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” (Vehicle Code §17150.)     

 

Section 17151 does not impose financial responsibility requirements on an owner.  It merely limits the liability exposure of an owner where the operator of the vehicle was not an agent or employee of the owner.  

 

Although not binding, the reasoning of Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242, 1249 is persuasive and applies here:  “In sum, neither the common law imposition of vicarious liability on rental car companies, nor the Florida legislature's endorsement of and limitations on such vicarious liability, constitutes a “financial responsibility” requirement. To the contrary, the import of the Graves Amendment is clear. States may require insurance or its equivalent as a condition of licensing or registration, or may impose such a requirement after an accident or unpaid judgment. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). They may suspend the license and registration of, or otherwise penalize, a car owner who fails to meet the requirement, or who fails to pay a judgment resulting from a collision. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2). They simply may not impose such judgments against rental car companies based on the negligence of their lessees. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).”  (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at p. 1249.)

 

Defendants establish that the Graves Amendment preempts Vehicle Code §17150. 

 

Defendants establish each element of the Graves Amendment as an affirmative statutory defense

 

Defendants establish each element of their affirmative defense under 49 USC §30106(a):  (1) that they were the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Ex. B; Nolan Dec., ¶2; Lieberman Dec., ¶2); (2) that the vehicle was being operated by someone who leased or rented the vehicle from Defendants (Nolan Dec., ¶¶3, 4, Ex. A); (3) Defendants are engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles (Nolan Dec., ¶6); and (4) Defendants were not negligent or engaged in criminal wrongdoing (Nolan Dec. ¶¶5, 7-12). 

 

Defendants establish each element of the Graves Amendment as a statutory defense.

 

Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of fact or offer any opposition to the legal issue of preemption

 

Defendants established each element of their statutory defense based on the Graves Amendment.  The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to establish preemption does not apply and/or raise a triable issue of fact as to the elements of the defense.  Plaintiff did not file any opposition.  Defendants therefore establish a complete defense to Plaintiff’s claims against it based on the Graves Amendment and summary judgment must be GRANTED. 

 

Conclusion

 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.  Based on the undisputed evidence, Plaintiff’s claims are completely barred by Defendants’ affirmative defense under the Graves Amendment.  No triable issues of fact remain.

 

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.