Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 19STCV39584, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV39584 Hearing Date: March 21, 2025 Dept: 29
Ruiz v. Enriquez
19STCV39584
Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
Tentative
The motion is denied.
Background
On November 4, 2019, Michael Ruiz (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Alba Susanna Enriquez (subsequently dismissed), Arturo Campos (subsequently dismissed), Christopher DeWayne Fields, and Does 1 through 10 for negligence arising out an automobile accident on November 6, 2017.
On May 6, 2020, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name City of Los Angeles as Doe 1 (subsequently dismissed).
On October 23, 2020, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Infinity Insurance Company as Doe 2 (subsequently dismissed).
On January 4, 2021, Defendants Alba Susanna Enriquez and Arturo Campos filed an answer to the complaint, as well as a cross-complaint (subsequently dismissed) against Christopher DeWayne Fields, City of Los Angeles, and Roes 1 through 10.
On January 3, 2023, default was entered against Christopher DeWayne Fields (“Defendant”).
On April 18, 2023, the Court entered a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $130,409.42.
On February 20, 2025, Defendant filed this motion to set aside the default and default judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 10, and Defendant filed a reply on March.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), provides for mandatory and discretionary relief from dismissal. “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) An application for discretionary relief must be filed “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months.” Where such an application for discretionary relief is made, the motion shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or pleading proposed to be filed, or the application will not be granted. (Ibid.) Mandatory relief is available, under certain circumstances, when the application is accompanied by an attorney affidavit attesting to the attorney’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Ibid.) An application for mandatory relief must be filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment.” (Ibid.)
In addition, and separately, even when there is no statutory basis to set aside a default or dismissal, courts have “the inherent authority to vacate a default and default judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake.” (Bae v. T.D. Service Co. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97; see also, e.g., Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-982.)
“Extrinsic fraud” generally involves some act that kept the party seeking relief “in ignorance of the action or proceeding” or “fraudulently prevented” the party “from presenting his claim or defense.” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471; see also, e.g., Bae, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.)
“Extrinsic mistake” is defined broadly and encompasses “almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342; see also, e.g., Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p, 981.) There need not necessarily be a mistake “in the strict sense.” (Park, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 342.) But a mistake is intrinsic, and not extrinsic, when “a party’s own negligence allows the … mistake to occur.” (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 29.) Intrinsic mistakes relate to the merits of the case, such that granting relief would improperly allow a party to relitigate the case. (Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at pp. 472-73.) Examples of intrinsic mistakes, or intrinsic fraud, are perjury, failing to complete discovery, or failing to prepare adequately for trial. (Ibid.)
Courts apply a stringent, three-part test for equitable relief pursuant to the inherent authority of the court. A party seeking relief on equitable grounds must show (1) “a satisfactory excuse”; (2) “a meritorious case”; and (3) “diligence in seeking” relief. (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982; see also, e.g., Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29; 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024), ¶ 5:435.)
“The court may, … on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).)
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Plaintiff’s government claim filed with the City of Los Angeles (“City”) on March 10, 2021, and City’s denial Plaintiff’s government claim dated April 9, 2021. The request is granted.
Discussion
This case involves an accident between Plaintiff’s vehicle and a sanitation truck driven by Defendant, apparently in the course and scope of his duties for City. (Fields Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendant did not previously appear in the case and is now represented by the City Attorney’s Office (“CAO”).
As a threshold matter, the Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff’s opposition, even though it is overly long and not in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113.
Defendant now moves to obtain relief from the entry of default and default judgment against him. In his supporting memorandum, Defendant argues (not in this order): (1) that he was not properly served, and therefore the default and default judgment are void and should be set aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d); (2) that the default and default judgment were entered as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect and should be set aside under section 473, subdivision (b); and (3) that the Court should exercise its inherent authority to set aside the default and default judgment on equitable grounds.
The Court considers each of these arguments in turn.
Section 473, Subdivision (d)
Defendant argues that the default and default judgment are void because he was not properly served. (Mem., at pp. 9-10.) Defendant states that he does not “recall” being served with the summons and complaint. (Fields Decl., ¶ 4.) He did receive legal documents delivered to his residence on three occasions: “sometime prior to July 2019”; on or about January 31, 2024; and on or about December 16, 2024. (Ibid.) He states that he is “not sure what these 3 documents were called,” but his supervisor’s secretary told him that the first document did not include a summons. (Ibid.)
On June 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a proof of service in this matter. The proof of service, signed under penalty of perjury by a registered process server, states that the summons and complaint were served on Defendant by substituted service: the documents were hand delivered to an adult occupant of the residence on East Tichenor Street in Compton on June 23, 2021, and then mailed to Defendant at that same address on June 24, 2021.
On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed another proof of service in this matter. The proof of service, signed under penalty of perjury by a registered process server, states that the statement of damages and a request for entry of default were personally served on Defendant at the same address on East Tichenor Street in Compton on November 5, 2022. (A similar proof of service was filed with the Court on December 20, 2022, and January 3, 2023.)
On this record, the Court credits the proofs of service signed under penalty of perjury by the registered process servers. The Court intends no disrespect to Defendant, but the Court finds the proofs of service more credible than Defendant’s declaration to the contrary.
The request to set aside the default and default judgment as void (for defective service) under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), is denied.
Section 473, Subdivision (b)
Defendant argues that the default and default judgment were entered as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect and should therefore be set aside under section 473, subdivision (b). (Mem. at pp. 5-6.)
Defendant’s default was entered on January 3, 2023. The default judgment was entered on April 18, 2023. Defendant did not file this motion until February 20, 2025.
A request to set aside a default or default judgment under section 473, subdivision (b), must be filed no later than six months after entry of judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) The motion for relief under section 473, subdivision (b) is untimely.
Accordingly, the request to set aside the default and default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), is denied.
Equitable Relief
Defendant also argues that the default and default judgment should be set aside pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority to do so on equitable grounds. (Mem. at pp. 6-7.)
In addressing a request for equitable relief to set aside a default judgment, a court must consider two weighty, competing public policies: the policy in favor of resolving disputes on the merits, after all parties have the opportunity to present their evidence and argument; and the policy in favor of finality and certainty of judgments. To address the tension in those competing policies, courts have, as noted above, developed a three-part test in which the party seeking relief must show (1) a satisfactory excuse; (2) a meritorious case; and (3) diligence in seeking relief. (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982; Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29; 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 5:435.) All three elements must be shown.
Here, Defendant has not shown diligence in seeking relief. Separate and apart from the service of the summons and complaint and the statement of damages, Plaintiff repeatedly served Defendant with a series of requests for entry of default. According to the documents in the Court’s file, Plaintiff’s counsel stated, under penalty of perjury, that she mailed a request for entry of default to Defendant at his address on East Tichenor Street in Compton on June 3, 2022; November 5, 2022; November 24, 2022; November 25, 2022; December 23, 2022; January 2, 2023; and February 22, 2023.
Moreover, after judgment was entered, a notice of filing of recorded judgment (including a copy of the judgment) was mailed to Defendant at his address on East Tichenor Street in Compton on January 18, 2024. On the same day, the same document was mailed to counsel Ms. Attarian with the CAO. According to a proof of service in the Court file, Ms. Attarian was also served with the judgment even earlier, on April 24, 2023, and she is included on CAO emails regarding the judgment on April 27, 2023. (Attarian Decl., Exh. A.)
Defendant states that from July 2019 through December 21, 2021, he was off work on a workers’ compensation leave and was also dealing with some serious family issues at the same time. (Fields Decl., ¶ 5.) But he does not state that there was any reason that he was not receiving mail at his home during 2022, 2023, or 2024.
On this record, the Court finds that Defendant’s now-counsel at the CAO (which represents City employees when they act within the course and scope of their employment) received actual notice of the default judgment in April 2023, and Defendant received actual notice of the default judgment by no later than January 2024. But this motion was not filed until more than a year later, in February 2025. That is not diligence in seeking relief.
Accordingly, the motion is denied.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES the motion of Christopher DeWayne Fields to set aside the entry of default and default judgment.
The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to give notice.