Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 20STCV10508, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 
IMPORTANT:  In light of the COVID-19 emergency, the Court encourages all parties to appear remotely.  The capacity in the courtroom is extremely limited.  The Court appreciates the cooperation of counsel and the litigants. 
ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case Number: 20STCV10508    Hearing Date: February 18, 2025    Dept: 29

Martinez v. Sephora USA, Inc.
20STCV10508
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Sephora USA, Inc.

Tentative

The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Background

On March 16, 2020, Marcelita Martinez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Sephora USA, Inc. (“Defendant”), JCPenney, J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., and Does 1 through 50 for premises liability arising out of trip and fall on May 27, 2018.

On August 10, 2020, J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., erroneously sued as JCPenney, and J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., (“J.C. Penney”) filed an answer. On February 17, 2022, J.C. Penney was dismissed.

On April 28, 2022, Defendant filed an answer.

On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel was relieved as attorney of record.

On November 30, 2023, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of certain documents in the court file.  The Court grants the request under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that she tripped and fell at a JC Penney store at the Glendale Galleria Mall (the “Store”) on May 27, 2028. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 2.) Defendant supplied beauty products and services to JC Penney locations, including the Store. (DSUMF, Nos. 1, 5-8.)

JC Penney and Defendant are separate and distinct corporations, with no common ownership. (DSUMF, No. 3.) The Store was managed and operated solely by JC Penney; Defendant was not an owner or lessee of the premises and did not operate, control, or manage the Store. (DSUMF, Nos. 4, 9-24.)

The only cause of action in the complaint is for premises liability. Defendant now brings this motion for summary judgment.

The basic elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as a cause of action for negligence: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court.¿¿(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)

Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)

“A plaintiff alleging injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove the defendant either: (1) created the dangerous condition, or (2) knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.” (See Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036.) “Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety …, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is [in many cases] a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) “[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ibid.) “Most Courts of Appeal hold that a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the dangerous condition existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by ordinary care and inspection.” (Id. at p. 1207.) “Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury.” (Ibid.)

If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe …. or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446; see also, e.g., Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 672-73.) In some cases, and subject to certain exceptions, however, a dangerous condition may be so obvious that the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner may have no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition. (See Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 673; Montes v. YMCA of Glendale (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142; Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126; Krongos v. Pacific Gas Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.)

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it did not own, operate, manage, or control the Store (the premises in which Plaintiff’s accident occurred).

Defendant supports its argument with the declaration of Eric Lowdermilk, senior director for Defendant. Mr. Lowdermilk states that Defendant did not own, manage, operate, or control any part of the Store. (Lowdermilk Decl., ¶ 2.) He states that JC Penney solely managed and operated the Store. (Id., ¶ 6.) Mr. Lowdermilk explains that JC Penney and Defendant entered into an operating agreement to allow JC Penney to market and sell Defendant’s products, in which JC Penney licensed to use the right to Defendant’s name and unique branding. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 9.) Lowdermilk further states that Defendant never hired or employed anyone to work at the Store; all employees were hired by JC Penney. (Id., ¶¶ 14, 16.)

Defense counsel submits a declaration stating that Plaintiff has abandoned her case, as Defendant has not received any discovery responses despite the Court’s order compelling Plaintiff to provide those responses. (Felsenfeld Decl., ¶ 2.)

On this record, Defendant has met its initial burden, as a defendant moving for summary judgment, of showing that Plaintiff cannot establish one or more of the elements of her cause of action: as the undisputed facts establish that Defendant did not own, operate, manage, or control the Store in which Plaintiff fell, Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of duty or breach.

This showing then shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show that a question of material fact exists. Plaintiff has not opposed this motion or otherwise discharged that burden.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Moving Party is to give notice.