Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 20STCV16335, Date: 2025-01-02 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV16335    Hearing Date: January 2, 2025    Dept: 29

Barnes v. Los Angeles Unified School District
20STCV16335
Demurrer filed by Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District.

Tentative

The demurrer is overruled.

Background

On April 29, 2020, Solomon Barnes (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”), Foshay Learning Center, Javier Bran (“Bran”), and Does 1 through 100. 

On May 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against LAUSD, Bran, and the Doe defendants. In the FAC, Plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence and negligent supervision arising out of an incident in which Plaintiff injured his lower back while carrying a heavy box of supplies “[w]hen returning from a field trip sanctioned by the school.”  (FAC, ¶ 6.)

LAUSD and Bran (collectively, “Defendants”) filed their answer on June 25, 2021.

On April 23, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  After a hearing on September 23, 2024, the Court took the matter under submission; on September 25, 2024, the Court issued an order (1) treating the motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings; and (2) granting the motion with leave to amend.

Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on October 2, 2024.

On November 6, 2024, LAUSD filed this demurrer to the SAC. Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 18. LAUSD filed a reply on December 24.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides:

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:

(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.

(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.

(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.

(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.

(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.

(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”

A general demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see also 1 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [2024], ¶ 7:40.)

“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.”  (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; accord Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104.)  All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleading.  (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)  Even “improbable” facts alleged in the pleading must be accepted as true.  (Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105.)

Courts must “liberally construe the pleading” and “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context.”  (Id. at p. 105.)

A complaint must contain a “statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1); see also C.A. v. William S. Hart High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action”].)  Ordinarily, a complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  Ultimate facts are those upon which “the right to recover depends” and are “essential” to the cause of action.  (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 643 fn. 2; see also 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 6:124.)

A demurrer can be sustained only when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

Leave to amend should be granted when “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”  (Centinela Freeman, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of documents in the Court’s file and a dictionary definition of the phrase “by reason of.”  The request is granted.

Meet and Confer Requirement

Before filing a demurrer, the parties must meet and confer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)  That requirement is satisfied here.  (Swedelson Decl., ¶ 2.)

Discussion

LAUSD demurs to each cause of action in the SAC based on (1) the immunity provided by California Education Code section 35330 and (2) the sham pleading doctrine.  The Court considers each in turn.

Education Code Section 35330

Education Code section 35330 provides school districts and their employees with what is sometimes called “field trip immunity”: 

“All persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have waived all claims against the district, a charter school, or the State of California for injury, accident, illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion. All adults taking out-of-state field trips or excursions and all parents or guardians of pupils taking out-of-state field trips or excursions shall sign a statement waiving all claims.”

(Education Code, § 35330, subd. (d).)

“The immunity granted by section 35330, subdivision (d), applies to “the district.” (Sanchez v. San Diego County Office of Education (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1584.) It also covers school district employees. (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 189.)

“The courts have construed the “deemed to have waived” language contained in section 35330, subdivision (d), as creating a “broad immunity.” (Sanchez, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1584 citing Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 130; accord Casterson, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)

In the FAC, Plaintiff previously alleged that he was injured “[w]hen returning from a field trip sanctioned by the school.” (FAC, ¶ 6.)  He now alleges:

“After returning from a field trip sanctioned by the school, Plaintiff exited the parked bus to go home with his parents.  BRAN asked Plaintiff to carry a box from the bus to the bungalow which included a set of stairs. The distance from the bus to the bungalow was approximately 300 yards and the box was 24” x 24” filled with heavy supplies. The box had no handles, so Plaintiff was forced to carry it with his arms underneath and held against his chest, while peering around the box to walk forward.  Plaintiff felt lower back pain as he brought the box towards the bungalow at the request of BRAN. BRAN failed to acknowledge Plaintiff is special needs and therefore is unable to advocate for himself.”

(SAC, ¶ 5.)

This is a meaningful different allegation that that contained in the FAC.  Plaintiff now longer alleges that the injury occurred during the field trip; reading the SAC in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the field trip was over when Defendant Bran asked Plaintiff to carry the box, leading to the injury to Plaintiff.

Nonetheless, LAUSD argues even if the field trip was over (which of course LAUSD does not concede is the case), the request to carry the box was made “by reason of” the field trip, and therefore the immunity under Education Code section 35330 still applies. 

Initially, the Court notes that neither side cites to any case law that explains the meaning of the phrase “by reason of” in this statute.  Nor has the Court located any case law on point.  In this context, the Court gives the phrase a plain meaning: “by reason of” means “because” or “as a result of.”  In other words, immunity applies whenever the accident or injury producing event occurs (1) during the field trip or (2) because of or as a result of the field trip.

Here, based only on the SAC, the Court cannot determine, as a matter of law, that the injury to Plaintiff occurred because of or as a result of the field trip.  It is certainly possible that the facts will ultimately show a causal relationship between the field trip and the injury producing event.  But, viewing the SAC in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, it is also possible that the facts might ultimately show no such causal relationship – that the event that lead to the injury was unrelated to the field trip and did not occur because of it or as a result of it. 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the SAC on the ground of Education Code section 35330, subdivision (d), is overruled.

Sham Pleading

“Under the sham pleading doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints to omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for summary judgment.” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.)  

As the Court of Appeal has explained:

“‘Generally, after an amended pleading has been filed, courts will disregard the original pleading. However, an exception to this rule is found ... where an amended complaint attempts to avoid defects set forth in a prior complaint by ignoring them. The court may examine the prior complaint to ascertain whether the amended complaint is merely a sham. Moreover, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. Accordingly, a court is not bound to accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case.”

(Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946.)  

LAUSD argues that the SAC is a sham pleading in which Plaintiff amended the earlier version of the complaint to skirt harmful allegations in the FAC, as set forth in LAUSD’s summary judgment motion.  But Plaintiff provides an adequate explanation here that the new allegations are based on subsequent evidence. Plaintiff provides the previously submitted declaration of Celestine S. Bass, who states she saw students walking to their cars once the bus arrived from the field, and that Plaintiff left the bus and school grounds, put his backpack in the car, and returned to help Bran. (Exh. 2, Bass Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) Further, Plaintiff’s deposition outlines a similar story of Plaintiff being released from the bus, dropping off his backpack with his parents, and then returning to help. (Exh. 2, Barnes Deposition, 56:13-19.)

In short, under the sham pleading doctrine, Plaintiff is required to explain the reasons for the omission of harmful allegations in a prior version of the complaint.  Here, Plaintiff has provided such an adequate explanation.

Accordingly, the demurrer on the ground of the sham pleading doctrine is also overruled.

Finally, the Court notes that this is a ruling based on the pleading, and all of the case law governing demurrers, not a ruling based on facts or evidence.  LAUSD may well ultimately prevail on its immunity defense.  At this time, however, all that the Court is ruling on is whether the causes of action in the SAC are barred by Education Code section 35330, subdivision (d) as a matter of law; the Court concludes that they are not.

Conclusion

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer filed by Los Angeles Unified School District.

Moving Party is to give notice.