Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 20STCV27304, Date: 2025-02-14 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT  (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2)

Communicating with the Court Staff re the Tentative Ruling 1. Please notify the courtroom staff by email not later than 9:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion. The email address is SSCDEPT29@lacourt.org. Please do not use any other email address. 2. You must include the other parties on the email by "cc." 3. Include the word "SUBMISSION" in all caps in the Subject line and include your name, contact information, the case number, and the party you represent in the body of the email. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENT UNLESS BOTH SIDES SUBMIT ON THE TENTATIVE.  4. Include the words "SUBMISSION BUT WILL APPEAR" if you submit, but one or both parties will nevertheless appear. 5. For other communications with Court Staff a. OFF-CALENDAR should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed to have a matter placed off-calendar. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) date of proceeding. b. CASE SETTLED should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have agreed that the case has settled for all purposes. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) whether notice of settlement/dismissal documents have been filed; (c) if (b) has not been done, a date one year from the date of your email which will be a date set by the court for an OSC for dismissal of the case. c. STIPULATION should appear in all caps in the Subject line where all parties have stipulated that a matter before the court can be postponed. All counsel should be cc'ed (and where appropriate parties not represented by counsel) and the body of the email should state: (a) name and case number; (b) what proceeding is agreed to be postponed e.g. Trial, FSC; (c) the agreed-upon future date; (d) whether all parties waive notice if the Court informs all counsel/parties that the agreed-upon date is satisfactory. This communication should be used only for matters that are agreed to be postponed and not for orders shortening time. 6. PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT STAFF DEAL ONLY WITH SCHEDULING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS AND DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE. (UPDATED 6/17/2020) 
IMPORTANT:  In light of the COVID-19 emergency, the Court encourages all parties to appear remotely.  The capacity in the courtroom is extremely limited.  The Court appreciates the cooperation of counsel and the litigants. 
ALSO NOTE:  If the moving party does not contact the court to submit on the tentative and does not appear (either remotely or in person), the motion will be taken off calendar.  THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL NOT BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case Number: 20STCV27304    Hearing Date: February 14, 2025    Dept: 29

Tupas v. Toyota Motor Corporation
20STCV27304
Motion to Strike Defendant Liang Liu’s Answer filed by Plaintiffs.

Tentative

The motion is denied.

Background

The Plaintiffs in this action are Wenro Tupas, Sr., both individually and as successor in interest to Felicidita Tandug Tupas; Felros Tupas Lim, both individually and as successor in interest to Felicidita Tandug Tupas; Wenefredo Villacorta Lim; Mary Jane Tupas Gonzales, as successor in interest to Felicidita Tandug Tupas; Rowne Tandug Tupas, as successor in interest to Felicidita Tandug Tupas; and Wenro Tandug Tupas, Jr. as successor in interest to Felicidita Tandug Tupas (collectively “Plaintiffs”).

On July 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor North America, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.; Seidner-Miller, Inc dba Toyota of Glendora; Liang Liu; and Does 1 through 100.  In the complaint, Plaintiffs assert causes of action for strict liability and negligence arising out of an automobile accident occurring on July 22, 2018.

On July 13, 2023, Defendant Liang Liu (“Liu”) filed an answer.

On May 10, 2024, the Court, at the request of Plaintiffs, dismissed all causes of action against all of the other named defendants with prejudice.

On June 21, 2024, counsel for Liu was relieved as attorney of record.  Since that time, Liu has been self-represented as a pro per litigant.

On November 5, 2024, the Court granted three discovery motions filed by Plaintiffs and (among other things) ordered Liu to provide verified, code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Requests for Production (Set One) within 15 days of notice.  Plaintiffs gave notice by mail on November 6, 2024.

Liu did not comply with the order and did not serve responses.  (Babakhanian Decl., ¶ 8.)

On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion to strike Liu’s answer as a terminating sanction for the failure to obey this Court’s order.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling answers to interrogatories, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).  In lieu of or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).)

When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling responses to requests for production, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).  In lieu of or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c).)

In Chapter 7 of the Civil Discovery Act, section 2023.030 provides for monetary, evidence, issue, and terminating sanctions for any “misuse of the discovery process,” “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title.”  A “misuse of the discovery process” is defined to include (among other things) failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery; making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to a discovery request; disobeying a court order to provide discovery; and making or opposing, unsuccessfully, a motion to compel without substantial justification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(h).)

The Civil Discovery Act provides for an escalating and “incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.” (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.) Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to and commensurate with the misconduct, and they “should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) “If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Ibid.; see also, e.g., Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280.) 

Terminating sanctions should be used sparingly. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992; R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 486, 496.) “Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure, a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective.” (Lopez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 604.)  But where discovery violations are “willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Repeated and willful violations of discovery orders that prejudice the opposing party may warrant a terminating sanction. (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702; Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390; Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327; Lang v. Hachman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246; Collisson X Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622.)

The primary purpose of discovery sanctions is to obtain compliance with the Civil Discovery Act and the Court’s orders. It is not to punish. (Newland v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 613; Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.) A discovery sanction should not create a “windfall” for a party or place a party in a better position than it would have been if the opposing party had simply complied with its obligations under the Court’s orders and the Civil Discovery Act. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1194; see also 2 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024), ¶¶ 8:2214-2220.)

Discussion

The Court made an order requiring Liu to provide discovery responses.  Liu violated that order.  Based on that violation, Plaintiffs seek an order striking Liu’s answer (a terminating sanction).

Liu has committed serious discovery misconduct.  Liu has failed to comply with the obligations of every litigant under the Civil Discovery Act, and Liu has violated a court order regarding discovery.  Serious sanctions are appropriate for serious misuses of the discovery process.

But to obtain a terminating sanction, a party must present evidence of repeated and willful misuse of the discovery process, as well as evidence that less severe sanctions have not (or likely will not) lead to compliance with the discovery rules.  Plaintiffs have not, on this record at this time, made such a showing.  There has not been a showing of a history or pattern of willful abuse or repeated violations that have not been (or cannot be) cured by lesser sanctions.

Moreover, a discovery sanction should not create a “windfall” for a party or place a party in a better position than it would have been if the opposing party had simply complied with its obligations under the Court’s orders and the Civil Discovery Act. (Rutledge, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194.)  Here, at this time, a terminating sanction would create such a windfall for Plaintiffs.

Accordingly, the request for a terminating sanction is denied.

Plaintiffs do not seek any lesser sanctions in this motion.

Finally, the Court notes that trial is set for February 28, 2025.  If Defendant Liu does not appear, the matter will proceed as an uncontested trial.

Conclusion

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for an order striking Defendant Liang Liu’s answer.

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.