Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 21STCV00820, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV00820, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV00820 Hearing Date: November 28, 2023 Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendant L.A. Federal Credit Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Background

Plaintiff Joy Macali (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was injured on January 19, 2020, when she tripped and fell on a dangerously uplifted and uneven sidewalk near East Elk and Glendale Avenue in Glendale. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on January 8, 2021, asserting causes of action for statutory liability/dangerous condition, premises liability, and general negligence against Defendants City of Glendale, City of Glendale Public Works, L.A. Federal Credit Union, Glendale Maintenance Service, and Does 1 through 50.

After the Court granted a motion to strike (with leave to amend), Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on May 12, 2021. In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts the same causes of action against the same defendants.

On June 10 and July 6, 2021, Defendants City of Glendale and L.A. Federal Credit Union each filed an Answer.

On June 23, 2023, Defendant L.A. Federal Credit Union (“Defendant”) filed this motion for summary judgment and supporting evidence.

On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed her opposition, supporting evidence, and objections to some of Defendant’s evidence.

On November 2, 2023, Defendant filed a reply, further evidence, and objections to some of Plaintiff’s evidence.

On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed responses to Defendant’s objections, a request for judicial notice, and additional evidence.

The Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing from November 9 to November 28, 2023.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Evidentiary Objections

Each party objects to some of the evidence presented by the other. Evidence presented in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court must “consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s Objection No. 2 (hearsay). Plaintiff’s other objections are OVERRULED.

The Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s Objections Nos. 2 (improper authentication; lacks personal knowledge), 5 (lacks personal knowledge), 6 (improper expert opinion as to issue of law), 12 (improper expert opinion as to issue of law), 14 (improper expert opinion as to issue of law), 15 (improper expert opinion as to issue of law), and 16 (improper expert opinion as to issue of law). Defendant’s other objections are OVERRULED.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Discussion

In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for negligence and premises liability. (A third claim in the FAC, for statutory liability/dangerous condition, appears to be directed primarily at the public entity defendants; to the extent that it is asserted against Defendant, it appears to be an alternative description of a premises liability claim.) The basic elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the same: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on three independent grounds: (1) that the sidewalk defect was so small as to be trivial as a matter of law; (2) that Defendant, as an owner of property abutting the sidewalk, exercised no control over the sidewalk and owed no duty of care to third parties in relation to the sidewalk condition; and (3) that the sidewalk defect was so large as to be open and obvious as a matter of law.

Defendant’s first and third arguments appear to be in some tension. In any event, the Court begins with Defendant’s second argument.

Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) But “[a] defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.)

The application of these basic principles to the liability of landowners with regard to defects or dangerous conditions in sidewalks abutting their property is well established by numerous appellate cases. “Under the common law, a landowner does not have any duty to repair abutting sidewalks along a public street, and does not owe any duty to pedestrians injured as a result of a defect in the sidewalks.” (Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490 (citing Schaefer v. Lenahan (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 325).) Under Streets and Highways Code section 5610, abutting property owners do bear the duty to repair defects in the sidewalk, regardless of whether they created the defects. (See Jones v. Deeter (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.) Nonetheless, the so-called “Sidewalk Accident Doctrine” provides that abutting property owners have no duty to members of the public in tort law, and are not liable to members of the public, unless the property owner created the defect or exercised dominion or control over the abutting sidewalk. (Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 244, 255; Jordan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1490-91 [Section 5610 “imposes a duty of repair on the abutting property owners for defects in sidewalks, regardless of who created the defects, but does not of itself create tort liability to injured pedestrians or a duty to indemnify municipalities, except where a property owner created the defect or exercised dominion or control over the abutting sidewalk”]; see also Contreras v. Anderson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 188, 196; Jones, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at pp. 802-803.)

As the Court of Appeal stated in Williams v. Foster (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 510, “[W]e are unwilling to find the duty to maintain the sidewalk established by section 5610 is owed to members of the public in the absence of clear and unambiguous legislative language, especially in view of the long-standing judicial determination that abutters ordinarily have no such duty.” (216 Cal. App.3d at p. 521 (citing Schaefer, supra).)

Here, Defendant presented evidence that it did not create the defect in the sidewalk or exercise control over the sidewalk. (SUMF, Nos. 8-13, and supporting evidence.) Indeed, the City of Glendale admitted that it controlled the sidewalk and did not expect Defendant to repair or maintain it. (SUMF No. 9 and supporting evidence.) Based on this evidence, and the Sidewalk Accident Doctrine established by the case law, Defendant satisfied its initial burden of proving that one or more elements of each of Plaintiff’s causes of action against it cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Thus, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has not done so. The evidence it cites (to the extent it is admissible) shows, at most, that a landowner has property rights that are subject to a municipality’s exclusive easement (in the street, parkway, and sidewalk); this general principle is not contrary to but rather is consistent with, and incorporated into, the Sidewalk Accident Doctrine established by the case law. And under the Sidewalk Accident Doctrine, an abutting landowner (such as Defendant) generally owes no duty of care to members of the public (such as Plaintiff) with regard to an alleged defect or allegedly dangerous condition in the sidewalk. Plaintiff has not cited any evidence that creates a triable issue on whether Defendant created the alleged defect or exercised dominion or control over the section of the abutting sidewalk at issue.

Thus, Defendant has shown that there is no triable issue as to any material fact on the issue of duty and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Court need not reach, and does not reach, the issues of whether the alleged defect was so small as to be trivial as a matter of law or so large as to be open and obvious as a matter of law.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Defendant L.A. Federal Credit Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.