Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV03573, Date: 2025-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV03573    Hearing Date: June 6, 2025    Dept: 29

Navarro v. Costco Wholesale Corporation
21STCV03573
Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues filed by Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation.

Tentative

The Court will call this matter.

Both parties have submitted video evidence in connection with this motion. The Court has been unable to review this evidence. If either party wishes the Court to consider video evidence in connection with ruling on the motion, the party must be prepared to display the video evidence to the Court at the hearing.

Background

On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff Olivia Navarro (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Defendant”), Miguel, and Does 1 through 25, asserting causes of action for negligence and premises liability arising out of an incident at a Costco location on Commonwealth Avenue in Alhambra on February 15, 2019, in which, Plaintiff alleges, a television or display monitor fell on her, causing injuries.

On March 12, 2021, Defendant filed an answer.

On April 13, 2021, Defendant filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. On July 6, 2021, the District Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for remand.

On August 29, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues.

On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, along with objections to Defendant’s evidence.

On May 27, 2025, Defendant filed a reply. On May 28, Defendant filed objections to Plaintiff’s evidence and a notice of errata regarding Defendant’s reply and objections (relating solely to a typographical error as to the hearing date).

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiff asserts seven objections to Defendant’s evidence. The objections are overruled. To the extent that assertions in the Separate Statement are inconsistent with the evidence, the Court will base its decision on the evidence, not the assertions in the Separate Statement.

Defendant asserts one objection to Plaintiff’s evidence. The objection is overruled.

Discussion

This case arises from an incident on February 15, 2019, at a Costco retail location (which Costco calls a “warehouse”) in Alhambra (the “Store”). (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 1.)

Prior to the incident, Costco employees Doreen Cobarrubias and Hector Zavala used a pallet jack to move several televisions. (DSUMF, No. 4.) Ms. Cobarrubias and Mr. Zavala moved the television displays to line up with each other, to ensure that none of the TVs were sticking out in the aisle, and to allow room behind the displays to plug in the TVs. (DSUMF, No. 5.) This work occurred between approximately 10:13 and 10:18 a.m. (DSUMF, No. 5.)

Ms. Cobarrubias testified that it her “standard practice to use brackets to secure the TVs on the displayers to prevent them from falling over.” (Cobarrubias Decl., ¶ 5.) She testified that it is her “recollection … that the TVs were secured with brackets in the area where the incident occurred” and that “[t]o the best of my knowledge, the TVs were secure and the display was sturdy prior to the incident.” (Id., ¶¶ 5, 7.)

On that day, Plaintiff and her adult son David Navarro were shopping in the Store. (DSUMF, No. 7.) Mr. Navarro was pushing their shopping cart. (DSUMF, No. 11.) Just before the incident, Plaintiff and Mr. Navarro were walking down the TV aisle, and they veered to the right as another customer (or “member,” to use Costco’s terminology) with a shopping cart passed them in the aisle. (DSUMF, No. 10.)

As they passed the TVs on the pallet, Mr. Navarro “clipped” the pallet or the TVs with his shopping cart as he turned the corner. (DSUMF, No. 12.) Mr. Navarro thinks he clipped one of the boxes on the bottom. (DSUMF, No. 12.) In his deposition, Mr. Navarro testified that he “barely tapped [the] pallet with the TVs on it” and “barely clipped it with the shopping cart.” (Flock Decl., Exh. C, at 17:24-18:6, 21:6-8.)

When Mr. Navarro “tapped” or “clipped” the TV display, it caused the televisions to sway. (DSUMF, No. 13.) The televisions then fell forward and struck Plaintiff, knocking her to the ground. (DSUMF, No. 13.) This was at approximately 10:37 a.m. (DSUMF, No. 9.)

Prior to the incident, Mr. Navarro did not notice that display to be shaking or unstable. (DSUMF, No. 14.) Neither did Plaintiff. (DSUMF, No. 11.)

Costco employees routinely inspect the “warehouse.” (DSUMF, No. 17.) The Daily Floor-Walk/Safety Inspection sheet from February 15, 2019, indicates (among other things) that an employee with the last name of Ibarra conducted a floor walk that began at 10:03 and concluded at 10:26 a.m. (Stout Decl., Exh. E.)

In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Defendant for negligence and premises liability.

The basic elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the same: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)

Defendant now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of issues. Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment, or summary adjudication as to each cause of action, on essentially three grounds: (1) there was no dangerous condition; (2) Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition; and (3) Defendant did not cause Plaintiff’s injuries. The Court considers each of these arguments in turn.

Dangerous Condition

As set forth in Civil Code section 1714, “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This establishes what the California Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” that every person has a legal duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.) “It is well established in California that although a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

A dangerous condition is one that exposes others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Ibid.; see also, e.g. Hassaine v. Club Demonstration Services, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 843, 852 [stating that a store owner must keep premises “in a reasonably safe condition so as not unnecessarily to expose the customer to danger or accident”]; (Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37 [“Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.”]; CACI No. 1003.)

If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446; see also, e.g., Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 672-73.) In some cases, and subject to certain exceptions, however, a dangerous condition may be so obvious that the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner may have no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition. (See Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 673; Montes v. YMCA of Glendale (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142; Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126; Krongos v. Pacific Gas Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.)

“The existence of a dangerous condition ordinarily is a question of fact, but the issue may be resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.” (Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist.¿(1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 810; accord Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205; Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110.)

The Court will review the video evidence and hear from counsel.

The starting point (which should not be in dispute) is that Costco has a duty to maintain its warehouses (stores) in a manner that does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to members (customers). When heavy items are displayed at some elevation above the floor, the items must be secured in a reasonably safe manner.

A television on display fell and injured Plaintiff. (DSUMF, No. 13.) Immediately before the incident, Mr. Navarro bumped his shopping cart into the display. (DSUMF, Nos. 10, 12.) Mr. Navarro testified that he “barely tapped [the] pallet with the TVs on it” and “barely clipped it with the shopping cart.” (Flock Decl., Exh. C, at 17:24-18:6, 21:6-8.)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, is the testimony of Mr. Navarro sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to dangerous condition? Could the finder of fact reasonably draw an inference that the televisions were not safely secured from the evidence that the television fell on Plaintiff after Mr. Navarro “barely tapped” the display?

The Court understands that Ms. Cobarrubias testified that, to the best of her knowledge, the televisions were secure prior to the incident, but on this record is that a sufficient basis to grant the motion for summary judgment. Or must the trier of fact decide whether (for example) to credit Ms. Cobarrubias’s testimony and/or Mr. Navarro’s testimony?

What, if anything, does the expert opinion testimony of Mr. Rivera add to the analysis of this issue?

Actual or Constructive Notice

A plaintiff alleging injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove that the defendant either (1) created the dangerous condition, or (2) knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1206-1207; Hatfield v. Levy Bros. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798, 806; Getchell v. Rogers Jewelry (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 381, 385.)

If the dangerous condition is created by a customer or other third party (such as when a customer drops or spills a slippery substance on the store floor), then the “owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) But where the dangerous condition was created by the store owner or its employees, then actual knowledge of the dangerous condition is imputed to the owner as a matter of law. (Getchell, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 385.)

Here, if there is a triable issue as to whether the dangerous condition was a display of televisions that was not safely secured, and there is evidence in the record that the display was modified by Costco employees approximately 20 minutes before the accident (DSUMF, Nos. 3-6), does it follow that there is a triable issue of fact as to actual notice?

What, if anything, does the floor walk of Costco employee Ibarra add to the analysis? Costco employees modified the display between 10:13 and 10:18 am. (DSUMF, No. 5.) The accident occurred at approximately 10:37 am. (DSUMF, No. 9.) The floor walk began at 10:03 and concluded at 10:26 a.m. (Stout Decl., Exh. E.)

Causation

“A plaintiff meets the causation element by showing that (1) the defendant's breach of its duty to exercise ordinary care was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm, and (2) there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205; see also, e.g., Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 481.) Even when a plaintiff proves breach, the plaintiff cannot recover absent evidence “that it was more probable than not that, but for the [defendant’s] negligence, the [injury] would not have occurred.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 775. “Proof of causation cannot be based on mere speculation,” and a “mere possibility of such causation is not enough.” (Ibid.; see also, e.g., Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1205-1206; Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 435 [“speculative possibility” of causation is not sufficient].)  

More than one substantial factor may combine to cause harm to a plaintiff. “[A] defendant cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person, condition, or event was also a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm.” (Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 187; accord Uriell v. Regents of University of California (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 735, 746-747; CACI No. 431.)

Causation is ordinarily a question of fact, but it can become a question of law where the facts are undisputed (or otherwise one-sided) and only one reasonably inference is possible. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205; Modisette v. Apple Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 136, 152; Novak v. Continental Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 198.) 

On this record, if there is a triable issue as to whether the dangerous condition was a display of televisions that was not safely secured, and there is evidence (noted above) that plaintiff was injured by a falling television that was dislodged after Mr. Navarro “barely tapped” the display with his shopping cart, is there a triable issue of fact as to causation?

Conclusion

The Court will call this matter.