Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV05214, Date: 2024-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV05214    Hearing Date: April 17, 2024    Dept: 29

Motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, filed by Defendant American Home Shield of California, Inc.

TENTATIVE

The motion is granted.

Background

Plaintiff Hakob Ghazaryan (“Plaintiff”) alleges that suffered severe injuries from being electrocuted while he was performing repair work on August 16, 2018, at a residence on Daisy Avenue in Pasadena. 

On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action against the property owners (Nicholas J. Carlin and Alexandra L. Carlin (collectively “the Carlins”)), and Does 1 through 20, asserting one cause of action for negligence.

On January 4, 2022, the Carlins filed their answer to the complaint as well as a cross-complaint for indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief against Cross-Defendants American Home Shield of California, Inc. (“AHS”); YH HVAC and Refrigeration, Inc. (“YH HVAC”); and Roes 1 through 20. On February 14, 2022, AHS filed its answer to the cross-complaint. On June 6, 2022, the Carlins filed a request for dismissal, with prejudice, of their claims against YH HVAC in the cross-complaint.

On February 2, 2024, AHS filed this motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication of each of the three causes of action set forth in the Carlins’ cross-complaint.

The Carlins have not filed any opposition to the motion.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Discussion

Background Facts

AHS is a home warranty company that administers home warranty contracts on major home systems and appliances. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“SUMF”], No.1.) When an AHS requests service, AHS dispatches an independent contractor (not an AHS employee) to perform the work covered by the home warranty. (SUMF, Nos. 2-3.)

YH HVAC is one of the independent companies that AHS contracts with to provide heating and air conditioning work. (SUMF, No. 4.) The relationship between AHS and YH HVAC is an independent contractor relationship. (SUMF, Nos. 5-6, 17.)

On July 12, 2018, the Carlins signed a home warranty agreement with AHS for their residence. (SUMF, No. 7.) There were no express term in the agreement requiring AHS to indemnify or defend the Carlins. (SUMF, No. 9.)

In August 2018, the Carlins contacted AHS for service to their heating and air conditioning unit. (SUMF, No. 10.) AHS contacted YH HVAC to perform the work at the Carlins’ residence, and YH HVAC sent Plaintiff, its employee. (SUMF, No. 11.) Plaintiff asserts that he was electrocuted while performing work at the Carlins’ residence. (SUMF, No. 15.)

AHS was never involved or present during the work at the Carlins’ residence. (SUMF, No. 16.) The agreement between AHS and YH HVAC requires YH HVAC to ensure that YH HVAC’s employees receive proper safety training. (SUMF, Nos. 18, 20.) AHS is not involved in the training of YH HVAC’s employees and did not direct YH HVAC’s employees regarding how to perform their work. (SUMF, No. 18.)

Claims Against Defendant

The Carlins assert three claims against AHS in the cross-complaint: (1) Equitable Indemnity, (2) Comparative Fault, and (3) Declaratory Relief. AHS moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on each of the three causes of action.

Equitable Indemnity

“The elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor; and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is contractually or equitably responsible.” (Expressions at Rancho Niguel Ass'n v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.) “ ‘A key restrictive feature of traditional equitable indemnity is that, on matters of substantive law, the doctrine is “wholly derivative....” [Citations.] This rule “is often expressed in the shorthand phrase ‘... there can be no indemnity without liability.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Centex Homes v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1099.) 

AHS contends under the Equitable Indemnity cause of action AHS cannot be found liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. AHS hired YH HVAC as an independent contractor, and under the Privette doctrine the hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for an injury sustained by the independent contractor’s employee.

In Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 and subsequent cases, courts in California have repeatedly affirmed the rule that when a person or entity hires an independent contractor to provide work or services, and one of the contractor’s employees is injured on the job, the hirer is generally not liable to the employee. (Id., at p. 702; see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“we have repeatedly reaffirmed the basic rule that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job”]; Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1244-1245.)

“There is a strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 37.) “This means that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.” (Id., at pp. 37-38.)

“When a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely. … This presumption is grounded in two major principles: first, that independent contractors by definition ordinarily control he manner of their own work; and second, that hirers typically hire independent contractors precisely for their greater ability to perform the contracted work safely and successfully.”

(Sandoval v. Qualcomm (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 269.) The hirer, in contrast, “is typically less knowledgeable and more poorly positioned to prevent injury to the contract workers than the contractor is.” (Id. at p. 270.) Accordingly, “A person or entity hiring an independent contractor (a ‘hirer’) ordinarily delegates to that independent contractor all responsibility for the safety of the contractor’s workers.” (Id. at p. 264; see also, e.g., Seabright Ins. Co. v. U.S. Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 597 [“Our decisions recognize a presumptive delegation of responsibility for workplace safety from the hirer to the independent contractor, and a concomitant delegation of duty.”]; Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1445 [“When a hirer delegates contracted work to an independent contractor, it also impliedly delegates its duty to provide a safe workplace to that contractor. In these circumstances, the hirer has no duty and the contractor may not recover from the hirer for his or her injuries.”].)

The California Supreme Court has recognized two primary exceptions to the Privette doctrine. First, the hirer may be liable where it “retains control over the contractor’s work and actually exercises that control in a way that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 264; see also, e.g., Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 38.) This is sometimes referred to as the “Hooker exception,” named after the California Supreme Court case in which the exception was recognized, Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202.

Here, on the undisputed facts, the Hooker exception does not apply. AHS did not retain any control over the work of YH HVAC and in fact was not involved at all in the work performed by YH HVAC and Plaintiff at the Carlins’ residence. (SUMF, Nos. 11, 16-18.)

Second, the hirer may also be liable where it “withholds critical information regarding a concealed hazard.” (Id., at p. 264.) This is sometimes referred to as the “Kinsman exception,” named after the California Supreme Court case in which the exception was recognized, Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659. Although the hirer ordinarily “turns over control of the worksite to the contractor so that the contract can perform the contracted work,” the hirer may still be liable under the Kinsman exception for injuries resulting from a “hazard that the hirer either knows or reasonably should know exists, and that the contractor does not know exists and could not reasonably discover without the hirer’s disclosure.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 271-272; see also, e.g., Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 38, 42-43; Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664.)

The Kinsman exception does not apply here, as a matter of law, as AHS was never even present at the site and had no knowledge of concealed hazards (if any existed) at the residence. (SUMF, No. 16.)

AHS has met its initial burden on summary judgment of showing that, as a matter of law, it did not have any duty, and did not breach any duty, to Plaintiff. Thus, the Carlins’ claim for equitable indemnity fails as a matter of law.

The Carlins have not filed an opposition and therefore have not shown that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the equitable indemnity claim.

The motion for summary adjudication on this cause of action in the cross-complaint is granted.

Contribution and Declaratory Relief

Equitable contribution is the right to recover from a co-obligor who shares liability with the party seeking contribution.¿ (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1293.)¿ As AHS has shown, as a matter of law, that it owed no duty, and breached no duty, to Plaintiff, AHS does not share any liability to Plaintiff with the Carlins.

There are two essential elements for declaratory relief: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [Cross-Complainant's] rights or obligations.” (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.) The Carlins cannot, as a matter of law, show that they are entitled to a declaration that they have any rights as against AHS, or that AHS has any obligation to them, in connection with any liability for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

Accordingly, AHS is entitled to summary adjudication on these two causes of action in the cross-complaint.

Conclusion

AHS has shown that all of the causes of action against AHS in the Carlins’ cross-complaint have no merit, and that AHS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of these causes of action.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS AHS’s motion for summary judgment on the Carlins’ cross-complaint.

Moving Party is to give notice.