Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV10298, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV10298    Hearing Date: April 22, 2025    Dept: 29

Lawson v. McElroy
21STCV10298
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Yamashiro, LLC, and 1999 Sycamore, LLC.

Tentative

The motion is denied.

Background

This matter arises out of an incident on December 29, 2019, in which Defendant Cash McElroy Jones (“Jones”) allegedly punched Plaintiff Kenneth Lawson (“Lawson”) at the Yamashiro Hollywood Restaurant on Sycamore Avenue in Los Angeles.

On March 16, 2021, Plaintiffs Lawson and his wife Monique Jourdain-Lawson (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the complaint in this action against Jones and numerous other defendants.

On June 14, 2021, Defendants Brian William Williams, Ronald Williams, and Cash Money Records, Inc. each filed an answer.

On September 1, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”).

On October 1, 2021, Defendants Brian William Williams, Ronald Williams, and Cash Money Records, Inc. each filed an answer to the FAC.

On October 8, 2021, Defendant Yamashiro, LLC (“Yamashiro”) filed an answer to the FAC, as well as a cross-complaint against Jones and Roes 1 through 20.

On October 15, 2021, Defendants Jones, 5th Amendment Management Corp., and 5th Amendment Entertainment, Inc. filed an answer to the FAC.

On December 14, 2021, Jones filed an answer to Yamashiro’s cross-complaint.

On May 6, 2022, Defendant 1999 Sycamore, LLC (“Sycamore”) filed an answer to the FAC.

Defendants Brian William Williams, Ronald Williams, and Cash Money Records, Inc., settled with Plaintiffs, and on April 30, 2024, the Court granted a motion for determination of good faith settlement.

Currently before the Court and set for hearing on April 22, 2025, is the motion of Defendants Yamashiro and Sycamore for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ FAC.  The motion was filed on November 21, 2024. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on April 8, 2025, and then supplemented the opposition with additional filings on April 9 and 10. Defendants filed a reply on April 11, 2025.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Discussion

In the FAC, Plaintiffs assert two causes of action against Defendants: for premises liability (Fifth Cause of Action) and for loss of consortium (Eighth Cause of Action). Defendants Yamashiro and Sycamore (“Defendants”) now move for summary judgment.

Before addressing the merits of Defendants’ argument, the Court addresses some preliminary issues.

Preliminary Issues

First, Defendants ask the Court to refuse to consider Plaintiffs’ opposition because it is untimely.

Prior to the recent amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, the opposition to a motion for summary judgment was due 14 days prior to the hearing. Last year, the Legislature amended section 437c, subdivision (b)(2), so that oppositions are due 20 days before the hearing. The amendment is effective January 1, 2025.

The Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiffs’ opposition, given the importance of a summary judgment motion, the preference for resolving cases on the merits, and the uncertainty whether the new briefing schedule applies to motions that were filed before, but are set for hearing after, the effective date of the amendment.

Second, Plaintiffs request a continuance of the hearing under section 437c, subdivision (h). Plaintiffs do not, however, submit any affidavit or declaration in support of the request that indicates that facts essential to the opposition exist but cannot be presented. Indeed, given that Defendants answered in October 2021 and May 2022, and this motion was filed in November 2024, it would likely be difficult for Plaintiffs to make the showing required for a continuance, but in any event Plaintiffs have not submitted the required support by affidavit or declaration. The request for a continuance of the hearing is denied.

Merits

On December 29, 2019, Plaintiffs attended a “birthday party and/or promotional event” at Yamashiro Hollywood Restaurant (the “Restaurant”). (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 5.) The party or event was in honor of Bethany Henderson (Plaintiff Jourdain-Lawson’s cousin) and was hosted by Travis Wilson, Ms. Henderson’s partner. (DSUMF, Nos. 5, 7-8.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Yamashiro owned, operated, possessed, controlled, or maintained the Restaurant and that Defendant Sycamore owned, possessed, controlled, or maintained the property on which the Restaurant was located. (DSUMF, Nos. 2-3.)

Prior to the incident, Plaintiff Lawson did not know Defendant Jones personally and had never spoken to him. (DSUMF, No. 10.)

The incident began at approximately 9:52 pm, when Jones “aggressively” approached Lawson and told Lawson not to talk to his (Jones’s) wife. (Lawson Depo., at 29:17-30:6, 34:6-35:18, 43:17-20.) (Excerpts from deposition of Plaintiff Lawson appear as Defendants’ Exhibit B and Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A.) Lawson denied speaking to Jones’s wife. (Id., at 29:24-25, 34:12-14.) Jourdain-Lawson came up and asked, “What’s going on?” and Jones “got aggressive with her” and told Lawson to “check your female.” (Id., at 30:3-8, 34:19-45:5.) After “a couple of minutes,” two or three people who were with Jones “grabbed him and pushed him away.” (Id., at 32:1-15, 32:25-33:2, 33:9-18, 35:6-18.)

Mr. Wilson, the host of the party, was one of the people who intervened to pull Jones away from Lawson. (Wilson Depo. [Defendant’s Exhibit D], at 58:20-25.) Mr. Wilson believed at that point that “we had calmed everything down.” (Id., at 59:14-60:9.) “I thought everything was okay.” (Id., at 60:13; see also DSUMF, No. 12.)

Lawson decided to leave because he did not want to have any issues with Jones; it was “time to go,” he testified. (Lawson Depo., at 33:3-5, 35:16-24.)

At approximately 9:56 pm, as Lawson and Jourdain-Lawson were leaving, Jones came up to them and yelled obscenities at Jourdain-Lawson. (Id., at 92:24-93:7, 94:17-24, 103:22-104:4; see also DSUMF, No. 14.) Jones “sucked punched” Lawson, knocking him unconscious. (DSUMF, No. 14.) Prior to the punch, Lawson did not believe that Jones was going to punch him. (Lawson Depo., at 104:5-8.)

On these facts, Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Defendants for premises liability and loss of consortium.

The basic elements of a cause of action for premises liability are: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

Defendants argue that they owed no duty, and breached no duty, to protect Plaintiffs from the unforeseeable third-party criminal conduct of Defendant Jones. 

The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court.¿¿(Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.) Pursuant to Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), “Everyone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person ....” This statute establishes the default rule that each person has a duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (Brown, supra, at pp. 213-214.)

Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) Although a business owner “is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)

“A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person. … Courts have found such a special relationship in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235.) A business owner owes “a duty to undertake “reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that [were] likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures” and to take such “appropriate action as is reasonable under the circumstances to protect patrons.” (Id., at p. 244.)

“[O]nly when ‘heightened foreseeability’ of third party criminal activity on the premises exists—shown by prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location —does the scope of a business proprietor's special-relationship-based duty include an obligation to provide guards to protect the safety of patrons.” (Id., at p. 240; see also, e.g., Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213-1214; Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676-679 [disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 fn. 5]; Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 664-665.)

Here, Defendants presented evidence that the Restaurant reopened under new management and ownership in June 2016, and in the three-and-a-half years prior to the incident, Defendants had no knowledge of any incidents of physical violence in the Restaurant. (Braidi Decl. [Defendant’s Exhibit F], ¶¶ 5-7; Galvez Depo. [Defendant’s Exhibit G], at 12:6-13, 81:15-19, 83:12-18.)

With this evidence, Defendants met their initial burden on summary judgment of presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Specifically, without evidence of prior incidents of physical violence, Defendants had no duty of care, and breached no duty of care, to protect Plaintiffs from violent third-party criminal conduct.

This shifts the burden on summary judgment to Plaintiffs to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Here, Plaintiffs have done so.

With their opposition, Plaintiffs submit excerpts from the deposition testimony of Tricia Gilfone. Ms. Gilfone testified that she worked at the Restaurant and she remembered “a few times” prior to the date of the incident that the police had been called in because of “disturbances.” (Gilfone Depo. [Plaintiffs’ Exhibit B], at 48:17-49:2.) Some related to noise complaints from neighbors. (Id., at 49:3-50:8.) But Ms. Gilfone also testified that there had been prior incidents in which customers had punched other customers. (Id., at 53:2-54:2.) “Things like that did happen,” she stated, and she had observed physical “altercations,” including “arguments or pushing.” (Id., at 54:16-55:19.) “This isn’t the first time that something broke out. It’s happened in the past.” (Id., at 55:15-16.)

On summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties (here, Plaintiffs) and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Applying this standard, the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact relating to the elements of duty and breach; a finder of fact could reasonably credit the testimony of Ms. Gilfone and draw an inference that that there had been several prior instances of physical violence at the Restaurant, and that the violent attack by Cash on Lawson was reasonably foreseeable under all of the circumstances in the absence of reasonable precautionary measures to protect the safety of patrons, including, for example, the hiring of a security guard. The Court understands that Defendants presented evidence to the contrary, but on summary judgment the Court cannot resolve disputes in the evidence.

It is not the role of the Court on summary judgment to weigh the evidence or attempt to predict a likely outcome at trial. The Court’s role is limited to determining whether there are disputed issues of material fact. The Court concludes that there are.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

(As Defendants move only for summary judgment, and not for summary judgment, and as the Court has determined that there are triable issues on the cause of action for premises liability, the Court need not reach or address Defendants’ arguments as to the loss of consortium cause of action.)

Conclusion

The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Yamashiro, LLC and 1999 Sycamore, LLC.