Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV11145, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV11145 Hearing Date: November 20, 2024 Dept: 29
Gutierrez v. State of California
Case No. 21STCV11145
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Tentative
The tentative ruling is
that the motion is denied.
Background
Three related cases arise out of a series
of events involving multiple parties on the 105 Freeway on March 22, 2020.
In this case, the first filed action
(this case, Case No. 21STCV11145), on March 22, 2021, David and Patty Gutierrez
(“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendant State of California, California Department
of Transportation, California State Transportation Agency, Department of
California Highway Patrol, County of Los Angeles (“County”), City of Lynwood
(“City”), Teron Liggins (“Liggins”), Trino Naranjo (“Naranjo”), and Does 1
through 100, asserting causes of action for dangerous condition of public property,
negligence (two counts), negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss
of consortium. This is referred to as
the “Gutierrez Action.”
In May and June 2022, answers were filed
by the State of California, acting by and through the Department of
Transportation; Liggins; Naranjo; and State of California, acting by and
through the California Highway Patrol.
In June 2022, the Court, at the requests
of Plaintiffs, dismissed City and County.
On June 13, 2022, Naranjo filed a
cross-complaint against Liggins and Roes 1 through 50.
On August 17, 2023, the Court denied the motion
of Defendant Liggins to enforce a settlement agreement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6. The denial was
on procedural grounds and without prejudice.
The Court made no finding and no ruling as to whether the parties did or
did not enter into a binding settlement agreement in November 2021.
On October 22, 2024, the Court, at the
request of Plaintiffs, dismissed the fifth cause of action by Plaintiff Patty
Gutierrez, for loss of consortium.
In the second filed case (Case No. 22STLC00914),
on February 14, 2022, Plaintiff Aspire General Insurance Company (“Aspire”) filed
a complaint for subrogation against Liggins and Does 1 through 10. This is the “Aspire Action.”
On August 29, 2024, the Court, at the
request of Aspire, dismissed the entire Aspire Action with prejudice.
In the third filed case (Case No. 22STCV07237), on February 28, 2022, Plaintiffs Jorge and
Guadalupe Gomez filed a complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence
against Liggins,
Naranjo, and Does 1 through 100.
This is the “Gomez Action.”
On June 10, 2022, Naranjo filed an answer
and a cross-complaint against Liggins and Roes 1 through 50.
On August 23, 2022, Liggins filed an
answer to the complaint.
On April 24, 2024, the Court granted the
motion of Infinity Insurance Company (“Infinity”), the insurer for Naranjo, to
intervene. On May 1, 2024, Infinity
filed a pleading labeled “Complaint-In-Intervention.”
By order dated August 25, 2022, the Court
related these three actions. All are
assigned to Department 29 of the Spring Street Courthouse.
As it relates to the matter set for
hearing in this action on November 20, 2024, Liggins filed a motion for summary
judgment on July 1, 2024. Plaintiffs
filed an opposition on November 6, and Liggins filed a reply on November 13.
Legal Standard
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a
mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether,
despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the
trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant
moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the
cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense
to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)
A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary
adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to
show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved
each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the
cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff
or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or
cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must
instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material
fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To
establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must
produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Discussion
This case arises out of a
series of events that occurred between approximately 5:50 and 6:45 pm on March
22, 2020, on the 105 Freeway.
(Complaint, ¶ 11; Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
[“DSUMF”], No. 2.) Plaintiffs allege
that their adult son, Jacob Gutierrez, drove into a pool of accumulated water
on the freeway, lost control of the car, and collided with the guardrail. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Elizabeth Gomez, the girlfriend of Jacob
Gutierrez, was a passenger in the vehicle.
(Complaint, ¶ 11.)
While Jacob Gutierrez and
Elizabeth Gomez were waiting for assistance, a second vehicle struck Jacob
Gutierrez’s vehicle and then continued driving, without stopping. (Complaint, ¶
12.)
Plaintiff David Gutierrez
arrived at the accident scene, as did Jorge Gomez, one of the plaintiffs in the
Gomez Action. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Meanwhile, Elizabeth Gomez’s father drove
Elizabeth to a hospital. (Complaint, ¶
13.)
California Highway Patrol
officers arrived and employed a traffic break.
(Complaint, ¶ 14.) After the
traffic break was discontinued, vehicles driven by Liggins and Naranjo collided,
and one of their vehicles collided with the pedestrians remaining on the scene
– Jacob Gutierrez, Plaintiff David Gutierrez, and Jorge Comez. (Complaint, ¶ 16; DSUMF, No. 2.) Jacob Gutierrez died, and Plaintiff David
Gutierrez and Jorge Gomez were injured.
(Complaint, ¶ 17.)
In their complaint,
Plaintiffs assert one cause of action against Defendant Liggins for negligence
(Third Cause of Action). Plaintiff David
Gutierrez (only) also asserts a cause of action against Liggins for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (Fourth Cause of Action). (Plaintiff Patty Gutierrez also asserted in
the complaint a cause of action against Liggins for loss of consortium, but after
Liggins filed this motion she dismissed that cause of action.)
Defendant Liggins now
moves for summary judgment, arguing that he is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on essentially two grounds: (1) the parties reached a binding and
enforceable settlement agreement as a matter of law, or, in the alternative,
(2) Plaintiffs are estopped, by their conduct, from denying the existence of a
binding and enforceable settlement agreement.
As a threshold matter,
Plaintiffs assert that the motion is procedurally defective and should be
denied because Liggins does not identify any element of a cause of action that
cannot be established and he did not allege, in his answer, an affirmative
defense of release or settlement. (Opp.
at pp. 5-6.) Under the case law,
however, “courts generally have allowed an affirmative defense to be asserted
for the first time in a motion for summary judgment absent a showing of
prejudice.” (Atkins v. St. Cecilia Catholic
School (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1328, 1341; accord Nieto v. Blue Shield of
California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 75; see
also 3 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before
Trial (2023), ¶ 10:51.6.) As no
prejudice has been shown here, the Court will consider the motion of Defendant
Liggins on the merits.
Liggins contends that he entered
into a binding and enforceable agreement to settle with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs deny that any such agreement was
reached.
A settlement agreement is
a contract, and a contract is generally formed by an offer and an
acceptance. (Donovan v. RRL Corp.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270-271; Mar v. Perkins (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
201, 212.) The acceptance “must be absolute and unqualified.” (Civ. Code, § 1585.) “[T]erms proposed in an offer must be met
exactly, precisely, and unequivocally for its acceptance to result in the
formation of a binding contract.” (Panagotacos
v. Bank of America (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 851, 855; accord Siri v. Sutter
Home Winery (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 685, 691.)
“A qualified acceptance is
a new proposal.” (Civ. Code, §
1585.) A conditional or qualified
acceptance does not create a binding agreement but rather “amounts to a new
proposal or counteroffer putting an end to the original offer.” (Panagotacos, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at
p. 856; accord Siri, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691-693; Flintco
Pacific v. TEC Management Consultants (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 727, 736; Bias
v. Wright (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 811, 820-821.)
“The interpretation of the
purported acceptance or rejection of an offer is a question of fact.” (Guzman v. Visalia Community Bank (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376.) “[T]he test
of the true meaning of an acceptance or rejection is not what the party making
it thought it meant or intended it to mean.
Rather, the test is what a reasonable person in the position of the
parties would have thought it meant.” (Id.,
at pp. 1376-1377.)
Accordingly, the Court now
turns to the facts in the record to determine whether, as a matter of law, there
was an offer and acceptance that created a binding and enforceable settlement
agreement.
At the time of the
accident, Liggins was covered by an insurance policy issued by Progressive
Insurance Company (“Progressive”). (DSUMF, No. 3.) Plaintiff’s claims for damages are in excess
of the insurance policy personal injury limits of $15,000/$30,000. (DSUMF, No.
3.)
By letter dated October
20, 2021, Plaintiffs, along with Jorge Gomez, made a joint offer to settle with
Liggins. (DSUMF, Nos. 7-10; Morales
Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.) In addition to
setting forth, in some detail, the nature of the claims of Plaintiffs and Jorge
Gomez (described in the letter as “claimants”), the letter stated (among other
things):
“[B]ecause of the presumed
limited insurance coverage available in this case, and the apparent absence of
any substantial assets held by Liggins, the claimants have authorized their
counsel to settle all non-property damage claims against your insureds for policy
limits for the wrongful death of Jacob Gutierrez, and for the personal injuries
suffered by David Gutierrez and Jorge Gomez.
The purpose of this
letter, therefore, is to allow Progressive and its insured, Mr. Liggins, the
opportunity to settle within policy limits in exchange for a full settlement
and release of your insureds. Any release or other document Progressive or its
insured require be signed should reflect that the claimants will satisfy all
known liens required by them to be satisfied related to this matter, whether
medical, statutory, or otherwise; claimants will not defend nor indemnify; and,
any restitution a criminal court may order be paid by Liggins to the claimants
is excluded from this settlement
…
[W]e have the claimants’
authority to settle all bodily injury claims against your insureds for the
liability limits applicable to the per occurrence limit of Liggin's Progressive
policy. Given the dearth of relevant information available to the claimants at
this time, however, the claimants must of necessity make this offer conditioned
upon the following:
1. Progressive furnishing us, within the time
period set out below, with a certified copy of such Progressive liability
insurance policies that do, or may, insure Liggins for this incident, including
declarations and endorsements, in order that we may confirm the available
automobile and other liability insurance coverage; and, a sworn statement from
the insurer that it has performed good faith investigations of and for all
applicable sources of potential liability insurance for this matter,
Progressive and others, and expressly affirming Liggins had no other applicable
liability insurance (whether excess, umbrella, business, employer, etc.} that
did, or could even potentially, provide coverage for these claims. If other
such insurance exi[s]ts this offer of settlement is conditioned upon payment
ofthe limits of all such policies by the applicable insurance carriers.
2. Progressive furnishing us, within the time
period set out below, a declaration signed by its insured that states, if true,
that at the time of the incident he was not acting within the course and scope
of employment, agency, joint venture, or errand for another person or entity;
that he was not operating his vehicle to or from or for any form of employment,
errand, agency, or otherwise on behalf of any person or entity; and, that he
was not operating his vehicle incidental to any such employment or agency or
otherwise for or on behalf of another person or entity. If the insured was or
may have been acting for another person or entity at the time of this incident,
or was operating his vehicle for, to or from his employment or activity for
such other person or entity, that employer, person or entity must be expressly
excluded from this settlement.
The declarations should
additionally state: “If any representation made within this declaration is
materially inaccurate or false, claimants reserve, and shall have the right, to
rescind any settlement agreement reached and to prosecute a lawsuit against all
at-fault parties. The statute of limitations shall be tolled during the period
between making the statement and notice of its materially inaccurate or false
nature.”
3. Receipt by this office of Progressive’s
written acceptance of this offer prior to expiration of the date and time
stated below;
4. If acceptance of this offer is conditioned
upon the execution of a release or similar document by the claimants,
Progressive furnishing us that release or similar document, consistent with
this offer, concurrent with its acceptance; and
5. The settlement check should be made payable to
both law firms, on behalf of their respective clients, and received by this
office within ten (10) days of the email return to Progressive of the fully
executed release and/or conforming settlement documents, if any.
… [T]his offer shall
remain open until 5:00 p.m. on November 18, 2021, at which time it shall be
deemed withdrawn and will not be offered again.”
(Morales Decl., Exh. A.,
at pp. 2, 4-5; see also DSUMF Nos. 11-16.)
The letter was signed by counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for Jorge
Gomez. (Morales Decl., Exh. A., at p.
5.)
On November 18, 2021, Ed
Morales, counsel for Liggins, sent an email to counsel for Plaintiffs and
counsel for Jorge Gomez. (Morales Decl.,
¶ 6 & Exh. B.) The email stated:
“Pursuant to you[r] demand
letter date[d] 10-21-021. Here are the
documents you requested to settle for the policy limits. Please let me know if you have any
questions.”
(Morales Decl. Exh.
B.) The email also listed five
attachments: a declaration from a Kimberly Interrante, a Senior Lead Claims
Adjuster at Progressive; a declaration from Liggins; the insurance policy
covering Liggins; the declarations page of the police; and a settlement
agreement. (Morales Decl., Exh. B; see
also Morales Decl., ¶¶ 7-8 & Exh. U [draft settlement agreement];
Interrante Decl., ¶¶ 4-6 & Exhs. D-G [declaration of Interrante, copy of
policy, copy of declarations page, declaration of Liggins]; see also DSUMF, No.
19.)
The next day, counsel for
Plaintiffs responded, “Thank you for your response. Should be able to review next week.” (Morales Decl., ¶ 9 & Exh. C.)
Approximately three weeks
passed, and Plaintiffs did not respond further.
On December 8, 2021, counsel for Liggins sent an email to counsel for
Plaintiff and counsel for Jorge Gomez stating, “Dear Michael – have you been
able to review this? Hoping we can wrap
it up soon.” (Morales Decl., ¶ 9 & Exh.
J.)
On February 9, 2022,
counsel for Liggins and counsel for Plaintiffs discussed the matter. (Rand Decl., ¶ 6.) On February 16, 2022, counsel for Plaintiffs
sent a letter to counsel for Liggins advising that Plaintiffs would proceed
with litigation. (Rand Decl., ¶ 11 &
Exh. 1.) Counsel for Liggins
acknowledged receipt of the summons and complaint on April 21, 2022, and filed
an answer on May 31, 2022. (Rand Decl.,
¶¶ 3-4, 12-13 & Exhs. 2-3.)
The parties subsequently
exchanged correspondence and had further discussions in which Liggins asserted
that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement in November 2021
and Plaintiffs asserted that they had not.
(See Morales Decl., 10-12 & Exhs. H, L-O; Rand Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)
On these facts, it does
appear that the letter dated October 20, 2021, from Plaintiffs to Liggins, was
a contractual offer to settle. No party
argues otherwise. What the parties
dispute, however, is whether Liggins accepted the offer.
The settlement offer
contained a number of specific and express conditions. (Morales Decl., Exh. A, at pp. 4-5.) As set forth above, under the clear case law,
if there was any material variance from these conditions in the response of
Liggins, then the response was not an acceptance but rather a counteroffer or
invitation to deal.
The Court concludes that
it cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Liggins accepted the offer made by
Plaintiffs to settle. There are, at the
least, triable issues of material fact as to whether the email dated November
18, 2021, from Liggins to Plaintiff was an unqualified acceptance.
For example, and without
limitation, Plaintiffs’ offer required Liggins to provide a declaration containing
specific language. (Morales Decl., Exh.
A, at p. 4.) The declaration provided by
Liggins contained some, but not all, of that required language. (Morales Decl., Exh. G.) Similarly, the declaration provided by
Progressive did not meet the requirements set forth in Plaintiffs’ offer. (Compare Morales Decl., Exh. A, at p. 4 with Morales
Decl., Exh. E.) And the settlement
agreement sent by Liggins contained release and hold harmless provisions that
were inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ proposal.
(Compare Morales Decl., Exh. A., at pp. 2, 4-5 with Morales Decl., Exh. U.)
The appellate decision in CSAA
Insurance Exchange v. Hodroj (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 272, upon which Liggins
relies, is not to the contrary. In that
case, the insurance company accepted all of the conditions of the settlement
offer, and all that remained was the drafting of a more formal document. (Id., at p. 277.) Here, in contrast, a
trier of fact could reasonably find that Liggins did not fulfill all of the
conditions of the settlement offer, and that he instead made a counteroffer to
settle.
The Court need not reach,
and does not reach, all of the other arguments that Plaintiffs make about the
purported acceptance of its offer to settle.
It is sufficient at this time for the Court to conclude that there are
at least some triable issues of fact as to whether Liggins validly accepted Plaintiffs’
settlement offer. Whether a reasonable
person in the position of the parties would have thought that the email dated
November 18, 2021 (including its attachments) was an unqualified acceptance of
the Plaintiffs’ settlement offer – or was, instead, a rejection of Plaintiffs’
offer and a counteroffer to settle on materially different terms – is, on this
record, a question of fact. (Guzman,
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1376-1377.)
As a result, the Court
cannot find, as a matter of law, that there was a valid and enforceable
settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and Liggins.
In the alternative, Liggins
argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs should be
equitably estopped from denying the existence of a valid and enforceable
settlement agreement. The elements of
equitable estoppel are:
“(1) the party to be
estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the
estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be
ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to
his injury.”
(Strong v. County of
Santa Clara (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720, 725; accord Schafer v. City of Los
Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261.) The detrimental reliance by the party invoking
the doctrine of equitable estoppel must be reasonable. (Schafer, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p.
1261.)
Liggins argues that Plaintiffs
led him to believe for a period of 16 months that they had a valid and
enforceable settlement agreement. (Mem.,
at pp. 24-25.) As for detrimental
reliance, Liggins asserts that he was “denied the bargained-for benefit of a
release from liability for Plaintiffs’ non-property injuries in exchange for
$30,000.” (Id., at p. 25.)
Liggins has not shown, on
this record, that equitable estoppel applies here. First, the facts are inconsistent with the
claim by Liggins that he was somehow misled by Plaintiffs for a period of 16
months. To the contrary, in December
2021, less than a month after the purported acceptance, Liggins followed up
with Plaintiffs in an email that expresses uncertainty, not confidence that the
parties had a deal. (Morales Decl., Exh.
J.) And approximately two months after
that, Plaintiffs sent a letter stating clearly that they would proceed with
litigation rather than settlement. (Rand
Decl., & Exh. 1.) Although Liggins
may have preferred to settle rather than to litigate, Liggins has not made a
sufficient showing that Plaintiffs misled him (whether by words, deeds, or
silence) into believing that they had a valid and enforceable settlement
agreement.
Second, and independently,
Liggins has not shown any actual, reasonable, and detrimental reliance. Liggins has not identified any action that he
took (or failed to take) in reliance on the purported settlement
agreement. A disappointed expectancy is
not the same as detrimental reliance.
Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs are not equitably estopped from denying the existence
of a valid and enforceable settlement agreement between them and Liggins.
Liggins’s motion for
summary judgment is denied.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES the
motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Teron Liggins on July 1, 2024.
Moving party to give
notice.