Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV13304, Date: 2025-03-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV13304 Hearing Date: March 13, 2025 Dept: 29
Gomez v. Target Corporation
21STCV13304
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Adjudication of Issues
Tentative
The motion is denied.
Background
On
April 7, 2021, Joann Gomez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Target
Corporation (“Target”), Matthew Doe, and Does 1 through 50, asserting causes of
action for negligence and premises liability arising out of an incident on April
23, 2019, in which, Plaintiff alleges, she slipped and fell due to a liquid on
the floor of a Target store on Firestone Boulevard in Norwalk.
On
May 26, 2021, Target filed an answer.
On
January 4, 2024, Target filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication of issues. Plaintiff filed an opposition,
along with objections to Target’s evidence, on February 21, 2025. Target filed
a reply, along with objections to Plaintiff’s evidence, on February 28.
Legal Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Objections to Evidence
Each side asserts objections to the other’s
evidence.
Evidence
presented in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment
must be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v.
Bakewell Hawthorne LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court must
“consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to
which objections have been made and sustained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(c).)
Plaintiff
asserts five objections to Target’s evidence.
The objections are overruled.
Target
asserts five objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. The objections are overruled.
Discussion
On
April 23, 2019, Plaintiff was a customer in a Target store on Firestone
Boulevard in Norwalk (the “Store”).
(Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No.
1.) While Plaintiff was near to the
front of the store, Plaintiff slipped on some liquid on the floor and
fell. (Ibid.; Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts [“PSAMF”], No. 1.)
On
these facts, Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Target for negligence
and premises liability. The basic
elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the
same: (1) the existence of a legal duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown
v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions
for the court.¿¿(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki¿v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)
Those who own,
possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in
managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
(Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) If a dangerous condition exists, the
property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the
condition reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to give a warning
adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores,
Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)
“It is well established in California that although
a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does
owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably
safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) “A store
owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions
of the premises open to customers.” (Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 472, 476.) “The care required is commensurate with the
risks involved.” (Ibid.) “[A]s to business invitees, the owner
should conduct frequent inspections.” (Ortega, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)
“A
plaintiff alleging injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove the
defendant either: (1) created the dangerous condition, or (2) knew or should
have known of the dangerous condition.” (See Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc.
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036.) “Because
the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety …, the owner’s
actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is [in many cases] a
key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 1206.) “[W]here the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous
condition to prove the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct
it.” (Ibid.) “Most Courts of Appeal hold that a defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the dangerous
condition existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by ordinary
care and inspection.” (Id. at p. 1207.) “Whether a dangerous condition
has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it
is a question of fact for the jury.” (Ibid.)
One
common factual scenario that arises is that a plaintiff alleges an injury
sustained as a result of a dangerous condition in a store, but plaintiff does
not know how long the dangerous condition existed. For example, if the
dangerous condition is liquid on the floor of a supermarket, the plaintiff
often does not know when the spill occurred.
The
California Supreme Court addressed this precise situation in the landmark case
of Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra. There, the court described the issue as
“under what circumstances, if any, a store owner may be liable for injuries to
a business invitee from a dangerous condition on its premises where the
evidence fails to show how long the dangerous condition existed prior to the
injury.” (26 Cal.4th at p. 1203.) After analyzing the extensive precedent in
this area, the court reaffirmed the basic rules that there must be evidence of
the defendant’s actual or constructive notice and that the plaintiff has the
burden of proof on this issue. (Id., at pp. 1205-1209.)
The
court went on to hold in Ortega, however, that a plaintiff may make the
showing necessary to meet this burden of proof through circumstantial evidence,
including evidence of a failure to conduct frequent inspections. (Id.,
at p. 1210.) “‘[E]vidence that an inspection has not been made within a
particular period of time prior to an accident may warrant an inference that
the defective condition existed long enough so that a person exercising
reasonable care would have discovered it.’” (Ibid. [quoting Bridgman,
supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 447.) “[T]he failure to inspect the premises within
a reasonable time prior to the accident [may] give rise to an inference that
the defective condition lasted long enough to have been discovered and
remedied.” (Id., at p. 1211.)
The
burden remains on plaintiff, the court emphasized, to produce evidence of the
defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge. (Id., at p. 1212).
Nonetheless, the court held:
“[P]laintiffs may demonstrate the storekeeper had
constructive notice of the dangerous condition if they can show that the site
had not been inspected within a reasonable period of time so that a person
exercising due care would have discovered and corrected the hazard. In other
words, if the plaintiffs can show an inspection was not made within a
particular period of time prior to an accident, they may raise an inference the
condition did exist long enough for the owner to have discovered it. It remains
a question of fact for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the
defective condition existed long enough so that it would have been discovered
and remedied by an owner in the exercise of reasonable care.”
(Id.,
at pp. 1212-1213 [citations omitted].)
Here, Target moves
for summary judgment (or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to each
cause of action) on the ground that Plaintiff cannot establish that Target
created the dangerous condition or that Target had actual or constructive
notice of the dangerous condition in the Store sufficiently in advance of
Plaintiff’s accident to remedy the condition or warn Plaintiff and other
customers.
Defendant
relies primarily on the declaration of Matthew Karnsritong, Target’s Leader on
Duty at the Store at the time of Plaintiff’s accident. (Karnsritong Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.) In his declaration, Mr. Karnsritong explains:
“As the Leader on Duty, my role was to
oversee the store, which required that I continuously walk throughout the
entire store during my shift, making sure everything is in order and the entire
store was safe. While doing this, consistent with my training, I constantly
look at the floor for spills, debris or potential safety hazards. As part of my
duties, I inspect each part of the store, including the area where Plaintiff
reported that she allegedly slipped and fell, every thirty minutes or less.”
(Id., ¶
3.) He states that he did not see “any
water or liquid of any kind on the floor in the area where Plaintiff alleges
she slipped” and heard “no complaints about spills or liquids on the floor
before Plaintiff’s fall.” (Id.,
¶¶ 4-5.) “All Target employees share the
responsibility to keep the store safe as it is everyone’s duty to inspect for
spills.” (Id., ¶ 6.)
Defendant also
cites the testimony of Plaintiff, who stated in her deposition that she does
not know how long the water was on the ground before she slipped; that she does
not know where the water came from; and that she does not know whether any
Target employee was aware of the puddle before her accident. (DSUMF, Nos. 6-8.)
In response,
Plaintiff makes essentially at least two arguments: (1) that there are triable
issues of fact with regard to the adequacy of Target’s inspection program, and
therefore as to the issue of constructive notice; and (2) that there is a
triable issue of fact with regard to whether the floor material used by Target in
this Store is so slippery (particularly when wet) as to be an unsafe and
dangerous condition.
The Court
begins with Plaintiff’s first argument.
Target
presents evidence that Mr. Karnsritong, the Leader on Duty, as part of his
duties, inspects the entire store “every thirty minutes or less.” No evidence is presented regarding (1) the
time of Plaintiff’s accident; or (2) the time of Mr. Karnsritong’s last
inspection of the area in which the accident occurred.
Plaintiff’s
expert performed a site inspection and estimated that the size of the store is
approximately 125,000 square feet.
(Oandasan Decl., ¶ 11; Gorb Decl., ¶ 4.)
There is no
single benchmark or fixed time period that applies in all cases with regard to
the frequency of inspections. As the
California Supreme Court stated in Ortega v. Kmart Corp.:
“If
the owner operates a self-service grocery store, where customers are invited to
inspect, remove, and replace goods on shelves, ‘the exercise of ordinary care
may require the owner to take greater precautions and make more frequent
inspections than would otherwise be needed to safeguard against the possibility
that such a customer may create a dangerous condition by disarranging the
merchandise’ and creating potentially hazardous conditions.”
"’The exact time the condition must
exist before it should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have been
discovered and remedied, cannot be fixed, because, obviously, it varies
according to the circumstances. A person operating a grocery and vegetable
store in the exercise of ordinary care must exercise a more vigilant outlook
than the operator of some other types of business where the danger of things
falling to the floor is not so obvious.’”
(Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp.
1205, 1210 [quoting Bridgman, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 448 and Louie v.
Hagstrom’s Food Stores (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601, 608.]) (To the extent that Target argues that federal
trial courts have established a fixed benchmark for a reasonable inspection
interval, the Court declines to follow such rulings and instead relies on the published
California appellate authorities.)
“Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a
reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the
jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations. Each accident must be
viewed in light of its own unique circumstances.” (Ortega,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1207; see
also id. at pp. 1209-10.)
The Court is mindful that a store owner “must
have a reasonable time to make an inspection in order to discovery the dangerous
condition and correct it.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1210-11.)
There are undoubtedly some time periods between inspection and accident that
are so brief that, under all of the facts and circumstances, no fact finder
could draw an inference of constructive notice. (See Girvetz v. Boys’ Market
(1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 831-32 [affirming judgment for defendant
notwithstanding the verdict where evidence indicated that banana or banana peel
was on floor for approximately one-and-a-half minutes].)
On this record, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in her favor, the Court concludes that a finder of fact could reasonably
conclude that Target’s inspection protocol was not sufficient, and as a result could
reasonably draw an inference of constructive notice. Given the nature and size of the Store, and
the fact that the inspections are conducted every 30 minutes by a Leader on
Duty who has other responsibilities, there are competing inferences regarding
Defendant’s constructive knowledge that the finder of fact could reasonably
draw. (See Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1204, 1211-13 [affirming
judgment in favor of plaintiff where evidence indicated aisle in which spill
occurred was usually inspected every 15 to 30 minutes]; Zipusch v. LA
Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1293 [noting that “a 15- to
30-minute interval between inspections at a busy commercial retail center may
lead to an inference of negligence”]; Hale v. Safeway Stores
(1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 124, 127-28 [time from inspection to accident estimated
to be five to twelve minutes]; Tuttle v. Crawford (1936) 8 Cal.2d 126,
131 [five to eight minutes].) A trier of
fact could reasonably conclude, under these circumstances, that the exercise of
ordinary care required more frequent inspections, or inspections more focused
on safety issues, than Target conducted. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude, under
these circumstances, that a 30-minute inspection of a Store as large as this one
by a single employee with other obligations is not a sufficient inspection for
potential safety hazards. Alternatively,
the trier of fact could reasonably agree with Target and not draw any inference
of constructive knowledge. On these facts, this is an issue for the jury to decide.
As the Court has determined that there are
triable issues of fact with regard to constructive notice, the Court need not
reach, and does not reach, the other issues presented in the evidence and
briefing.
The motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative for summary adjudication on each cause of action in the complaint,
is denied.
Conclusion
The
Court DENIES Target’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for
summary adjudication of issues.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice.