Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV24698, Date: 2023-09-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV24698 Hearing Date: October 18, 2023 Dept: 29
Tentative
Moving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims asserted
against them in Plaintiff’s FAC is GRANTED.
Moving Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Eighth Cause of Action as against WFE in
the Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.
Background
This case arises out of a workplace
accident that allegedly occurred on July 5, 2019. In the operative complaint in
this action, the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff Jaime Moreno
(“Plaintiff”) asserts two causes of action. In the First Cause of Action, for
general negligence, Plaintiff names as defendants Superior Personnel Inc. (“Superior”),
Mario Alcala, Andrew Hernandez, and Does 1 through 50. In the Second Cause of
Action, also for general negligence, Plaintiff names as defendants Mario
Alcala, Isaac Ash, United Legwear Company, LLC (“ULC”), United Legwear
Distribution LLC (“ULD”), United Legwear & Apparel Co., and Does 1 through
50. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages against all defendants.
On September 24, 2021, Defendants Superior,
Hernandez, and Alcala filed an answer.
On October 8, 2021, Defendants ULC, ULD,
and Ash filed an answer.
On November 23, 2022, Defendants ULC, ULD,
and Ash filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and declaratory relief against
Workforce Enterprises WFE Inc. (“WFE”), Superior, Hernandez, Alcala, and Roes 1
through 50. Cross-Defendants WFE, Superior, Hernandez, and Alcala filed an
answer to the cross-complaint on January 9, 2023.
On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff amended
the FAC to name WFE as Doe 1.
Currently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed
on June 30, 2023, by Defendants ULC, ULD, and Ash (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”). The Moving Defendants
seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims against them in the FAC and also
as to their affirmative claims in the cross-complaint. If the motion for
summary judgment is not granted, the Moving Defendants seek summary
adjudication of the Second Cause of Action in Plaintiff’s FAC, Plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages, and their affirmative claim for declaratory relief
in the cross-complaint against WFE.
The hearing on the motion of the Moving Defendants
was initially set for September 13, 2023. Neither Plaintiff nor any of the
Cross-Defendants filed a timely opposition. On September 11, 2023, Plaintiff
filed an ex parte application for leave to file an untimely opposition to the
motion; the Court granted the motion and continued the hearing date to October
2.
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion
on September 18, 2023. Cross-Defendants did not file any opposition. The Moving
Defendants filed a reply on September 26. On October 2, the Court, on its own
motion, continued the hearing to October 18, 2023.
Legal
Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through
the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment
or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting
facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as
to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)
A plaintiff
or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once
the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the
defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely
upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth
the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of
material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive
evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Request
for Judicial Notice
Moving Defendants
ask the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint filed on July 6, 2021,
and the Cross-Complaint filed on November 23, 2022. The requests are GRANTED.
Discussion
The Second Cause of Action in the FAC
The only claim in the FAC asserted against the Moving Defendants is the Second
Cause of Action for general negligence. The elements of a negligence cause of
action are: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. (Kesner v.
Super. Ct. (2016) 1 Cal 5th 1132, 1142.) The existence of a duty of care is
a question of law that may in certain circumstances be resolved on a motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication. (J.L. v. Children’s Institute
(2009) 177 Cal 4th 388, 396; Regents of University of California v. Super. Ct.
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 755, 758.)
ULD operates a distribution center at the site of the accident. (SUMF No.
1.) ULD and WFE entered into a contract for WFE to provide temporary staff to
work in the distribution center. (SUMF Nos. 2-3.) Pursuant to the agreement,
the workers provided by WFE are employees of WFE, not ULD. (SUMF No. 4.)
Plaintiff was one of the workers hired and employed by WFE to work in ULD’s
distribution center. (SUMF Nos. 5-7, 9.) Plaintiff was injured during the course
of his work at the ULD distribution center. (FAC, p. 5.)
Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against them is barred as
a matter of law under the rule of Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5
Cal.4th 689, and its progeny. In Privette and other cases, courts have
recognized (1) that workers compensation coverage generally provides the
exclusive remedy for injuries sustained at work; and (2) that an owner of the work
premises or a party who hires a contractor to provide services through the
contractor’s employees should not be subject to any greater liability than the
contractor-employer. As the California Supreme Court explained in Privette:
[T]he “principal” who hires an independent contractor should be subject
to no greater liability “than its [independent contractor] agent,” whose
exposure for injury to an employee is limited to providing workers'
compensation insurance. (Olson v. Kilstofte and Vosejpka, Inc., supra,
327 F.Supp. 583, 587.) … [T]he rule of workers’ compensation exclusivity, which
shields an independent contractor who pays workers’ compensation insurance
premiums from further liability to its employees for on-the-job injuries,
should equally protect the property owner who, in hiring the contractor, is
indirectly paying for the cost of such coverage, which the contractor
presumably has calculated into the contract price. Therefore, these courts have
concluded, the property owner should not have to pay for injuries caused by the
contractor’s negligent performance of the work when workers’ compensation
statutes already cover those injuries.
(Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 699.)
Here, the undisputed facts establish that Moving Defendants retained the
services of WFE to provide workers, including Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff was
employed by WFE. In this very scenario, under the Privette doctrine, Plaintiff
is generally barred from bringing a civil action not only against WFE (his
employer) but also against Moving Defendants as the hirer of the independent
contractor, WFE. (Ibid; see also, e.g., Sandoval v. Qualcomm (2021)
12 Cal.5th 256, 270 [“a hirer is ordinarily not liable to the contract workers”];
Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“we have repeatedly
reaffirmed the basic rule that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries
sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job”]; Camargo
v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1244-1245.)
Thus, the Court concludes that Moving Defendants have met their initial burden
of showing that there is a complete defense (the Privette doctrine) to
the cause of action asserted against them. The burden under Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c now shifts to Plaintiff to show that there is a triable
issue of one or more material facts as to this defense.
In his Opposition, Plaintiff does not do so. He does not, for example,
present any evidence that creates a triable issue as to the application of the Privette
doctrine to bar his claims or as to any applicable exception. Indeed, he
does not discuss the Privette doctrine at all in his opposition. Plaintiff
does argue at length that the exculpatory clause in the contract between WFE
and Moving Defendants is not valid or enforceable release as between the
contracting parties (Opp. at 6-9), but, even if Plaintiff is correct on this
point, Plaintiff does not explain how (if at all) that would create a triable
issue as to whether the Privette doctrine is a complete defense to his claims
against the Moving Defendants. Similarly, Plaintiff’s arguments about Cal/OSHA
rules and gross negligence (Opp. at 9-11) do not create triable issues as to
the Privette doctrine defense.
Accordingly, for this reason alone, the Court GRANTS the motion of the
Moving Defendants for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims against them in
the FAC.
In addition, the Court notes that there is a separate and independent
ground to grant the Moving Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In both the
initial complaint (pages 4-5) and in the FAC (pages 4-5), Plaintiff alleges
that the cause of the injury was that “Plaintiff was compelled by Mario Alcala
to remove a safety harness while Plaintiff was greater than 4 feet above ground
while on a lift device while pulling product orders from the storage racks.” Plaintiff
alleges that after he removed the safety harness, “he fell from the lift device
to a solid floor incurring injury to his body and damages as alleged herein.” Mario
Alcala is an employee of WFE, not of the Moving Defendants. (SUMF No. 9.) In
connection with their motion, Moving Defendants also submit evidence that
Plaintiff was instructed by Mario Alcala, an employee of WFE, to remove his
safety harness and retrieve an item, and that Plaintiff allegedly fell while
trying to retrieve the item. (SSUMF nos. 8-10; Zucker Decl. ¶¶ 12-17;
Plaintiff’s Depo. at p. 55:12-20.)
In his Opposition, Plaintiff appears to attempt to change his account and
assert that it was Mr. Ash (an employee of the other Moving Defendants), rather
than Mr. Alcala, who ordered him to remove the safety harness or otherwise put
him in harm’s way. But Plaintiff has not sought to amend his complaint again,
and in connection with his summary judgment opposition Plaintiff submits to the
Court no evidence to support his allegation that it was Mr. Ash, and not Mr.
Alcala, who acted (or failed to act) in a manner that subjected him to injury.
For that additional and independent reason, summary judgment for the
Moving Defendants on the claims against them in the FAC is proper.
Punitive Damages
As the Court is granting the motion of the Moving Defendants for summary judgment
as to the claims against them in the FAC, the Court need not reach the Moving
Defendants’ alternative argument regarding Plaintiff’s attempt to recover punitive
damages against them based on the claims in the FAC.
Moving Defendants’ Cause of Action in the Cross-Complaint for Declaratory
Relief Against WFE
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the scope of the Moving
Defendants’ motion as it relates to the Cross-Complaint is unclear. In the
Notice of Motion and Motion, it appears that the Moving Defendants are seeking
summary judgment as to the entire Cross-Complaint, but in the supporting
Memorandum and Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, it appears that the motion
is limited to the Moving Defendants’ cause of action for declaratory relief against
WFE. Given the significance of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication, the Court will construe this uncertainty against the moving party
and treat the motion (as it relates to the Cross-Complaint) as a motion for
summary adjudication (only) as to the Moving Defendants’ cause of action for
declaratory relief (only) against WFE (only).
Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 provides that a person may bring an
action for declaratory relief if he or she “desires a declaration of his or her
rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon
property . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) To state a declaratory relief
claim, the plaintiff must allege a proper subject of declaratory relief and an
actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s
rights or obligations. (See Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 872, 909.)
Defendants provide as follows: (1) ULD entered into the Service Agreement
with WFE on April 12, 2019 (SUMF at No. 2); (2) Mr. Alcala was employed by WFE
(SUMF at No. 9); the Agreement requires WFE to defend and indemnify ULD and
agents, including Mr. Ash, from any claims allegedly caused by a WFE Associate
or claims for worker’s compensation made by a WFE Associate (SUMF at No. 32);
(4) Plaintiff was employed by WFE and assigned to work at ULD’s distribution
center on July 5, 2019 (SUMF at Nos. 5-7); (5) Plaintiff claims that he was
injured after his supervisor, Mr. Alcala, instructed him to remove his safety
harness and he fell retrieving an item (SUMF at Nos. 8-10); (6) ULD, ULC, and
Mr. Ash are entitled to defense and indemnification as the injury was allegedly
caused by Mr. Alcala, a WFE Associate, instructing Plaintiff to remove his
safety harness; (7) WFE also must provide defense and indemnification as
Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is through worker’s compensation against WFE and
ULD is entitled to defense and indemnification for worker’s compensation claims
under the Agreement; and (8) ULD tendered this claim to WFE, although WFE has
failed to defend and indemnify ULD, ULC, and Mr. Ash. (SUMF at Nos. 34- 35.)
Moving Defendants
have met their initial burden of presenting evidence in support of each element
of their cause of action for declaratory relief proof and of showing that there
is no defense to the cause of action.
WFE has not
filed any opposition to the motion or Moving Defendants’ separate statement. WFE
has not shown, with evidence, that there is a triable issue of one or more
material facts as to the declaratory relief cause of action or a defense thereto.
Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the Eighth
Cause of Action as against WFE in the Cross-Complaint filed on November 23,
2022.
Conclusion
Moving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims asserted
against them in Plaintiff’s FAC is GRANTED.
Moving Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Eighth Cause of Action as against WFE in
the Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice.