Judge Steven A. Ellis, Case Number: 21STCV31913, Date: 2024-02-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV31913, Date: 2024-02-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31913 Hearing Date: February 29, 2024 Dept: 29

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Cross-Defendant Hyundai Motor America, Inc.

Tentative

The motion is granted.

Background

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident on August 29, 2019, on the 60 Freeway east of San Gabriel Boulevard. On August 27, 2021, Plaintiff Marina Kuptsova (“Plaintiff”) filed the Complaint in this action, asserting causes of action for general negligence and motor vehicle negligence against Defendants Michelle LaMarche (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 100. On October 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting the same causes of action against the same defendants.

On November 19, 2021, Defendant filed an Answer to the FAC. Defendant also filed on the same day a Cross-Complaint for indemnity and contribution against Cross-Defendant Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (“Hyundai”) and Roes 1 through 25.

On April 11, 2022, Hyundai filed its Answer to the Cross-Complaint. Hyundai also filed on the same day a Cross-Complaint for indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief against Defendant and Moes 1 through 25.

On May 13, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to Hyundai’s Cross-Complaint.

This matter was related to 21STCV30463 on November 19, 2021. A cross-complaint against cross-defendant was also filed in that matter but later dismissed.

On December 15, 2023, Hyundai filed this motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, against Defendant. Hyundai contends that there is no merit to the causes of action for indemnity and contribution set forth in Defendant’s Cross-Complaint against Hyundai.

No opposition has been filed.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Discussion

The accident in this case occurred on August 29, 2019, on the 60 Freeway. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“SUMF”], No. 1.) As traffic came to a stop, Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff’s car, causing a chain reaction in which two other cars were damaged. (SUMF, Nos. 1, 3-5, 7-8.) Defendant did not mention anything about an engine failure, engine seizure, engine “cutting out,” steering failure, or brake failure in her statement to a police officer immediately after the accident. (SUMF, No. 6.)

Defendant alleges in her Cross-Complaint that the accident was caused by Hyundai’s negligent design, manufacture, assembling, maintaining, installing, selling, or supplying of Defendant’s vehicle. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 7.) When Hyundai propounded discovery to Defendant in the litigation, however, Defendant failed to respond to some of the discovery requests and provided unverified responses to other requests; moreover, even the unverified responses were devoid of any facts to support Defendant’s claims against Hyundai. (SUMF, Nos. 17-22, 27-31.) Hyundai also presented affirmative evidence in support of its motion that even if the engine had stalled or failed, a driver would still be able to steer and apply the brakes. (SUMF, No. 25.)

On this record, Hyundai met its initial burden on summary judgment of showing that Plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of her causes of action for indemnity and contribution against Hyundai. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Hyundai met this burden through its own affirmative evidence, as well as the evidence of Defendant’s factually devoid discovery responses. (See Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 73; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 589-590.)

This shifts the burden to Defendant (cross-complainant) to show that there is a triable issue of material fact on her causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Defendant, who has not filed any opposition to the motion, has not done so.

Accordingly, Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment as to the causes of action asserted by Defendant/Cross-Complainant Michelle LaMarche against Hyundai in LaMarche’s Cross-Complaint filed on November 19, 2021.

Moving Party is to give notice.