Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV32698, Date: 2024-11-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV32698    Hearing Date: November 22, 2024    Dept: 29

Bedigian v. Lake Balboa Care Center
21STCV32698
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jamie D. Hernandez, M.D., and Jamie D. Hernandez, M.D., Inc.

Tentative

 

The motion is GRANTED.

 

Background

 

On September 3, 2021, Julie Bedigian and Paul Bedigian (“Plaintiffs”), both individually and as successors in interest of Edith Bedigian, filed a complaint against Lake Balboa Care Center, Northridge Hospital Medical Center, Dignity Health, Jaime Hernandez, M.D., Keyvan Shirazi, M.D., and Does 1 through 100, asserting cause of action for (1) Professional Negligence – Wrongful Death, (2) Elder Abuse under Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15600-15675, and (3) Violation of Patient’s Rights under Health & Safety Code § 1430(b), all arising out of decedent Edith Bedigian’s medical care from July 6, 2020 to July 27, 2020. (Complaint, ¶ 11.)

 

On April 25, 2022, Lake Balboa Health Care, Inc dba Lake Balboa Care Center filed an answer.

 

On May 3, 2022, Dignity Community Care dba Northridge Hospital Medical Care filed an answer.

 

On September 15, 2022, Keyvan Shirazi, M.D. filed an answer.

 

On December 28, 2022, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to name Jaime D. Hernandez, M.D., Inc. as Doe 41.

 

On February 23, 2023, Jamie D. Hernandez, M.D., Inc. filed an answer.

 

On September 4, 2024, Jamie Hernandez, M.D. and Jamie D. Hernandez, M.D., Inc. (collectively, “Hernandez”) filed this motion for summary judgment.

 

Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition on November 8, 2024.

 

Legal Standard

 

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

 

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

 

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

 

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

 

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

 

Discussion

 

Hernandez moves for summary judgment on the grounds that he met the standard of care when treating Decedent Edith Bedigian (“Decedent”) was were not a substantial factor in causing Decedent’s injuries. As to Hernandez, Plaintiffs bring a Professional Negligence – Wrongful Death cause of action in the complaint.

 

Decedent fell and suffered a left mid shaft displaced fracture on July 6, 2020. (Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), No. 8.) Hernandez performed an ORIF surgery on Decedent on July 9, 2020. (UMF, No. 8.) Decedent returned to Hernandez’s office on July 23, 2020, where x-rays of the “left leg fracture showed stable left hip hemiarthroplasty with well-fixed femoral stem and periprosthetic fracture.” (UMF, No. 8.)

 

In a medical negligence action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of [the] profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4tha 1410, 1420; Simmons v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-02.) “Both the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008), 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

 

A medical professional breaches the duty of professional care by failing to act in accordance with the prevailing industry standard of care. (See Folk v. Kilk (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 176, 186.) “The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony …, unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman.’” (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 410.)

 

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.” (Johnson v. Super. Ct. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.) “When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports [the] motion with expert declarations that [their] conduct fell within the community standard of care, [the defendant] is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985.) An expert declaration, if uncontradicted, is conclusive proof as to the prevailing standard of care and the propriety of the particular conduct of the health care provider. (Starr v. Mooslin (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 988, 999.)

 

Here, Hernandez presents the declaration of Theodore K. Gregorious, M.D. (“Dr. Gregorious”), who is specializes in the field of orthopedic surgery and has been board certified since 2006. (Gregorious Decl., ¶ 2.) Dr. Gregorious is familiar with the standard of care in the medical profession that applies to physicians within the community. (Id., ¶ 4.)

 

Dr. Gregorious has reviewed Decedent’s medical records. (Id., ¶ 5.) Based upon that review, Dr. Gregorious opines that Hernandez acted at all relevant times within the standard of care related to his care and treatment of Decedent. (Id., ¶ 8.) Dr. Gregorious also opines that no action or inaction by Hernandez caused or contributed to the injuries of which Plaintiffs’ complaints. (Id., ¶ 10.)

 

Dr. Gregorious’ opinion testimony is “evidence which, if uncontradicted, would constitute a preponderance of evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case cannot be established.” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 879.) The expert opinion testimony of Dr. Gregorious is evidence that Hernandez complied with his duties under California law and the standard of care for a reasonably careful medical professional under similar circumstances.

 

With this evidence, Hernandez has satisfied the initial burden of showing that one or more elements of the causes of action in the complaint cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) This shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to show that there is a triable issue of one or more material facts as to the causes of action. (Ibid.)

 

Plaintiffs filed a non-opposition, and thus, have not met their burden.

 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment.

 

Conclusion

 

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by Jamie D. Hernandez, M.D., and Jamie D. Hernandez, M.D., Inc.

 

Moving Party is to give notice.