Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV35048, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV35048 Hearing Date: February 27, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Food
4 Less of California, Inc.
Tentative
The motion is granted.
Background
This cases arises out of an alleged
incident on October 22, 2020, at a Food 4 Less grocery store on East Olympic
Boulevard in Los Angeles in which Plaintiff Sylvia Vargas (“Plaintiff”) contends
that she tripped on a cleaning cart, fell, and broke her ribs.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this
action on September 22, 2021, asserting causes of action for premises liability
and general negligence against Defendants The Kroger Co. dba Food 4 Less and
Does 1 through 25.
Defendant Food 4 Less of California, Inc.
dba Food 4 Less (incorrectly named as The Kroger Co. dba Food 4 Less) (“Defendant”)
filed its Answer on October 28, 2021.
On October 2, 2023, Defendant filed this Motion
for Summary Judgment.
No opposition has been filed.
Legal Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth
the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of
material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Discussion
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action
against Defendant, for general negligence and premises liability. The basic
elements of the causes of action for negligence and premises liability are the
same: (1) the existence of a legal duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown
v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)
The general rule
governing duty is set forth in Civil Code section 1714: “Everyone is
responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter
has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or
herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This establishes what the California
Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” that every person has a legal
duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of
others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)
Those who own,
possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in
managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
(Annocki¿v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If
a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise
ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their
[customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the
harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)
In some cases, a dangerous
condition may be so obvious that the condition itself serves as a warning, and
the property owner may have no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.
(See Kinsman
v. Unocal Corp.
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 673; Montes v. YMCA of Glendale (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142; Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438. Christoff v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co.
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126; Krongos v. Pacific Gas Electric Co. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 387, 393; Edwards
v. California Sports, Inc. (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 1284.) As the Court of Appeal has explained, “the rationale for
the exception to the general duty of ordinary care is that the foreseeability
of harm usually is absent because third parties will perceive the obvious and
take action to avoid the danger.” (Zuniga v. Cherry Avenue Auction, Inc. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 980, 995; see also, e.g., Jacobs,
supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 447 [“Foreseeability
of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open and obvious.”].)
Here, the undisputed facts in the record
establish, as a matter of law, that the allegedly dangerous condition was open
and obvious. Plaintiff alleges that she fell after her foot “hit” an unattended
cleaning cart. (Complaint, at p. 4.) Plaintiff saw the cleaning cart prior to
her fall. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No.
5.) The cleaning cart was, according to Plaintiff, colored yellow and white and
it was “pretty big.” (DSUMF, Nos. 6-7.) Plaintiff recognized that she needed to
walk around the cleaning cart and attempted to do so. (DSUMF, No. 8.) The
cleaning cart was not blocking any walkway in the store. (DSUMF, Nos. 11-15.)
Based on this evidence in the record,
Defendant has satisfied its initial burden on summary judgment of showing “that one or
more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) As a matter of law, Defendant had no duty to warn
of the obvious danger; indeed, Plaintiff herself saw the danger and recognized
the need to walk around the cleaning cart. Under these circumstances, as a
matter of law, Defendant had no duty to post a sign stating, “Warning: cleaning
cart ahead” or otherwise warn customers of the danger or remedy it.
This shifts
the burden to Plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Plaintiff has not submitted any opposition papers or otherwise made such a
showing.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is
granted.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
Moving
Party is to give notice.