Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV36211, Date: 2024-12-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36211    Hearing Date: December 18, 2024    Dept: 29

Espindola v. Getaround, Inc.
21STCV36211
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Tatiana Ikonnikova.

Tentative

The motion is granted.

Background

On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff Xochitl Alvarez Espindola (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants GetAround, Inc. (“Getaround”), Luke Mitchell Crawford (“Crawford”), and Does 1 through 50 for negligence, negligence per se, and statutory liability. Plaintiff alleges that on January 15, 2021, she was injured in a vehicle accident; Defendant Crawford was the other driver, and he was driving a vehicle procured through a rideshare program operated by Defendant GetAround. 

On January 19, 2022, GetAround filed an answer.

On July 27, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Max Cherniavsky Nobel as Doe 1. On January 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss this defendant.

On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Tatiana Ikonnikova (“Defendant”) as Doe 2.

On January 22, 2024, the Court denied Getaround’s motion for summary judgment.

On February 27, 2024, Defendant and Crawford each filed an answer.

On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff substituted in as her own counsel of record.

As it relates to the matter set for hearing on December 18, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment on August 7, 2024. No opposition has been filed.

The motion was originally set for hearing on October 31, 2024, in Department 32. On October 28, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing to December 5. Defendant gave notice to Plaintiff.

On November 22, 2024, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing to December 18, 2024, in Department 32. The Clerk gave notice.

On December 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a two page document described as “Submission of Evidence in Case.” No proof of service is attached.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)

A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Discussion

Background Facts

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with Luke Mitchell Crawford on January 15, 2021. (Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), No. 3.) The automobile Luke Mitchell Crawford was driving was a Ford F-150 (“Vehicle”) owned by Defendant. (UMF, No. 2.) Defendant signed up with GetAround, a car sharing program; Luke Mitchell Combs rented Defendant’s Vehicle through GetAround. (UMF, Nos. 1-3.)

Claim Against Defendant

Plaintiff asserts negligence, negligence per se, and statutory liability under Vehicle Code section 17150-17159 claims against Defendant.

The basic elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” (Vehicle Code § 17150.)

Defendant states under oath that she was not involved in the accident as she was not operating the vehicle and was not a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident. (Ikonnikova Decl., ¶ 4.)

Further, Defendant argues that under California Law, she is not responsible as the owner of the vehicle. Insurance Code section 11580.24(d) states

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any provision in a private passenger motor vehicle owner’s automobile insurance policy, in the event of a loss or injury that occurs during any time period when the vehicle is under the operation and control of a person, other than the vehicle owner, pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program, or otherwise under the control of a personal vehicle sharing program, the personal vehicle sharing program shall assume all liability of the owner and shall be considered the owner of the vehicle for all purposes. Nothing in this section limits the liability of the personal vehicle sharing program for its acts or omissions that result in injury to any persons as a result of the use or operation of a personal vehicle sharing program.”

It is undisputed that GetAround is a ride-sharing platform under Insurance Code section 11580.240(b)(2) as it is an entity which provides the means of “use of private passenger motor vehicles by persons other than the vehicle’s owner.” (Morris Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendant signed up to rent the Vehicle with GetAround on December 14, 2017; the Vehicle was rented by GetAround User Luke Mitchell Crawford on January 15, 2021. (Ikonnikova Decl., ¶¶ 2, 3; Morris Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5.)

The Court finds Defendant has met her burden as the party moving for summary judgment.  She has shown that she was not the driver of the vehicle, that she was not negligent in connection with the accident, and that, as a matter of law, she is not statutorily liable as the owner under California law.

This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to show that there are one or more triable issues of fact with regard to the causes of action in the complaint against Defendant.

Plaintiff has not done so.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Conclusion

The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Tatiana Ikonnikova.

Moving Party is to give notice.