Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV36493, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV36493 Hearing Date: December 7, 2023 Dept: 29
Tentative
The
Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to provide an
authorization for the release of her medical records to Defendant.
The
Court MODIFIES the subpoena.
The
Court ORDERS UCLA to comply with the subpoena as MODIFIED.
The Court DENIES the request for sanctions.
Background
This case arises out of incident on November 21, 2019, in
which Plaintiff Daisy Marie Correa ("Plaintiff") allegedly slipped
and fell in the freezer aisle of a grocery store on Carson Street in Torrance,
California. On October 4, 2021,
Plaintiff (by and through her Guardian Ad Litem Evelyn Martell) filed the
complaint in this action, asserting claims for negligence and premises
liability against Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company, The
Kroger Co., Chris Roles, and Does 1 through 25. On December 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint (the “FAC”), asserting the same claims against the same
defendants, but this time with no reference to a guardian ad litem.
On March 7, 2022, Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company dba
Ralphs (“Defendant”) filed an answer to the FAC. On May 15, 2022, the Court, at the request of
Plaintiff, dismissed all claims against The Kroger Co. and Chris Roles.
On July 12, 2022, Defendant issued a subpoena to UCLA for
ten years of Plaintiff’s medical records.
(Tinta Roca Decl., Exh. D.) UCLA
refused to provide the subpoenaed records without an authorization from
Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 8 & Exh. E.) Despite Defendant’s requests, Plaintiff
refused to provide an authorization for UCLA to release her medical records to
Defendant. (Id., ¶¶ 9-14 & Exhs.
F-J.) Defendant served Plaintiff with
the motion; UCLA refused to accept service in person and was served by mail.
Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 2. Defendant filed a reply on November 7. The hearing was initially scheduled for
November 16 but was continued to December 6.
Legal Standard
When a
subpoena has been issued requiring the attendance of a witness or the
production of documents, electronically stored information, or other things
before a court or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion
“reasonably made” by the party, the witness, or any consumer whose personal
records are sought, or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice
and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena
entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms and
conditions as the court may specify. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1; Southern
Pac. Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 206.)
The court can make an order quashing or modifying a subpoena
as necessary to protect a person from “unreasonable or oppressive demands,
including unreasonable violations of the right of
privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd.
(a).)
For discovery purposes,
information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the
case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez
v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Generally,
all unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the
action is discoverable if it would itself be admissible evidence at trial or if
it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010; Schnabel
v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.)
Discussion
Motion to Compel Authorization
Defendant
cites no statutory authority for an order compelling a party to sign an
authorization for the release of their medical records, and the Court is aware
of none. Generally, courts lack the
power to order civil discovery by a method that is not authorized in the Code
of Civil Procedure. (Haniff v. Super.
Ct. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 191, 200.)
Defendant
cites two cases in support of its contention that the court has the power to
compel an authorization for release of records.
In both cases, the superior court had issued an order compelling a party
to provide an authorization for disclosure of medical records, but in neither case
did the Court of Appeal directly address whether the superior court had acted
properly in doing so (or had the authority to do so). Rather, in Miranda v. 21st Century Ins.
Co. (2004), 117 Cal.App.4th 913, the Court of Appeal affirmed a sanction
against a party who had violated the court order to provide the authorization,
without ruling on whether the underlying order was properly issued. And in Coats v. K-Mart Corp. (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 961, the issue on appeal related to the statute of limitations,
although the superior court had issued a order for a compelled authorization
for the records of a decedent. (The
Court is also aware of a third case, Little v. Superior Court (1968) 260
Cal.App.2d 311, in which the Court of Appeal reversed (on other grounds) a
judgment of contempt for failing to comply with an order for a compelled
authorization.) Of course, cases do not
provide authority or guidance on issues that the appellate court did not
address or decide.
There is
a statutorily authorized procedure for enforcing a subpoena: a motion for an
order directing compliance with a subpoena under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1987.1. Indeed, in the Miranda case, upon which Defendant relies, the
Court of Appeal was puzzled regarding why this standard procedure had not been
followed. (Miranda, supra, 117
Cal.App.4th at 918 fn. 2.) This
alternative is discussed below.
Given
the absence of statutory authority to compel an authorization and the presence
of an express statutory alternative, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for an
order compelling Plaintiff to provide an authorization for the release of her
medical records to Defendant.
Motion to Compel UCLA to Comply With Subpoena
Alternative, Defendant requests an order compelling UCLA
to comply with the subpoena. Plaintiff
objects, asserting her right to maintain the privacy of her medical records.
California’s
Constitutional right to privacy protects against the unwarranted, compelled
disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one’s personal
life.¿ (Britt v. Superior Court (1978)20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.)¿¿This
includes medical and financial records.¿(John B. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1177, 1198; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d
652, 656.)
In Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, and other cases, the California Supreme Court
has established “a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy.” (Williams,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) First, a party asserting a privacy right must
establish “a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion
that is serious.” (Id., citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.
35-37.) In response, the party seeking the information may raise “whatever
legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves,” and “the
party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same
interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Id.,
citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 37-40.) The court must then
“balance these competing considerations.” (Ibid.) The party seeking the
information need not, however, establish a “compelling interest” unless the
disclosure would be “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal
autonomy.” (Id. at p. 556.)
Under the Williams and Hill framework,
Plaintiff here must first establish a legally protected privacy interest and a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Plaintiff has done so. The records that are the subject of the subpoena
include medical and financial information that is protected by the right to
privacy, and Plaintiff has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
these records.
Next, the subpoena
appears on its face to be a serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s right to
privacy. The circumstances of her medical conditions and treatment, and the
financial issues regarding insurance and payment, are private, personal, and
sensitive.
At this point,
under Williams and Hill, Defendant must identify the “legitimate
and important countervailing interests” that disclosure would serve. For
example, Defendant may attempt to show that the discovery sought in the
Subpoenas is “directly relevant” to the claims or defenses in dispute and is
“essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Lantz v. Super. Ct.
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854.)
Here, Defendant
has made this showing, at least in part.
In discovery, Plaintiff has attributed injuries to her right side, right
leg, and low back to the accident that is the subject of this litigation. (Tinta Roca Decl., Exh. A. [Response to Form
Interrogatory No. 6.2].) She has also
admitted that she had some pain to her right leg and arthritis pain in her back
prior to the accident. (Tinta Roca
Decl., Exhs. B-C [Amended Response to Form Interrogatory No. 10.1; Plaintiff’s Depo.
at 37:9-38:23].) Defendant has a
legitimate and important interest in obtaining records that could show that some
part, of even all, of the injuries that Plaintiff attributes to the accident were
caused by other conditions or events pre-dating the accident. Such information is directly relevant to the
claims and defenses in the action and essential to the fair resolution of this
lawsuit. Plaintiff has not identified any
feasible alternative to production of the medical records that would serve the same
interests and diminish the loss of privacy.
Finally, under
the framework set out in Hill and reaffirmed in Williams, the
Court must balance the “competing considerations” of the serious intrusion into
Plaintiff’s privacy and Defendant’s legitimate need for the information. This balancing of competing considerations is
necessarily a difficult and delicate task, and it is particularly challenging
here as the Court does not know what the subpoenaed records will reveal – and
specifically to what degree the subpoenaed records include particularly
sensitive personal information. There is
some discussion in the briefing about mental health treatment that Plaintiff
may have received, and the Court does not find that there is any demonstrated
need or justification for the compelled production, over Plaintiff’s
objections, of records of any such treatment (if it occurred). In addition, Defendant has not shown any need
or justification for records dating back to November 2009, fourteen years ago (ten
years before the accident).
On balance,
because Plaintiff is seeking damages relating to injuries to her right side, right
leg, and back, and because there is evidence that prior to the accident Plaintiff
was experiencing pain in her right leg and back due of a separate injury or
condition, the Court exercises its authority under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1987.1 and MODIFIES the subpoena to be limited to records regarding injuries,
conditions, or treatments relating to Plaintiff’s right leg and back for the
period of November 21, 2014 (five years before the accident) to the present.
The Court finds
that these modifications of the subpoena strike the right balance between
providing Defendant with the information that it legitimately needs to defend
the lawsuit and protecting Plaintiff’s privacy.
Obtaining records from a five-year period prior to the accident will
give Defendant ample opportunity to gather and present evidence to support
their argument that Plaintiff was suffering from injuries or conditions prior
the accident.
The Court ORDERS
UCLA to comply with the subpoena as MODIFIED.
Sanctions
The Court denies Defendant’s request for
sanctions. The Court does not find that
Plaintiff engaged in any sanctionable conduct; Plaintiff’s conduct was
substantially justified.
Conclusion
The
Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to provide an
authorization for the release of her medical records to Defendant.
The
Court MODIFIES the subpoena and limits it records regarding injuries,
conditions, or treatments relating to Plaintiff’s right leg and back for the
period of November 21, 2014 to the present.
The Court ORDERS UCLA to comply with the subpoena as MODIFIED within 30
days of notice of this ruling.
The Court DENIES the request for sanctions.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.