Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV36930, Date: 2024-07-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36930    Hearing Date: July 30, 2024    Dept: 29

Motion to Continue Trial filed by Defendant Renaissance Hotel Management Company, LLC.

Tentative

The Court will call this matter and hear from counsel. 

The Court is concerned that defendants have not acted with appropriate diligence: they were aware of the conflict by February 2024, Defendant Renaissance did not retain new counsel until approximately late May 2024, and Defendant Sunstone apparently still has not retained new counsel.  (Zech Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.)  Had defendants acted in a reasonably prompt manner, a much shorter continuance (if any) would have been required, and it is unclear to the Court why Plaintiff should have to wait for trial based on defendants’ lack of diligence.

The Court would also like to understand why there has been such a delay in scheduling the  PMQ depositions of defendants (and Sunstone’s own delay in retaining new counsel is not a particularly strong excuse).   

Background

On October 6, 2021, Dariole Gordy (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Renaissance Hotel Holdings, Inc. (“RHH”), Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. (“Marriott”), Renaissance Los Angeles Airport Hotel, Doe Property Owner, Doe Property Manager, Does Installer, and Does 1 through 100 for premises liability and general negligence arising out of a trip and fall occurring on October 12, 2019.

On January 10, 2022, RHH, Marriott, and Renaissance Hotel Operating Company, Inc. (erroneously sued as Renaissance Los Angeles Airport Hotel) (“RHOC”) filed an answer.

On April 11, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Renaissance Hotel Management Company, LLC (“RHMC”) as Doe 1 and Sunstone LA Airport, LLC (“Sunstone”) as Doe 2.

On June 13 and 17, 2022, RHMC and Sunstone each filed an answer.

On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff obtained an order correcting the true name of Sunstone to Sunstone LA Airport Lessee, Inc.

On January 25, 2023, RHH, Marriott, RHOC, RHMC, and Sunstone (all represented by the same counsel) filed a cross-complaint against JC Developers, Inc., and Roes 1 through 25.

On March 22, 2023, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed the claims in the complaint against RHH, Marriott, and RHOC without prejudice.

On May 3, 2023, the cross-complainants amended their cross-complaint to name Ironwood General, Inc. (“Ironwood”) as Roe 1.  

On May 12, 2023, JC Developers, Inc. filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Ironwood and Moes 1 through 100.

On June 2, 2023, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed the claims in the complaint against Renaissance Los Angeles Airport Hotel without prejudice.

In or about February 2024, counsel for RHMC and Sunstone discovered a conflict that made counsel unable to continue to represent either entity in this matter.  (Zech Decl., ¶ 4.)  It was not until about three months later, in late May, that RHMC approached new counsel, and in June 2024 new counsel substituted in for RHMC.  (Id., ¶ 5.)  Sunstone, however, has not substituted in new counsel, and counsel for Sunstone has not filed a motion to be relieved.

Also in February 2024, Plaintiff noticed PMQ depositions for RHMC and Sunstone.  (Miller Decl., ¶¶ 2, 6.)  These PMQ depositions have not gone forward – or even been scheduled.  (Id., ¶¶ 4, 6.)

On July 5, 2024, RHMC filed this motion to continue trial; trial is currently scheduled for October 1, 2024, and RHMC requests a new trial date on or after February 17, 2025. Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 17, and RHMC filed a reply on July 24.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), provides that the court has the power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. “The power to determine when a continuance should be granted is within the discretion of the trial court.” (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1603.) “A trial court has wide latitude in the matter of calendar control including the granting or denying of continuances.” (Park Motors, Inc. v. Cozens (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 12, 18.) 

“To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for trial are firm.  All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).)

“Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).)  “The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.”  (Ibid.)  Circumstances that may support a finding of good cause include: 

“(1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; 

(2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; 

(3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; 

(4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; 

(5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; 

(6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or 

(7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) 

“In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).)  California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may consider: 

“(1) The proximity of the trial date; 

(2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; 

(3) The length of the continuance requested; 

(4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; 

(5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance;

(6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay;

(7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials;

(8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; 

(9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; 

(10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and 

(11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).)

Discussion

RHMC seeks a trial continuance based on the recent substitution of counsel required based upon the discovery of an ethical conflict. 

Based on the evidence in the record, it appears that the conflict was discovered in February 2024.  (Zech Decl., ¶ 4.)  Nonetheless, for reasons that are not explained, and with a trial date set for October 1, 2024, RHMC did not substitute in new counsel until late June 2024, and Sunstone still has not substituted in new counsel.  (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.)

The Court understands that a required substitution of counsel (as opposed to a voluntary substitution of counsel) is commonly good cause of a continuance.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).)  But a party cannot force a continuance through its own lack of diligence in retaining new counsel.

The Court will hear from the parties on the following issues.

First, why did it take RHMC so long to retain new counsel?

Second, now that new counsel has been in place for more than a month, why has RHMC not offered dates for its PMQ deposition?

Third, why has Sunstone not yet substituted in new counsel – and why, given the conflict and the delay by Sunstone, has Sunstone’s counsel not filed a motion to be relieved?  Sunstone must understand that the case is going to move forward, and Sunstone will not be able to force a further continuance of trial based upon its own, unexplained, delay in retaining new counsel.

Conclusion

The Court will hear from counsel.