Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV40955, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV40955 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by PV Holding Corp.
Tentative
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
Background
This case arises out of an automobile accident
on November 28, 2019, near the intersection of Beaudry Avenue and Temple Street
in Los Angeles. On November 5, 2021, Plaintiff Hillary Thorogood (“Plaintiff”)
filed her complaint against PV Holding Corp. (“Defendant”), Yujie Wang, and
Does 1 through 50 asserting a cause of action for negligence/negligence per se.
Defendant filed its answer on July 28, 2022.
On November 3, 2022, Defendant filed its motion
for summary judgment and supporting evidence. On January 5, 2023, Defendant
filed additional evidence in support of its motion. Plaintiff filed her opposition
and supporting evidence on February 20, 2024. Defendant filed its reply,
objections to Plaintiff’s evidence, and further evidence in support of the
motion, on February 28, 2024.
The matter came on for hearing on March 5,
2024. Due to the unexpected absence of a court reporter, the hearing was
continued to March 6.
On March 6, 2024, the Court heard argument and
granted a brief continuance of the hearing so that Plaintiff could receive some
additional discovery responses. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a
supplemental opposition to the summary judgment motion by March 13, and granted
Defendant leave to file a supplemental reply by March 15.
No supplemental opposition or reply has been
filed.
Legal Standard
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment
is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in
order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact
necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c),
“requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits
or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact
within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each cause of action as framed by the
complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that one or
more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there
is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf
v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action
or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.)
A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for
summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of
proof by presenting facts to show “that there is no defense to a cause of
action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling
the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the
burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a “triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party opposing a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon the allegations or
denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of material
fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive
evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Evidentiary
Objections/Other Preliminary Matters
Defendant
asserts objections to some of Plaintiff’s evidence. Evidence presented in
support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must be
admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court
must “consider all of the
evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have
been made and sustained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
The
Court SUSTAINS in part Defendant’s objection to paragraph 2 of the Davidson
Declaration. The declarant (Plaintiff’s counsel) does not establish a
foundation of her personal knowledge of the facts stated. The Court will accept
the statements, however, as evidence of Plaintiff’s contentions.
The
Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s objection to paragraphs 3, 7, 10, and 11 of the
Davidson Declaration. The declarant does not establish a foundation of her
personal knowledge of the facts stated.
The
Court OVERRULES Defendant’s other objections.
The
Court will not consider the evidence submitted by Defendant with its reply
papers. The evidence in support of a summary judgment motion must be submitted
with the motion, or in any event at least 75 days before the hearing. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a)(2) & (b)(1).)
Discussion
Plaintiff
alleges that she was injured in an automobile accident on November 28, 2019.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff was driving one car, and Defendant Yujie Wang
(“Wang”) was driving the other car. (Id., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that
Wang was negligent and failed to yield the right of way. (Id., ¶ 3.)
Wang
rented the vehicle he was driving from Zipcar, a subsidiary affiliate of
Defendant. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No.
2.) Defendant and its affiliates are in the rental car business. (DSUMF, No.
9.) Wang was not an employee or agent of Defendant. (DSUMF, No. 3.)
Jeanne
Motosko, the Regional Insurance Risk Manager of an affiliate of Defendant, filed
a declaration in support of the motion that includes certain information from Defendant’s
records. (Motosko Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.) Ms. Motosko testifies that “at all relevant
times, including but not limited to November 28, 2019, Defendant and its
related affiliates met their financial responsibility pursuant to Vehicle Code
§ 16053 by Certification of Self-Insurance with respect to its rental fleet.” (Id.,
¶ 7.)
Ms.
Motosko also testifies that Defendant and its affiliates “keep a record of the
registration number of the motor vehicle rented, the name and address of the
person to whom the vehicle is rented, his or her driver’s license number or
identification card number, the license expiration date, and the jurisdiction
that issued the driver’s license or ID card.” (Id., ¶ 8.) She attaches
to her declaration information from Defendant’s records that includes (among
other things) Wang’s name, a birth date, a partial driver’s license number, an
indication that the license was issued by the State of California, an
expiration date, and an indication that his “Affiliate Group[]” is “UC Santa
Barbara (UCSB) – Students.” (Id., Exh. C.) This information corresponds to a rental by
Wang for approximately 90 minutes that began and ended on October 18, 2019 (about
six weeks prior to the accident). (Ibid.)
The
policy of Defendant and its affiliates is to compare either the signature on
the license with that of the person to whom a vehicle is to be rented or the photograph
thereon with the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented. (DSUMF, No. 10.)
Defendant
moves for summary judgment, arguing (in essence): (1) that any claim for
vicarious liability against Defendant is barred and preempted by the Graves
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. section 30106; and (2) that there is no evidence to
support any non-preempted claim against Defendant, such that it negligently
entrusted the vehicle to Wang.
The
Graves Amendment states:
“(a) In
General. - An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a
person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any
State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the
vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that
results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle
during the period of the rental or lease, if –
(1) the owner
(or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting
or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is
no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate
of the owner).
(b) Financial
Responsibility Laws. - Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State
or political subdivision thereof –
(1) imposing
financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle
for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or
(2) imposing
liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or
leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or
liability insurance requirements under State law.”
Here,
Defendant and its affiliates are in the rental car business and rented the
vehicle to Wang. (DSUMF, Nos. 2, 9.) Defendant also presents undisputed evidence that as
of the date of the accident (November 28, 2019), it was in full compliance with
the financial responsibility requirements of California Vehicle Code section
16053. (Motosko Decl., ¶ 7.)
Accordingly, the undisputed evidence
establishes, as a matter of law, that the Graves Amendment applies here and protects
Defendant. That means, for example, that Plaintiff may not proceed on a cause
of action against Defendant under Vehicle Code section 17150, which creates liability
merely for being the owner of a vehicle (i.e., that imposes liability on a
non-negligent vehicle owner for harm caused by someone else’s negligent driving
of the vehicle).
The
Graves Amendment does not, however, protect Defendant against claims that are based
on Defendant’s own alleged negligence. And it is to such a claim that the Court
now turns.
To recover on a claim for negligent
entrustment of a motor vehicle, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the driver operated
the vehicle negligently; (2) that the defendant owned the vehicle; (3) that the
defendant knew or should have known that the driver was incompetent or unfit to
drive the vehicle; (4) that the defendant permitted the driver to use the
vehicle; and (5) that the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a
substantial factor in causing the harm to plaintiff. (E.g., McKenna v.
Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-66; CACI No. 724.)
At common law, the general rule was
that an owner of a vehicle had “no duty to persons who may be injured by its
use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the absence of facts
putting the owner on notice that the third person is incompetent to handle it.”
(Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63 [citing cases].) With
regard to an unlicensed driver, the negligent entrustment tort traditionally required
the owner to have “actual knowledge of facts showing or suggesting the driver’s
incompetence – not merely his lack of a license.” (Dodge Center v. Super.
Ct. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 332, 341.) But courts also held that evidence
that the owner had actual knowledge of the driver’s lack of a license was prima
facie evidence that the owner knew the driver was incompetent. (Owens v.
Carmichael’s U-Drive Autos, Inc. (1931) 116 Cal.App. 348, 351-352; see also
McKenna, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 567-570 [discussing common law].)
Against this backdrop of the common
law, several pertinent positive enactments by the Legislature must also be
considered in this case.
First, Vehicle Code section 14604
provides:
(a)
No owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow
another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines
that the person possesses a valid driver’s license that authorizes the person
to operate the vehicle. For the purposes of this section, an owner is required
only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether the
prospective driver possesses a valid driver’s license before allowing him or
her to operate the owner’s vehicle. An owner is not required to inquire of the
[Department of Motor Vehicles] whether the prospective driver possesses a valid
driver’s license.
(b) A rental company
is deemed to be in compliance with subdivision (a) if the company rents the
vehicle in accordance with Sections 14608 and 14609.
Second, Vehicle Code section 14608,
subdivision (a), prohibits the rental of motor vehicles unless “both of the
following requirements have been met”:
(1)
The person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed under this code or is a
nonresident who is licensed under the laws of the state or country of his or
her residence.
(2)
The person renting to another person has inspected the driver’s license of the
person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared either the signature
thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented or the
photograph thereon with the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented.”
Third,
Vehicle Code section 14609, subdivision (a), requires rental companies to keep “a
record of the registration number of the motor vehicle rented, the name and
address of the person to whom the vehicle is rented, his or her driver’s
license number, the jurisdiction that issued the driver’s license, and the
expiration date of the driver’s license.”
Here,
Defendant did not present, with its summary judgment motion, evidence of
compliance with Vehicle Code section 14608 and 14609. Among other things,
Defendant did not present any evidence of how it compares either the signature or
the photograph on the license with that of the renter or whether it kept a
record of the registration number of the motor vehicle rented to Wang on the
date of the accident.
As
a result, Defendant does not fall within the safe harbor of Vehicle Code
section 14604, subdivision (b). Subdivision (a) of section 14604 applies here.
Thus, before entrusting its vehicle to Wang, Defendant was required “to make a
reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether the prospective driver
possesses a valid driver’s license.” (Vehicle Code, § 14604, subd. (a).)
Here,
the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant did so. Before the date of the
accident, Defendant determined that Wang had a valid California driver’s
license that did not expire until November 2022. (Matsoko Decl., Exh. C.)
Section 14604 requires nothing more. Defendant complied with its statutory obligation
under section 14604, and there is no evidence in the record that Defendant had
any notice that Wang was an unlicensed (or otherwise incompetent or unsafe)
driver.
Plaintiff’s
claims under theories of general negligence or negligence per se fare no
better. Even assuming that the failure to comply with Vehicle Code section
14608 and/or 14609 was an act of negligence or could give rise to a negligence
per se cause of action, there is no evidence in the record that the statutory
violations were a substantial factor in causing the harm to Plaintiff (or is
otherwise causally related at all to Plaintiff’s injury). The information in
Defendant’s records indicates that Wang was a licensed driver, and nothing
presented to the Court is to the contrary; had Defendant checked the signature
or photograph on Wang’s license and kept a record of the registration number of
the vehicle rented by Wang, Defendant would still have rented to vehicle to
Wang, and, unfortunately, the accident (and resulting injury to Plaintiff)
would still have occurred.
Accordingly,
the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that there is no triable fact
as to any negligent or otherwise wrongful action by Defendant. As a matter of
law, Defendant is entitled to judgment.
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.