Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 21STCV42303, Date: 2025-02-24 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21STCV42303 Hearing Date: February 24, 2025 Dept: 29
Rivera-Rivera v. City of Long Beach
21STCV42303
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication
TENTATIVE
The Court will call this matter.
The Court has not been able to view the video evidence presented by moving and opposing parties. For security reasons, the Court will not insert an external flash drive into a court computer.
Counsel is directed to make arrangements to display the video evidence at the hearing.
Background
On November
16, 2021, Fernando Rivera-Rivera (“Rivera”) filed a complaint against City of
Long Beach (“City”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), California Department of
Transportation (“Caltrans”), Darden Restaurants, Inc. (“Darden”), Yard House,
and Does 1 to 50, asserting causes of action for premises liability and general
negligence arising out of an alleged trip and fall on March 5, 2021.
On May
4, 2022, Rivera filed a request for dismissal of City, County, and Caltrans.
On
August 4, 2022, Rivera amended the complaint to name Yard House USA, Inc. (“Defendant”)
as Doe 1.
On
August 5, 2022, Rivera and Reginald Stiles (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant and Does 2 to 50.
On
August 16, 2022, Defendant filed an answer.
On
December 13, 2023, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment. On February
6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. Defendant filed a reply on February
13.
Legal Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Objections to Evidence
Each side asserts objections to the other’s
evidence.
Evidence presented in
support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must be
admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v. Bakewell
Hawthorne LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court must “consider
all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which
objections have been made and sustained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Plaintiffs
asserts nine objections to Defendant’s evidence.
Plaintiff’s
objections are overruled.
Defendant
asserts thirty-eight objections to Plaintiff’s evidence.
Defendant’s
Objection No. 2 is sustained. Duty is a question of law for the Court and is
not a proper subject of expert testimony.
Defendant’s
Objection No. 12 is sustained. On summary judgment, the pleadings can be used
to frame the issues but cannot be used as evidence (unless the pleading is
verified).
Defendant’s
other objections are overruled.
Discussion
On March 5, 2021, Plaintiffs arrived at
Defendant’s Yard House restaurant between 11:30 a.m. and noon. (Defendant’s
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 3; Plaintiffs’ Statement
of Additional Material Facts [“PSAMF”], Nos. 1-2.) The table at which they were
sitting was outside on the patio, and the restroom was located inside the restaurant.
(DSUMF, No. 3.)
After Plaintiff Rivera finished eating, he got
up to use the restroom. (DSUMF, No. 4.) Rivera uses a walker due to a prior hip
replacement, and Plaintiff Stiles (Rivera’s son-in-law) decided to escort
Rivera to the restroom. (DSUMF, No. 5; PSAMF, No. 3.)
When Plaintiffs arrived at the entranceway,
there was a mat on the inside of the restaurant on the concrete floor. (DSUMF,
No. 6.) As Plaintiffs crossed over the floor mat, Plaintiffs tripped on the
mat. (DSUMF, No. 7.)
Stiles was able to catch himself and did not
fall. (DSUMF, No. 8.) Rivera fell and was injured. (DSUMF, No. 8.)
Rivera described the incident in his deposition:
“Q Okay.
And can you please generally describe the fall to me? So you're walking inside,
and what happened?
A In
order to go into -- in order to go to the restroom, there is this kind of hill
that is really horrible for anybody to climb, to go up there, and I was with
him [Plaintiff Stiles], and, when we got there, there was a mat, and it was on
the concrete.
…
And we
almost fell because of the mat that got all wrinkled up. As he was falling I
fell on my face, and he was falling on his back. The mat ended up all wrinkled
up.
…
As he
fell -- as he stepped on the mat, he fell, and it was at the time when he put
the mat, threw it on the walker, and then I -- and I got tangled on it, and I
-- it made me turn around. I fell against the wall. I hit myself against the
wall on my back.
…
Q Okay.
Mr. Rivera-Rivera, before we took our break you were describing the fall. I
just want to make sure. So you and your son-in-law are walking inside. Did he
-- are you saying that he tripped first on a mat?
THE
WITNESS (In English): Both at the same time.
THE
WITNESS: We were walking together next to each other.
THE WITNESS
(In English): But he started -- but he went down first. It was like someone had
pushed him, like, he kind of ran and he fell and then got me. I got on the mat,
tripped on the mat, and I fell.
MR.
WERBIN: Fernando, say it in Spanish.
THE
WITNESS: The mat was very old, and it was dried.
BY MS.
MONTROSE:
Q Okay.
So you said your son-in-law went down first. How did he trip?
A He
didn't actually fall. He's the one who was actually -- he was going to fall on
his face, and he didn't, but then he tripped me. He went, but not all the way
down, before me.
THE
WITNESS (In English):· And then I go around and hit the wall and then went down
inside of the building.
…
BY MS.
MONTROSE:
Q Mr.
Rivera, before we took that brief break you were describing how your son-in-law
and you fell. You said he didn't actually fall, but then he tripped you. Do you
mean to say he sort of caught his fall, and then how did he trip you?
A I
didn't see him. The thing is that we both went down at the same time. We both
went down at the same time. The thing is that mat was here, and it was, like it
was older.
THE
WITNESS (In English): I fly into the building from the door. The mat was in
front of the door, and that made me go around and fly.
MR.
WERBIN: In Spanish, please.
THE
WITNESS: When I got tangled in the mat, I went on and hit myself on the wall.
It threw me to the floor because I got all tangled up with that, and I fell on
my back.
…
When the
mat got tangled in my walker, that made me turn.
…
And I
hit against the wall.
…
And I
fell on the concrete, but the fall was pretty strong because I almost lost consciousness
because I hit my head on the concrete.
…
So you’re
walking on the mat with the wheel, the mat gets tangled on the left wheel, and
it made me get tangled, and I got tangled up on it ….”
(Rivera Depo., at 30:2-24, 31:17-32:19,
33:2-19, 34:5-15, 35:3-6 [Excerpts from the Deposition of Plaintiff Rivera
appear as Exhibit 2 in Defendant’s evidence and Exhibit B in Plaintiff’s
evidence].) Rivera testified that he broke his wrist in the fall. (Id., at 42:4-7.)
Stiles described the incident in his deposition:
“Q Yeah.
And can you kind of explain to me how the incident occurred.
A Mr.
Rivera had to use the restroom. And his condition -- he was walking with a
walker and needed assistance. So I was assisting him.
As we
were going into the restaurant as we was coming off the patio, we made a left
turn to go into the entrance of the restaurant. And when I walked in, my foot
hit something and I stumbled and I almost fell but I caught myself. I almost
hit the wall and I caught myself. And I looked back at -- like, a rug was kind
of bunched up or it wasn't -- it wasn't right. It caused me to trip. And then I
seen Mr. Rivera fall as well.
Q Okay.
So you said your foot, you think, hit the mat. Do you know which foot it was
that initially hit the mat?
A I
don't recall.
Q Okay.
And you said you stumbled and caught yourself. So did you ever make … contact
with the floor or a nearby wall?
A It
happened so quick. I think I might have caught myself by the wall, like,
stumbled to the wall, I think. I'm not sure. But I didn't fall.
Q And so
you said Mr. Rivera then also tripped. So can you just kind of explain the
scene. So after you catch yourself, what happens?
A I hear
him -- I don't know if he made a noise, but I looked over and he fell. He fell
over and hit his head on the floor.
Q Okay. Do
you know which part of his head hit on the floor?
A Back
of his head.”
(Stiles Depo., at 30:19-32:3 [Excerpts from the
Deposition of Plaintiff Stiles appear as Exhibit 3 in Defendant’s evidence and
Exhibit D in Plaintiff’s evidence].)
A video of the incident, as well as stills from
the video, have been submitted to the Court.
Kurt Shoemaker, General Manager of Defendant,
testified that the floor mat at issue was rented from a linen company named
Alsco. (Shoemaker Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) Defendant uses floor mats to prevent tracking
of outside debris into the restaurant. (Id., ¶ 3.) Alsco changes out the
floor mats weekly. (Ibid.) Defendant only accepts floor mats from Alsco
that are in good condition. (Ibid.)
Defendant maintains records, in the ordinary
course of its business, of reported slip or trip and falls at the restaurant. (Id.,
¶ 8.) There are not records of any other similar slip or trip and fall on a floor
mat the restaurant other than Plaintiffs’ incident. (Ibid.)
Daryl Stegall, Associate General Manager of the
restaurant, has worked at the location since 2018 and had no recollection of
any other incident of anyone tripping and falling on a mat or any complaints
about floor mats posing a danger. (Stegall Depo., at 14:15-17, 15:7-9, 25:3-12,
50:16-23 [Excerpts from the Deposition of Stegall appear as Exhibit 4 in Defendant’s
evidence and Exhibit E in Plaintiff’s evidence].)
Aside from a basic sweep of the restaurant
before opening, Defendant does not have any specific safety inspection schedule
or protocol. (Stegall Depo., at 48:14-49:8.) Instead, according to Mr. Stegall,
“All employees are responsible for making sure that there’s no debris or anything
on the floor” and are “trained to be constantly inspecting the restaurant for
potential dangerous conditions.” (Stegall Depo., at 20:9-28.) “[I]t’s pretty
much up to everyone to make sure that we maintain the restaurant.” (Stegall
Depo., at 49:6-8.)
In the FAC, Plaintiffs assert causes of action
against Defendant for negligence and premises liability. The basic
elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the
same: (1) the existence of a legal duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown
v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions
for the court.¿¿(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; Annocki¿v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 36.)
The general rule
governing duty is set forth in Civil Code section 1714: “Everyone is
responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter
has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or
herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This establishes what the California
Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” that every person has a legal
duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of
others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)
While those who own and
operate businesses are not insurers of the safety of their patrons, they
generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises
reasonably safe and in managing the property¿to¿avoid exposing others to an
unreasonable risk of harm. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp.¿(2001) 26 Cal.4th
1200, 1205; Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) If a dangerous
condition exists, the proprietor is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care
either to make the condition¿reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to
give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.¿(1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)
“A plaintiff alleging
injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove the defendant either: (1)
created the dangerous condition, or (2) knew or should have known of the
dangerous condition.” (See Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036.) “Because the
owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety …, the owner’s actual
or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is [in many cases] a key
to establishing its liability.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) “[W]here
the plaintiff relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition to prove
the owner’s negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner
had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ibid.)
“Most Courts of Appeal hold that a defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the dangerous condition
existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by ordinary care and
inspection.” (Id. at p. 1207.) “Whether a dangerous condition has
existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a
question of fact for the jury.” (Ibid.)
Defendant now moves for
summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication on each of
the two causes of action in the FAC. Defendant argues that it did not breach
any duty of care owed to Plaintiff because (1) there was no dangerous condition
present; and (2) Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of any
dangerous condition. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish that
any action or inaction by Defendant was a cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
The Court considers each
argument in turn.
Breach: Dangerous
Condition
A dangerous condition is one
that exposes others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Ortega,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205; CACI No. 1003.) Whether a condition is
dangerous is generally a question of fact, but it can become an issue of law where the facts
are undisputed and the only reasonable inference (or inferences) that may be
drawn from the facts support only one determination.
Defendant argues that the video evidence shows
no flaw or defect in the mat prior to Plaintiffs’ accident. Defendant’s expert
considered the evidence and inspected a mat of the same style and brad and
opines that the use of the mat in the restaurant did not create a dangerous
condition.
Plaintiffs argue that, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to them, and drawing all reasonable inferences in their
favor, a finder of fact could reasonably determine that the mat was not secured
to the floor and did not adhere to the floor, creating a dangerous condition. (See
PSAF Nos. 8, 10, 12, 14.)
The Court will hear from
counsel.
Breach: Actual or
Constructive Notice
Defendant argues that
Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of any
dangerous condition before Plaintiffs’ accident.
Plaintiffs
make essentially two arguments in response. First, they argue that proof of actual
or constructive notice of the dangerous condition is not required where, as
here, Defendant created the dangerous condition by placing a mat on the floor
that was not secured and did not adhere. (See Peralta, supra, 24
Cal.App.5th at p. 1036.) Second, Plaintiffs argue that an inference of
constructive notice can arise when a defendant has failed to conduct an
adequate inspection within a reasonable time prior to the accident. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1210-1211.)
Constructive notice is also
generally a question of fact, but it can
become an issue of law where the facts are undisputed and the only reasonable
inference (or inferences) that may be drawn from the facts support only one
determination.
The Court will hear from
counsel.
Causation
“[T]he causation element of
negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant's
breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial factor in
bringing about the plaintiff's harm and (2) that there is no rule of law
relieving the defendant of liability.” (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 472, 481.) Even when a plaintiff proves breach, the
plaintiff cannot recover absent evidence “that it was more probable than not
that, but for the [defendant’s] negligence, the [injury] would not have
occurred.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763,
775. “Proof of causation cannot be based on mere speculation,” and a “mere
possibility of such causation is not enough.” (Ibid.; see also Rinehart
v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419,
435 [“speculative possibility” of causation is not sufficient].)
Causation – like the dangerous
condition and constructive notice – is generally
an issue of fact, but it can become an issue of law where the facts are undisputed
and the only reasonable inference (or inferences) that may be drawn from the
facts support only one determination.
The Court will hear from counsel.
Conclusion
The Court will hear from counsel.