Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 221STCV05214, Date: 2024-04-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 221STCV05214 Hearing Date: April 17, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative
for summary adjudication, filed by Defendant American Home Shield of California,
Inc.
TENTATIVE
The
motion is granted.
Background
Plaintiff Hakob Ghazaryan (“Plaintiff”)
alleges that suffered severe injuries from being electrocuted while he was
performing repair work on August 16, 2018, at a residence on Daisy Avenue in
Pasadena.
On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed
the complaint in this action against the property owners (Nicholas J. Carlin
and Alexandra L. Carlin (collectively “the Carlins”)), and Does 1 through 20,
asserting one cause of action for negligence.
On January 4, 2022, the Carlins
filed their answer to the complaint as well as a cross-complaint for indemnity,
contribution, and declaratory relief against Cross-Defendants American Home
Shield of California, Inc. (“AHS”); YH HVAC and Refrigeration, Inc. (“YH HVAC”);
and Roes 1 through 20. On February 14, 2022, AHS filed its answer to the
cross-complaint. On June 6, 2022, the Carlins filed a request for dismissal,
with prejudice, of their claims against YH HVAC in the cross-complaint.
On February 2, 2024, AHS filed this motion for
summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication of each of the
three causes of action set forth in the Carlins’ cross-complaint.
The Carlins have not filed any opposition to
the motion.
Legal
Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,
trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section
437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if
all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion
for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the
affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of
fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of
Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v.
Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Discussion
Background
Facts
AHS is a
home warranty company that administers home warranty contracts on major home systems
and appliances. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“SUMF”], No.1.) When
an AHS requests service, AHS dispatches an independent contractor (not an AHS
employee) to perform the work covered by the home warranty. (SUMF, Nos. 2-3.)
YH HVAC
is one of the independent companies that AHS contracts with to provide heating
and air conditioning work. (SUMF, No. 4.) The relationship between AHS and YH
HVAC is an independent contractor relationship. (SUMF, Nos. 5-6, 17.)
On July
12, 2018, the Carlins signed a home warranty agreement with AHS for their
residence. (SUMF, No. 7.) There were no express term in the agreement requiring
AHS to indemnify or defend the Carlins. (SUMF, No. 9.)
In
August 2018, the Carlins contacted AHS for service to their heating and air
conditioning unit. (SUMF, No. 10.) AHS contacted YH HVAC to perform the work at
the Carlins’ residence, and YH HVAC sent Plaintiff, its employee. (SUMF, No.
11.) Plaintiff asserts that he was electrocuted while performing work at the
Carlins’ residence. (SUMF, No. 15.)
AHS was
never involved or present during the work at the Carlins’ residence. (SUMF, No.
16.) The agreement between AHS and YH HVAC requires YH HVAC to ensure that YH
HVAC’s employees receive proper safety training. (SUMF, Nos. 18, 20.) AHS is
not involved in the training of YH HVAC’s employees and did not direct YH HVAC’s
employees regarding how to perform their work. (SUMF, No. 18.)
Claims
Against Defendant
The
Carlins assert three claims against AHS in the cross-complaint: (1) Equitable
Indemnity, (2) Comparative Fault, and (3) Declaratory Relief. AHS moves for
summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on each of the three
causes of action.
Equitable
Indemnity
“The
elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the
part of the indemnitor; and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which
the indemnitor is contractually or equitably responsible.” (Expressions at
Rancho Niguel Ass'n v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
1135, 1139.) “ ‘A key restrictive feature of traditional equitable indemnity is
that, on matters of substantive law, the doctrine is “wholly derivative....”
[Citations.] This rule “is often expressed in the shorthand phrase ‘... there
can be no indemnity without liability.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Centex Homes v.
Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1099.)
AHS
contends under the Equitable Indemnity cause of action AHS cannot be found liable
for Plaintiff’s injuries. AHS hired YH HVAC as an independent contractor, and
under the Privette doctrine the hirer of an independent contractor is
not liable for an injury sustained by the independent contractor’s employee.
In Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5
Cal.4th 689 and subsequent cases, courts in California have repeatedly affirmed
the rule that when a person or entity hires an independent contractor to
provide work or services, and one of the contractor’s employees is injured on
the job, the hirer is generally not liable to the employee. (Id., at p.
702; see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 41 [“we
have repeatedly reaffirmed the basic rule that a hirer is typically not liable
for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the
job”]; Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1244-1245.)
“There is a strong presumption under California law
that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all
responsibility for workplace safety.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p.
37.) “This means that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by
an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.” (Id., at pp.
37-38.)
“When a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer
presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work
safely. … This presumption is grounded in two major principles: first, that
independent contractors by definition ordinarily control he manner of their own
work; and second, that hirers typically hire independent contractors precisely
for their greater ability to perform the contracted work safely and
successfully.”
(Sandoval v. Qualcomm (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 269.)
The hirer, in contrast, “is typically less knowledgeable and more poorly
positioned to prevent injury to the contract workers than the contractor is.” (Id.
at p. 270.) Accordingly, “A person or entity hiring an independent contractor
(a ‘hirer’) ordinarily delegates to that independent contractor all
responsibility for the safety of the contractor’s workers.” (Id. at p.
264; see also, e.g., Seabright Ins. Co. v. U.S. Airways, Inc. (2011) 52
Cal.4th 590, 597 [“Our decisions recognize a presumptive delegation of
responsibility for workplace safety from the hirer to the independent
contractor, and a concomitant delegation of duty.”]; Tverberg v. Fillner
Construction, Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1445 [“When a hirer
delegates contracted work to an independent contractor, it also impliedly
delegates its duty to provide a safe workplace to that contractor. In these
circumstances, the hirer has no duty and the contractor may not recover from
the hirer for his or her injuries.”].)
The California Supreme Court has recognized two
primary exceptions to the Privette doctrine. First, the hirer may be
liable where it “retains control over the contractor’s work and actually
exercises that control in a way that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s
injury.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 264; see also, e.g., Gonzalez,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 38.) This is sometimes referred to as the “Hooker
exception,” named after the California Supreme Court case in which the
exception was recognized, Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002)
27 Cal.4th 198, 202.
Here, on the undisputed facts, the Hooker exception
does not apply. AHS did not retain any control over the work of YH HVAC and in
fact was not involved at all in the work performed by YH HVAC and Plaintiff at
the Carlins’ residence. (SUMF, Nos. 11, 16-18.)
Second, the hirer may also be liable where it
“withholds critical information regarding a concealed hazard.” (Id., at
p. 264.) This is sometimes referred to as the “Kinsman exception,” named
after the California Supreme Court case in which the exception was recognized, Kinsman
v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659. Although the hirer ordinarily “turns
over control of the worksite to the contractor so that the contract can perform
the contracted work,” the hirer may still be liable under the Kinsman exception
for injuries resulting from a “hazard that the hirer either knows or reasonably
should know exists, and that the contractor does not know exists and could not
reasonably discover without the hirer’s disclosure.” (Sandoval, supra, 12
Cal.5th at pp. 271-272; see also, e.g., Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
pp. 38, 42-43; Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664.)
The Kinsman exception does not apply here, as
a matter of law, as AHS was never even present at the site and had no knowledge
of concealed hazards (if any existed) at the residence. (SUMF, No. 16.)
AHS has
met its initial burden on summary judgment of showing that, as a matter of law,
it did not have any duty, and did not breach any duty, to Plaintiff. Thus, the
Carlins’ claim for equitable indemnity fails as a matter of law.
The
Carlins have not filed an opposition and therefore have not shown that there is
a triable issue of material fact as to the equitable indemnity claim.
The
motion for summary adjudication on this cause of action in the cross-complaint is
granted.
Contribution and Declaratory Relief
Equitable contribution is the right to recover from a
co-obligor who shares liability with the party seeking contribution.¿ (Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1293.)¿ As
AHS has shown, as a matter of law, that it owed no duty, and breached no duty,
to Plaintiff, AHS does not share any liability to Plaintiff with the Carlins.
There are two essential elements for declaratory relief: “(1) a
proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving
justiciable questions relating to [Cross-Complainant's] rights or obligations.”
(Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405,
410.) The Carlins cannot, as a matter of law, show that they are entitled to a
declaration that they have any rights as against AHS, or that AHS has any
obligation to them, in connection with any liability for Plaintiff’s alleged
injuries.
Accordingly, AHS is entitled to summary adjudication on these two
causes of action in the cross-complaint.
Conclusion
AHS has
shown that all of the causes of action against AHS in the Carlins’
cross-complaint have no merit, and that AHS is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on each of these causes of action.
Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS AHS’s motion for summary judgment on the Carlins’ cross-complaint.
Moving
Party is to give notice.