Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV01699, Date: 2024-05-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV01699 Hearing Date: May 13, 2024 Dept: 29
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant DoorDash Inc.
Tentative Ruling
The motion for summary judgment is granted.
Background
This
action arises out of an automobile collision on May 25, 2021, near the
intersection of Balboa Boulevard and Chatsworth Street in Los Angeles.
On January
14, 2022, Plaintiff Donna Samora (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this
action against DoorDash, Inc. (“DoorDash”), Ana Guadalupe Ponce Ceja, Maria Ponce,
and Does 1 through 25, asserting causes of action for negligence and negligence
per se. DoorDash filed its answer on
February 23, 2022. Ana Guadalupe Ponce
Ceja and Maria Ponce filed their answer on April 15, 2022.
On April
3, 2023, Plaintiff amended her complaint to name Harley Parker (“Parker”) as
Doe 1. Parker filed an answer to the
complaint on May 2, 2023.
On May 4,
2023, DoorDash filed this motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed her opposition
on March 8, 2024. DoorDash filed its reply, along with objections to evidence,
on May 8, 2024.
The motion
was initially set for hearing on March 22, 2024, and was continued to May 13,
2024.
Legal Standard
“The purpose of
the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each cause
of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary judgment
or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting
facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
A plaintiff or
cross-complainant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must
satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to show “that there is
no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the
cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has
met that burden, the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant to show
that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
The party opposing
a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply “rely upon
the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set forth the
specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable issue of
material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th
384, 389.)
Objections to Evidence
Evidence presented in support of, or
in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry
v. Bakewell Hawthorne LLC
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court must “consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers,
except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Defendant objects to the Declaration
of Marina Madrid, paragraph 4, in which the declarant states, “Defendant drive[r]
ANA GUADALUPE PONCE CEJA stated to me that she made a U-turn because she was
finishing a DoorDash.” Defendant objects
on the ground that this statement is hearsay and not within any exception.
The Court SUSTAINS this
objection. As offered against DoorDash,
the statement is hearsay and not within any exception. (See Dart Industries,
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 1059, 1077; Markley v. Beagle (1967)
66 Cal.2d 951, 958-960; Bowser v. Ford Motor Co.
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 611.)
(The Court is not being
asked to rule on, and does not rule on, whether the statement is admissible, in
whole or in part, if offered against Defendant Ana Guadalupe Ponce Ceja.)
Discussion
In her
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts negligence and negligence per se causes of action
against DoorDash, alleging that the accident was caused by Defendant Ana
Guadalupe Ponce Ceja (“Driver”), a DoorDash employee acting within the course and
scope of her employment with DoorDash.
The basic elements of a cause of action for
negligence are: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting
damages. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
Negligence per
se is not a separate cause of action. (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 516, 534; accord Jones v. Awad (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1210; Millard v. Biosources, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1353, fn.2; Quiroz
v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140¿Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285.) Rather, the
doctrine of negligence per se “creates an evidentiary presumption that affects
the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Turner, supra,
27 Cal.App.5th at p. 534.) It “codifies the rule that a presumption of
negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect
a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm
that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation. (Quiroz, supra, 140¿Cal.App.4th
at p. 1285.)
Accordingly,
the negligence and negligence per se causes of action in the complaint will be
treated as a single cause of action for purposes of this summary judgment
motion.
The law regarding respondeat superior
liability is well established in California.
A “principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his
agent in the transaction of the business of the agency, including wrongful acts
committed by such agent in and as part of the transaction of such
business.” (Civ. Code, § 2338.) “[A]n employer is vicariously liable for the
torts of its employees committed within the scope of employment.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial
Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296.)
“The respondeat superior doctrine makes an employer liable, irrespective
of fault, for an employee’s tortious conduct in the scope of employment.” (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1148, 1154.)
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that
“the employee’s tortious conduct was committed within the scope of
employment.” (Mary M. v. City of Los
Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 209; accord Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979)
25 Cal.3d 707, 721; Moreno v. Visser Ranch, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 568,
576.) “Ordinarily, the determination
whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment presents a
question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however, when the facts are
undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.” Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 299.)
Here, a number of facts are
not disputed.
The accident occurred on
May 25, 2021, at approximately 9:00 to 10:00 pm on Balboa Boulevard in Los
Angeles. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed
Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 1.) Plaintiff Donna
Samora was driving one vehicle, and Defendant Driver was driving the other
vehicle. (Ibid.)
DoorDash maintains an
online platform that allows individuals to take advantage of delivery
opportunities through the DoorDash App; DoorDash considers the drivers to be
independent contractors and refers to them as “Dashers.” (DSUMF, No. 2.) Door Dash maintains activity logs of all
Dashers. (DSUMF, No. 3.)
DoorDash’s activity logs
show that Driver did not log on to the DoorDash App at all on May 25,
2021. (DSUMF, No. 4.)
(DoorDash also cites Driver’s
responses to Requests for Admission propounded by DoorDash in this litigation,
but responses to requests for admission are admissible only against the party
making the admission. [Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2033.410.] Driver’s response is not an
admission that may be used against Plaintiff or any other party in the
litigation.)
This is a sufficient showing
by DoorDash to satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment of showing that
one or more of the elements of Plaintiff’s causes of action cannot be
established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Even assuming (without deciding) that the relationship
between Driver and DoorDash is properly classified as an employment
relationship, if Driver was not driving for DoorDash at the time of the
accident, the accident did not occur within the course and scope of Driver’s
employment with DoorDash. It follows,
then, as a matter of law, that DoorDash is not responsible for the tort
committed by Driver.
With this
showing by DoorDash, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show that there is a
triable issue on the question of whether Driver was acting within the course
and scope of her employment with DoorDash.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Plaintiff has not done
so. The only evidence that she offers on
this point is the hearsay statement of Driver, offered through the declaration
of Marina Madrid. As set forth above,
the Court has sustained the objection to this evidence.
(In her opposition, filed
on March 8, Plaintiff argues that the deposition of Harley Parker, who was in
the car with Driver at the time of the accident, will provide evidence that
Driver was driving for DoorDash at the time of the accident. [Opp. at p. 5.] The deposition was scheduled for April 10,
2024. Plaintiff has not, however
presented any supplemental filing or other evidence of what Parker stated at
deposition. Nor has Plaintiff asked for
a further continuance of the hearing.)
The
Court has considered all of the evidence submitted by the parties (except the
evidence as to which an objection was sustained) and all of the parties’
arguments. Based on consideration of the
evidence, the law, and the applicable factors, the Court finds that on this record, there is no
evidence that creates a triable issue on whether Driver was driving for
DoorDash at the time of the evidence. To
the contrary, the only evidence in the record is that Driver was not doing
so. Accordingly, the Court must grant
DoorDash’s motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party to
give notice.