Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV01966, Date: 2024-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV01966    Hearing Date: March 11, 2024    Dept: 29

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Wing Lai.

Tentative

The motion is granted in part (with leave to amend) and denied in part.

Background

On January 18, 2022, Plaintiff Tigran Galstyan (“Galstyan”) filed a complaint against Defendant Wing Lai (“Lai”), and Does 1 through 25, alleging nine causes of action for: (1) Negligence, (2) Trespass, (3) Private Nuisance, (4) Violation of Health and Safety Code section 13007, (5) Negligent Misrepresentation, (6) Intentional Misrepresentation, (7) Concealment, (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and (9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. According to the complaint, a large fire originated on Lai’s property and spread to Galstyan’s causing extensive damage, and then Lai made misrepresentations about the cause and origin of the fire, causing Galstyan to suffer further damages and emotion distress.

Lai filed her answer to Galstyan’s complaint on March 16, 2022.

In a separate case, Case No. 22STCV14996, Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”)

filed its complaint against Galstyan and Does 1 through 20 on May 5, 2022, asserting three

causes of action in subrogation for: (1) Premises Liability, (2) General Negligence, and (3) Trespass. In its complaint, Allstate alleges that it insured Lai’s property; that Galstyan’s actions or inactions caused the fire and resulting damage to Lai’s property; and that as a result Allstate suffered a loss.

Galstyan filed his answer to Allstate’s complaint on July 5, 2022.

The two cases were related on August 5, 2022, and consolidated for all purposes on May 19, 2023.

Trial is scheduled for April 30, 2024.

On February 21, 2024, Galstyan filed an amendment to his complaint naming Chi Man Wong as Doe 1.

On February 15, 2024, Lai filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff filed his opposition on February 27, 2024. Lai filed an untimely reply on March 6, 2024.

Legal Standard

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds. (b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) 

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. ”  (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.)  “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations).)  The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)   

Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court exercises its discretion to consider Lai’s late-filed reply.  The Court disregards altogether, however, the inadmissible evidence submitted with the reply (and cited in the reply) regarding the parties’ settlement discussions.

In this motion, Lai challenges the adequacy of the pleading of the fourth through ninth causes of action in the complaint.

Fourth Cause of Action – Violation of Health & Safety Code § 13007

“Any person who personally or through another wilfully, negligently, or in violation of law, sets fire to, allows fire to be set to, or allows a fire kindled or attended by him to escape to, the property of another, whether privately or publicly owned, is liable to the owner of such property for any damages to the property caused by the fire.” (Health & Safety Code, § 13007.)

The Court denies Lai’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this cause of action.  Galstyan has adequately pleaded a cause of action under this statute.  Of course, Galstyan cannot recover more than once for the same injury, but he is entitled to proceed under alternative theories of relief (common law negligence, common law trespass, and a statutory cause of action under section 13007) to obtain a recovery.

Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation, Negligent Misrepresentation, and Concealment

The Court grants Lai’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh causes of action.  In the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, Galstyan alleges that Lai made affirmative misrepresentations regarding the cause of the fire to both Galstyan and Allstate (Lai’s insurer).  In the Seventh Cause of Action, Galstyan alleges that Lai concealed material facts regarding the cause of the fire from both Galstyan and Allstate.  But Galstyan does not allege that he himself believed the false representations or was deceived by any concealment, and so, at least based on the allegations in the complaint, it is unclear how he could proceed with a misrepresentation or concealment claim; the elements of reliance, causation, and damage are missing.  Nor is it clear how or why Galstyan would have the ability to prosecute a claim against Lai for her alleged misrepresentations to, or her alleged concealment of facts from, her insurance carrier; perhaps Allstate might have such a claim, but not a stranger to the relationship between Lai and Allstate, such as Galstyan (unless, perhaps, Allstate assigned such a claim to Galstyan).

Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action – Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Court grants Lai’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action.  In each of these causes of action, as pleaded, Galstyan seeks to recover for distress caused not by the fire itself but by Lai’s false statements to, or concealment of information from, Allstate; this (Galstyan alleges) led Allstate to file a complaint against him, causing him to suffer distress.

In general, the distress associated with defending a lawsuit (even one without merit, as Galstyan alleges, an allegation that the Court accepts for purposes of ruling on this motion) cannot be recovered through a cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Making a false statement to one’s insurance company, or concealing facts from the insurer, is not the type of extreme or outrageous conduct needed to support a claim for intentional inflict of emotional distress, and the threatened harm to Galstyan’s financial interest is not the type of harm needed to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Leave to Amend

This is the first challenge to the pleading of the complaint, and it appears that there is at least some reasonable possibility that Galstyan might be able to address the deficiencies in the pleading.  According, the Court grants Galstyan leave to amend.  (See Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.)

Conclusion

The Court DENIES the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourth Cause of Action in Galstyan’s complaint.

The Court GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action in Galstyan’s complaint, with leave to amend.

The Court GRANTS Galstyan leave to amend within 14 days of notice.

Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.