Judge: Steven A. Ellis, Case: 22STCV05042, Date: 2025-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV05042 Hearing Date: April 3, 2025 Dept: 29
Carr v. Westfield LLC
22STCV05042
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Tentative
The Court has not been able to view the video
described as Exhibit C to the Declaration of Amir-Reza Zad.
If Defendant would like the Court to consider
Exhibit C in ruling on its motion, Defendant should be prepared to display the
video to the Court at the start of the hearing.
The Court will call this matter and hear from
counsel.
Background
On February
9, 2022, Susan Carr (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Westfield LLC for premises
liability and general negligence arising from an injury sustained on February
15, 2020.
On June
1, 2022, Sherman Oaks Fashion Associates (erroneously sued as Westfield LLC) (“Defendant”)
filed an answer.
On March
22, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 13,
2025. Defendant filed a reply, along with objections to some of Plaintiff’s
evidence, on March 28, 2025.
Legal Standard
“The purpose
of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their
allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), “requires the trial judge to grant
summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367,
381-382.)
As to each
cause of action as framed by the complaint, a defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ...
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
850-851.)
The party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not simply
“rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings” but must instead “set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (p)(1) & (p)(2). To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial
responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Objections to Evidence
Defendant
asserts nine objections to Plaintiff’s evidence.
Evidence
presented in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment
must be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d); Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-43.) The court must
“consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to
which objections have been made and sustained by the court.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c).)
Defendant’s
objections are overruled.
Discussion
This case arises out of injuries that Plaintiff alleges
that she sustained after she slipped and fell on February 15, 2020, in a
corridor or hallway in the Sherman Oaks Fashion Square mall. (Defendant’s
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [“DSUMF”], No. 1.)
The corridor connects the shopping areas with the men’s
and women’s restrooms. (DSUMF, No. 7; Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material
Facts [“PSAMF”], Nos. 20, 25.) Between the restrooms there is a wall, and at
the bottom or “foot” of the wall there is an electrical vault. (DSUMF, No. 7.)
The vault is covered by a dark metal plate set into the floor; the surrounding
floor tile is tan. (Ibid.)
The metal plate is a square shape, measuring
approximately three feet six inches by three feet six inches. (DSUMF, No. 12.) There
is a metal strip or edge or trim between the plate and the tile floor that is
approximately 2.5 inches wide. (Ibid.) The strip or edge has horizontal
score lines for traction. (Ibid.) The metal plate itself has a raised
metal pattern for additional traction. (Ibid.)
At the time of Plaintiff’s accident, there was a long bench
in the corridor located against the corridor wall. (Plaintiff’s Statement of
Additional Material Facts [“PSAMF”], No. 26.) The bench was placed partly on
the tile floor and partly on the metal plate. (Blozan Decl., Exh. D.) For a
person exiting the women’s restroom and walking down the corridor, the bench
was on the person’s right and was placed first on the tile floor and then on
the metal plate. (Ibid.) At the time of the accident, an adult male was
seated on the bench. (PSAMF, No. 26.)
Plaintiff walked between the man seated on the bench and
a woman walking towards her. (PSAMF, Nos. 27-28.) Plaintiff took a step and her
right foot landed in part on the tile floor and in part on the trim or metal
plate. (Carr Decl., ¶ 12; Carr Depo. [Blozan Decl., Exh. B], at 13:23-25.)
Plaintiff testified:
“I felt the right portion of the
front right sole of the boot on my right foot slipping downward at an awkward
angle on the downward sloping metal trim around a recessed metal plate in the
walkway. The heal of my right boot then came down on the awkward downward
slopping corner of where two sections of the metal trim came to together at a
right angle at the corner of the metal plate. The multiple uneven surfaces upon
which I was stepping caused my right ankle to buckle, which caused me to lose
my balance and to trip/slip and fall to the floor in a twisting motion, and to
sustain bodily injuries.”
(Carr Decl., ¶
12; see also Carr Depo., at 14:14-15:16.)
There was not
any substance on the tile floor or metal plate at the time of the accident.
(DSUMF, No. 3.)
Prior to the
fall, Plaintiff had not noticed the recessed metal plate. (Carr Decl., ¶¶ 13-14;
Carr Depo., at 14:4-13; PSAMF, No. 34.) Plaintiff testified that as she exited
the rest room, the bench and the adult male sitting on the bench partially obstructed
her view of the plate. (Carr Decl., ¶¶ 16-17.)
Prior to the day
of the accident, Plaintiff had not walked in this corridor. (PSAMF, No. 33.)
Defendant’s
expert John Brault testified that he inspected the scene of the accident on
June 16, 2023. (Brault Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3.) Mr. Brault measured the height
differential between the floor and the recessed metal place as 3/8 of an inch.
(Brault Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Brault measured the slip resistance of the metal plate
under dry conditions as 0.66; as this value exceeds 0.40, Mr. Brault states
that the plate “is considered slip resistant under foreseeable walking
conditions.” (Brault Decl., ¶ 5.)
On these facts, Plaintiff asserts causes of
action for negligence and premises liability against Defendant. The basic
elements of a cause of action for negligence and for premises liability are the
same: (1) the existence of a legal duty;
(2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) resulting damages. (Brown
v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)
Defendant now moves for summary judgment or, in
the alternative, for summary adjudication, on the following grounds: (1) the
condition of the floor was not dangerous or unreasonably unsafe (Mem. at p. 8) ;
(2) the height differential between the tile floor and the recessed metal plate
was trivial as a matter of law (Mem. at pp. 8-11; and (3) the allegedly
dangerous condition was open and obvious (Mem. at pp. 11-12.)
The Court
considers each argument in turn.
Dangerous
Condition
The general rule
governing duty is set forth in Civil Code section 1714: “Everyone is
responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter
has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or
herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) This establishes what the California
Supreme Court has described as the “default rule” that every person has a legal
duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of
others.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 214.)
Those who own,
possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in
managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
(Annocki¿v.
Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) If
a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise
ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their
[customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the
harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) Although
a business owner “is not an insurer of
the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise
reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart
Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.)
Defendant argues
that there was no dangerous condition at the scene of Plaintiff’s
accident. The concepts of “dangerous
condition” and “trivial defect” have been developed primarily in the context of
litigation against public entities, but these concepts can also be applied in
private litigation in appropriate cases.
A dangerous condition is one
that exposes others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Ortega,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205; CACI No. 1003; see also, e.g., Thimon v. City of Newark (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 745, 754.) The condition must create a “substantial risk” of
injury. (Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 749,
758; Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 130, fn.5.)
The fact of an accident does not establish or
support a presumption that the condition of the property was dangerous. (See Brown
v. Poway (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 826.) “[T]here are many accidents
which, as a matter of common knowledge, occur frequently enough without
anyone’s fault.” (Ibid.) A court may not presume that there was a
dangerous condition merely because the plaintiff was injured. (Sambrano v.
City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, 241 [describing such an
argument as “reason[ing] backwards”].)
The term
“trivial defect” generally means the opposite of a dangerous condition: a
condition that is of such a minor nature that it does not create a substantial
risk of injury. (See Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104; Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 11, 26; Gov’t Code, § 830.2)
“The existence of a
dangerous condition ordinarily is a question of fact, but the issue may be
resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.”
(Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist.¿(1984) 36 Cal.3d 799,
810; accord Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110; Nunez,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; Huckey,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1104-1105.)
The Court will
hear from counsel. What was the dangerous condition of the floor at the time of
Plaintiff’s accident? What evidence in the record would support a determination
by the trier of fact that the floor was dangerous – that there was a condition
that exposed Plaintiff and others to
an unreasonable risk of harm?
Trivial
Defect
One
of the concepts at the core of the trivial defect doctrine is the recognition
that it is impossible to maintain public or private walkways in perfect
condition. (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 109-110; Nunez,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 758; Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities,
Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 26.) In general, the law does not make
public or private landowners the “insurers” against injuries arising from
trivial defects. (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 109; Thimon,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) Rather, the trivial defect
doctrine shields the owner from liability for “minor, trivial, or
insignificant” defects. (Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104; Kasparian, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p.
27.)
This
is not to say that it is impossible for someone to trip, fall, and sustain
injuries as a result of a defect that is trivial. (See Nunez, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 759-760.) But the duty of care of a public entity (or a
private landowner) does not extend to protecting pedestrians or others from injuries
resulting from minor or trivial defects. (Id. at pp. 757, 759.)
“In
appropriate cases, the trial court may determine ... whether a given walkway
defect was trivial as a matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37
Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) “‘Where reasonable minds can reach
only one conclusion—that there was no substantial risk of injury—the issue is a
question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment.’” (Id. at
pp. 1104-1105 (quoting Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 922, 929).) “If, however, the court determines that sufficient
evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether
the defect presents a substantial risk of injury, the court may not conclude
that the defect is trivial as a matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37
Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.)
In
cases involving allegedly dangerous conditions on a sidewalk or other walkway,
courts often begin their analysis by considering the size of the defect. The
size of the height differential, rise, or other defect is in many cases the
“most important” factor. (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 111; see
also, e.g., Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105 [stating that size
of defect “may be one of the most relevant factors”].) As the Court of Appeal
has explained, however, “[i]n determining whether a given walkway defect is
trivial as a matter of law, the court should not rely solely
upon the size of the defect.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105
[emphasis in original].) “[A] tape measure alone cannot be used to determine
whether the defect was trivial.” (Caloroso, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p.
927.) Rather, a “court should consider other circumstances which might have
rendered the defect a dangerous condition at the time of the accident.” (Huckey,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.)
“These other circumstances
or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged edges in the
area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material obscured a
pedestrian’s view of the defect, the plaintiff’s knowledge of the area, whether
the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the time
of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents.” (Huckey,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) “In sum, ‘[a] court should decide
whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of the
circumstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more [or
less] dangerous than its size alone would suggest.’” (Ibid. [quoting Caloroso,
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 927]; accord Nunez, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 757.)
The Court will
hear from counsel. What evidence in the record would support a determination by
the trier of fact that the condition of the floor was anything more than a
trivial defect?
Open and
Obvious
As noted above,
when a dangerous condition exists, a property owner generally has a duty either
to make the condition reasonably safe or provide a warning to allow others to
avoid the harm. (Bridgman,
supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 446.) In some cases, and subject to
certain exceptions, however, a dangerous condition may be so obvious that the
condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner may have no further
duty to remedy or warn of the condition. (See Kinsman v. Unocal Corp.
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 673; Montes v. YMCA of Glendale (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142; Jacobs
v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447; Christoff
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126; Krongos
v. Pacific Gas Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.)
The
Court will hear from counsel. What evidence in the record would support a determination by the court
that, as a matter of law, any dangerous condition here was open and obvious?
Conclusion
The Court will hear from counsel.